Canales-Robles v. Laney

Decision Date09 September 2021
Docket NumberA169555
Parties Hector Fernando CANALES-ROBLES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Garrett LANEY, Superintendent, Oregon State Correctional Institution, Defendant-Respondent.
CourtOregon Court of Appeals

Kenneth A. Kreuscher argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Jordan R. Silk, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Frederick M. Boss, Deputy Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and Kamins, Judge.

KAMINS, J.

Petitioner appeals from a judgment dismissing his post-conviction relief petition as time barred. ORS 138.510(3). Petitioner does not dispute that he filed his post-conviction petition outside of the statutory two-year time limit, but argues that his late filing should be excused under the statutory "escape clause" because he was deprived of all legal materials while housed in the custody of the Oregon Youth Authority. The trial court granted the state's motion for summary judgment because, assuming that the deprivation of legal materials could excuse a late filing, petitioner waited almost two years after he was transferred to an adult facility before he filed his post-conviction petition. Because there is a factual dispute as to whether petitioner reasonably could have asserted any available grounds for relief within the statute of limitations, we reverse.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In post-conviction proceedings, a movant is entitled to summary judgment if, "viewing the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the opposing party," "the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, declarations and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." McDonnell v. Premo , 309 Or. App. 173, 183, 483 P.3d 640 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). We state the facts in accordance with that standard.

II. BACKGROUND

When petitioner was 17 years old, he committed several crimes, including attempted murder, robbery, and assault. Petitioner had not completed high school and had limited proficiency in English, requiring the assistance of an interpreter during his criminal trial. After the jury convicted him, petitioner was placed in the custody of the Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) and housed at MacLaren Youth Correctional Facility.

With the assistance of counsel, petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his conviction. His appellate attorney sent a letter to MacLaren informing petitioner that he had lost his appeal and that the attorney-client representation was now terminated. The letter further informed petitioner that he had three steps available to him: (1) appeal his conviction to the United States Supreme Court; (2) file a petition for post-conviction relief in state court; (3) file a federal habeas corpus petition. Petitioner spoke to his appellate attorney on the telephone and asked for a packet of information on what he understood to be the first step: appealing to the United States Supreme Court. The attorney advised that he did not have such a packet but would instead provide petitioner with information on how to file a petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's attorney then sent petitioner a blank template of a post-conviction relief petition that provided, in its entirety:

"Petitioner believes that the conviction and imprisonment from the proceedings described above was, and is, illegal. Petitioner was substantially denied his rights in violation of ORS 138.530 as follows."

This text was followed by sections labeled "First Claim for Relief" and "Second Claim for Relief" containing blank lines for petitioner to fill in his claims.

Petitioner asked to use the law library and was informed that "MacLaren does not have a law library." At that time, not only did MacLaren not have a law library, but it also did not have a directory of attorneys, any statutes (including ORS chapter 138, governing post-conviction relief), or any case law (including cases relating to challenges to criminal convictions). About a year and one-half after petitioner's conviction became final, the Oregon Youth Authority adopted a "legal assistance policy" that required offenders to have access to ORS chapter 138, which concerns direct criminal appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief, and a directory of attorneys, although it did not require that a facility provide access to any other statutes, case law, or the United States Constitution. Despite this OYA policy shift, petitioner did not see ORS chapter 138 or the attorney directory at MacLaren, and the record does not indicate that the youth there were made aware of the change in policy.

In August 2014, over four years after his conviction became final, petitioner was transferred to the custody of the Oregon Department of Corrections, where he had access to legal materials. Approximately 23 months later, in July 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief. In response, the superintendent moved for summary judgment, arguing that the petition was time barred because it was filed over six years after petitioner's conviction became final, well beyond the two-year limit provided in ORS 138.510(3). Petitioner opposed the motion, arguing that the lack of legal materials at MacLaren meant that his claims "could not reasonably have been raised" during that time period, thus qualifying him for a statutory exception to the statute of limitations. See ORS 138.510(3). The trial court granted the superintendent's motion for summary judgement:

"[L]ooking at the facts most favorable to the petitioner is I do have someone that at the time of conviction was 17, it would appear that had limited English skills.
"* * * * *
"I would also take it that at MacLaren that there were legal materials—or a lack of legal materials ***[.]
"* * * * *
"My concern about this, though, is if part of the reasonableness equation involves the fact that for a significant period at the beginning of the incarceration *** we have is him being [at an adult prison] for 23 months without filing something.
"And despite the fact that I am concerned about his age and English skills and access to materials while at MacLaren, it seems to me that waiting 23 months after you get to [prison] to file a petition does not come within the term of reasonableness.
"Now, I'm not saying that had he filed this on August 2nd, 2014, that would be too late. But certainly there is a period there where it's no longer reasonable to wait and file the petition or not initiate the petition.
"So given the fact that there's 23 months after he's [transferred] from MacLaren and he had been advised by [his appellate attorney] that he had this post-conviction process available to him well before that date, I can't find that it would be reasonable to wait till July 1st, 2016, in order to file the petition."

On appeal, petitioner does not dispute that he filed his petition more than two years after the date his criminal conviction became final. He contends, however, that until he was transferred to the Oregon Department of Corrections, he did not have access to any legal materials and therefore could not reasonably have raised the claims in his petition. Because he filed the petition within two years of the transfer, petitioner argues the filing was timely under the statutory "escape clause." The state responds that petitioner was on notice of any available grounds for relief because he was present at his criminal trial and his appellate attorney informed him of the possibility of filing for post-conviction relief. The state further contends that, even if the petitioner could not have raised his claims while he was housed at MacLaren, he could have raised them sooner than nearly two years after his transfer.

III. ANALYSIS

To resolve this dispute, we must first determine whether a complete lack of access to legal materials renders post-conviction grounds for relief unavailable for purposes of the statutory escape clause. If we conclude that the petition qualifies for the escape clause, we must then determine whether the petition was untimely filed as a matter of law on the record before us.

A. Triggering the Escape Clause

ORS 138.510(3) provides:

"A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be filed within two years of the [date that the conviction became final], unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition."

The second part of the sentence is known as the "escape clause," allowing petitioners to escape the consequences of an untimely filing if the claims for relief could not reasonably have been raised within the statute of limitations.

Generally, the escape clause allows for the filing of an untimely petition in two circumstances: (1) "the applicable law is established within the two-year limitation period, and the question is whether the petitioner reasonably could have asserted that available legal ground for relief" or (2) "a new constitutional rule is announced after the two-year limitation period expired, and the question is whether that ‘new rule’ reasonably could have been raised within the limitations period." Chavez v. State , 364 Or. 654, 658, 438 P.3d 381 (2019). In either case, "the availability of information forming the grounds for post-conviction relief is the statute's focus." Fisher v. Belleque , 237 Or. App. 405, 409, 240 P.3d 745 (2010), rev. den. , 349 Or. 601, 248 P.3d 419 (2011) (emphasis added). The escape clause "is meant to be construed narrowly" and is limited to only those claims based on information—either facts or law—that was not reasonably available. Bartz v. State of Oregon , 314 Or. 353, 359, 839 P.2d 217 (1992) ; but see Gutale v. State of Oregon , 364 Or. 502, 514, 435 P.3d 728 (2019) (observing...

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