Canales-Robles v. Laney
Decision Date | 09 September 2021 |
Docket Number | A169555 |
Parties | Hector Fernando CANALES-ROBLES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Garrett LANEY, Superintendent, Oregon State Correctional Institution, Defendant-Respondent. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Kenneth A. Kreuscher argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Jordan R. Silk, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Frederick M. Boss, Deputy Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and Kamins, Judge.
Petitioner appeals from a judgment dismissing his post-conviction relief petition as time barred. ORS 138.510(3). Petitioner does not dispute that he filed his post-conviction petition outside of the statutory two-year time limit, but argues that his late filing should be excused under the statutory "escape clause" because he was deprived of all legal materials while housed in the custody of the Oregon Youth Authority. The trial court granted the state's motion for summary judgment because, assuming that the deprivation of legal materials could excuse a late filing, petitioner waited almost two years after he was transferred to an adult facility before he filed his post-conviction petition. Because there is a factual dispute as to whether petitioner reasonably could have asserted any available grounds for relief within the statute of limitations, we reverse.
In post-conviction proceedings, a movant is entitled to summary judgment if, "viewing the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the opposing party," "the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, declarations and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." McDonnell v. Premo , 309 Or. App. 173, 183, 483 P.3d 640 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). We state the facts in accordance with that standard.
When petitioner was 17 years old, he committed several crimes, including attempted murder, robbery, and assault. Petitioner had not completed high school and had limited proficiency in English, requiring the assistance of an interpreter during his criminal trial. After the jury convicted him, petitioner was placed in the custody of the Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) and housed at MacLaren Youth Correctional Facility.
With the assistance of counsel, petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his conviction. His appellate attorney sent a letter to MacLaren informing petitioner that he had lost his appeal and that the attorney-client representation was now terminated. The letter further informed petitioner that he had three steps available to him: (1) appeal his conviction to the United States Supreme Court; (2) file a petition for post-conviction relief in state court; (3) file a federal habeas corpus petition. Petitioner spoke to his appellate attorney on the telephone and asked for a packet of information on what he understood to be the first step: appealing to the United States Supreme Court. The attorney advised that he did not have such a packet but would instead provide petitioner with information on how to file a petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's attorney then sent petitioner a blank template of a post-conviction relief petition that provided, in its entirety:
This text was followed by sections labeled "First Claim for Relief" and "Second Claim for Relief" containing blank lines for petitioner to fill in his claims.
Petitioner asked to use the law library and was informed that "MacLaren does not have a law library." At that time, not only did MacLaren not have a law library, but it also did not have a directory of attorneys, any statutes (including ORS chapter 138, governing post-conviction relief), or any case law (including cases relating to challenges to criminal convictions). About a year and one-half after petitioner's conviction became final, the Oregon Youth Authority adopted a "legal assistance policy" that required offenders to have access to ORS chapter 138, which concerns direct criminal appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief, and a directory of attorneys, although it did not require that a facility provide access to any other statutes, case law, or the United States Constitution. Despite this OYA policy shift, petitioner did not see ORS chapter 138 or the attorney directory at MacLaren, and the record does not indicate that the youth there were made aware of the change in policy.
In August 2014, over four years after his conviction became final, petitioner was transferred to the custody of the Oregon Department of Corrections, where he had access to legal materials. Approximately 23 months later, in July 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief. In response, the superintendent moved for summary judgment, arguing that the petition was time barred because it was filed over six years after petitioner's conviction became final, well beyond the two-year limit provided in ORS 138.510(3). Petitioner opposed the motion, arguing that the lack of legal materials at MacLaren meant that his claims "could not reasonably have been raised" during that time period, thus qualifying him for a statutory exception to the statute of limitations. See ORS 138.510(3). The trial court granted the superintendent's motion for summary judgement:
On appeal, petitioner does not dispute that he filed his petition more than two years after the date his criminal conviction became final. He contends, however, that until he was transferred to the Oregon Department of Corrections, he did not have access to any legal materials and therefore could not reasonably have raised the claims in his petition. Because he filed the petition within two years of the transfer, petitioner argues the filing was timely under the statutory "escape clause." The state responds that petitioner was on notice of any available grounds for relief because he was present at his criminal trial and his appellate attorney informed him of the possibility of filing for post-conviction relief. The state further contends that, even if the petitioner could not have raised his claims while he was housed at MacLaren, he could have raised them sooner than nearly two years after his transfer.
To resolve this dispute, we must first determine whether a complete lack of access to legal materials renders post-conviction grounds for relief unavailable for purposes of the statutory escape clause. If we conclude that the petition qualifies for the escape clause, we must then determine whether the petition was untimely filed as a matter of law on the record before us.
ORS 138.510(3) provides:
"A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be filed within two years of the [date that the conviction became final], unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition."
The second part of the sentence is known as the "escape clause," allowing petitioners to escape the consequences of an untimely filing if the claims for relief could not reasonably have been raised within the statute of limitations.
Generally, the escape clause allows for the filing of an untimely petition in two circumstances: (1) "the applicable law is established within the two-year limitation period, and the question is whether the petitioner reasonably could have asserted that available legal ground for relief" or (2) "a new constitutional rule is announced after the two-year limitation period expired, and the question is whether that ‘new rule’ reasonably could have been raised within the limitations period." Chavez v. State , 364 Or. 654, 658, 438 P.3d 381 (2019). In either case, "the availability of information forming the grounds for post-conviction relief is the statute's focus." Fisher v. Belleque , 237 Or. App. 405, 409, 240 P.3d 745 (2010), rev. den. , 349 Or. 601, 248 P.3d 419 (2011) (emphasis added). The escape clause "is meant to be construed narrowly" and is limited to only those claims based on information—either facts or law—that was not reasonably available. Bartz v. State of Oregon , 314 Or. 353, 359, 839 P.2d 217 (1992) ; but see Gutale v. State of Oregon , 364 Or. 502, 514, 435 P.3d 728 (2019) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Ingle v. Matteucci
...... of an untimely filing if the claims for relief could not reasonably have been raised" within the two-year limitation period, Canales-Robles v. Laney , 314 Or. App. 413, 418, ––– P.3d –––– (2021), and its purpose is, at bottom, to ensure that post-conviction petitioners are ......
-
Ingle v. Matteucci, A170009
...filing if the claims for relief could not reasonably have been raised" within the two-year limitation period, Canales-Robles v. Laney, 314 Or.App. 413, 418, P.3d(2021), and its purpose is, at bottom, to ensure that post-conviction petitioners are not unfairly denied access to justice. In th......
-
Canales-Robles v. Laney
...314 Or.App. 413 HECTOR FERNANDO CANALES-ROBLES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Garrett LANEY, Superintendent, Oregon State Correctional Institution, Defendant-Respondent. A169555Court of Appeals of OregonSeptember 9, Argued and submitted February 17, 2021. Marion County Circuit Court 16CV21742; L......
-
Giltner v. Saif Corp. (In re Giltner)
...... which indicates that they state exceptions to the. requirement. ORS 656.230(1); see Canales-Robles v. Laney, 314 Or.App. 413, 422, 498 P.3d 343 (2021). ("By its use of the word 'unless,' the statute. creates an exception to the requirement ......