Canal Ins. Co. v. Axley
| Decision Date | 09 December 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. l:08-cv-01029.,l:08-cv-01029. |
| Citation | 680 F.Supp.2d 923 |
| Parties | CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Jeffrey AXLEY, James Mark Bass, and Ryan's Trucking, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
Jonathan David Stewart, R. Dale Thomas, Rainey Kizer Reviere & Bell-Main St Jackson, TN, for Plaintiff.
Kyle E. Crowe, Law Offices of Kyle Crowe, Martin, TN, R. David Strickland Law Offices of R. David Strickland, Jackson, TN, Nicholas J. Owens, Jr., Owens Law Firm, Memphis, TN, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Canal Insurance Company's, Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry ("D.E") No. 57), to which Defendant Ryan's Trucking, Inc., has responded. (D.E. No. 61.) For the reasons set forth hereinafter, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion.1
Canal Insurance Company ("Plaintiff or "Canal"), is a Greenville, South Carolina corporation that issued a policy of automobile liability insurance (the "Policy") on June 15, 2001 to Ryan's Trucking, Inc. ("Ryan's Trucking"), headquartered in Lawton, Oklahoma. (D.E. No. 28, Amended Complaint, ¶¶1, 4, 7.) At all times relevant to Plaintiffs present motion, Defendant James Mark Bass ("Bass"), an Oklahoma resident, was a truck driver employed by Ryan's Trucking. (Id. at ¶¶3, 11, 12.) Defendant Jeffrey Axley ("Axley") is a resident of Weakley County, Tennessee, and is the plaintiff in a related tort action before the Court, out of which the present lawsuit arises.2 (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 810); See Axley v. Bass et al, No. l:07-cv1205. As the circumstances of the tort lawsuit are vital to the determination of this matter, the Court will provide a brief description of the allegations contained therein.
On October 24, 2006, Axley, who was an employee of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company ("Goodyear")3 in Union City, Tennessee, was participating in a "picket line" on Goodyear's property. (No. 1:07cv-1205, Axley v. Bass et al, D.E. No. 25, Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 4, 5, 8.) Bass, who was delivering a load to Goodyear in his capacity as a truck driver for Ryan's Trucking, "wrongfully" attempted to drive his vehicle through the picket line, past the picketers. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Axley does not allege, and none of the evidence suggests, that Bass's vehicle ever struck anyone, and no facts indicate that the vehicle itself in any way caused any damage or injury to the picketers. However, after a group of angry protestors surrounded Bass's truck, he exited the vehicle "with a wooden club and severely beat [Axley] with the same."4(Id.) As a result of the altercation, Axley sustained injuries for which he demands damages under a number of different legal theories. (Id.) Against Bass, Axley alleges common law and statutory negligence, reckless driving, and assault and battery. (Id. at ¶¶9-11, 13.) Against Ryan's Trucking, Axley asserts liability under theories of agency and vicarious liability, as well as negligent entrustment, hiring, supervision, and training. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 1416.)
Upon removal of Axley's lawsuit to this Court, Canal filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it was not obligated to indemnify or provide a defense for Ryan's Trucking or Bass. (D.E. No. 28, Amended Complaint, ¶ 13.) On, August 26, 2008, Canal obtained a default judgment against Bass in this matter, resulting in its contentions against him being deemed admitted. (D.E. No. 44, Order Granting Default Judgment.) The sole issue before the Court is whether the Policy obligates Plaintiff to indemnify and/or provide a defense for Ryan's Trucking based on the allegations in Axley's amended complaint in the previous pending tort action.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) provides that judgment... should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Canderm Pharmacol, Ltd. v. Elder Pharms., Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir.1988). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Ra-dio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). When the motion is supported by documentary proof, such as depositions and affidavits, the nonmoving party may not rest on the pleadings but, rather, must present some "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Abeita v. TransAmerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 250 (6th Cir.1998). It is insufficient for the nonmoving party "simply [to] show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. These facts must be more than a scintilla of evidence and must meet the standard of whether a reasonable juror could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the nonmoving party is entitled to a verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In this Circuit, "this requires the nonmoving party to 'put up or shut up' [on] the critical issues of [an] asserted cause[] of action." Lord v. Saratoga Capital, Inc., 920 F.Supp. 840, 847 (W.D.Tenn.1995) (citing Street v. J.C Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir.1989)). Finally, the "judge may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 379 (6th Cir.1994).
Issues of contract interpretation, such as the one currently before the Court, are especially appropriate for summary judgment because "the interpretation of a contract... is a matter of law for the Court to resolve." Whitehorse v. Johnson, 156 P.3d 41, 47 (Okla.2007) (footnote omitted).
In this case, the Court is called upon to interpret the meaning of a contract, which is a matter of state law. The contract at issue—the Policy—does not contain a choice-of-law provision. However, Canal and Ryan's Trucking agree that Oklahoma state law governs this dispute because the Policy was formed there. (D.E. No. 57, Motion for SJ, pp. 3-4; D.E. No. 61, Response to SJ Motion, pp. 8-9.) "In contract disputes, Tennessee follows the traditional rule of lex loci contractus, which provides that the construction of a contract is governed by the law of the state where the contract was made," absent contrary intent of the parties or a contravention of the strongly expressed public policy of the forum state. Fred Montesi's, Inc. v. Centimark Corp., 2006 WL 1174480, at *6 (citing Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indent. Co., 493 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tenn. 1973)). Thus, because the parties are in agreement and because Tennessee has no strongly expressly public policy to the contrary, the Court will apply Oklahoma law in evaluating the parties' contentions.
Canal advances two theories as to why the Policy does not obligate it to defend or indemnify Ryan's Trucking. First, the Plaintiff contends that the events precipitating Axley's injuries did not arise from the "ownership, maintenance, or use of the insured vehicle," as those terms are defined in the Policy, thus precluding Canal's duty to defend or indemnify either Defendant. (D.E. No. 57, Motion for SJ, pp. 1523.) Related, but slightly different, is Canal's second argument: that the events that gave rise to Axley's claims against Bass5 and Ryan's Trucking do not constitute an "occurrence," as that term is defined in the Policy. (Id. at pp. 5-15.) Conversely, Ryan's Trucking maintains that Canal is obligated to defend it because Axley's claims against it "give[] rise to the potential for liability." (D.E. No. 61, Response to SJ Motion, p. 9) (emphasis in original). After reviewing the parties' arguments, the Court finds that Plaintiffs first position—that the events did not arise from the "ownership, maintenance, or use of the insured vehicle"—is dispositive of this action.6
(D.E. No. 1, Policy, p. 3) (emphasis added). The Policy defines "bodily injury" as "bodily injury, sickness, or disease sustained by any person which occurs during the policy period, including death at any time resulting therefrom." (Id. at p. 4.) It defines "occurrence" as "an accident... which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." (Id. at p 5.)
However, the Policy is silent as to the determination of whether or when an incident "arises out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of an insured vehicle, which causes the Court to turn to Oklahoma law on contract interpretation. Oklahoma case law is sparse on the issue of whether a particular tortious event "arises out of the ownership, maintenance, or use" of an insured vehicle, but analyses from courts in various other jurisdictions prove instructive. In Kangas v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 64...
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