Canales v. Laughlin
Decision Date | 20 October 1948 |
Docket Number | No. A-1768.,A-1768. |
Citation | 214 S.W.2d 451 |
Parties | CANALES et al. v. LAUGHLIN et al. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Perkins & Floyd and Carmel F. Davis, all of Alice, for petitioners.
Robert Lee Bobbitt, of San Antonio, and Frank B. Lloyd, Dist. Atty., and Homer E. Dean, Co. Atty., both of Alice, for respondents.
Gus Canales, individually and as Commissioner of Precinct Four of Jim Wells County, and Albert D. Gartner and eight other tax-paying citizens of that county brought this suit against the County Judge, the remaining members of the Commissioners Court and certain other county officials to enjoin the expenditure of county funds pursuant to a resolution adopted by the Commissioners Court creating the office of County Road Unit Administrative Officer and employing respondent Bryan Patterson to fill such office. In general, the resolution was attacked as being beyond the legal authority of the Commissioners Court. The District Court sustained special exceptions to the plaintiffs' petition, holding in effect that the Commissioners Court had acted within its legal powers, and entered a judgment of dismissal. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 213 S.W.2d 167.
The resolution of the Commissioners Court which is attacked by this suit reads as follows:
In determining the validity of the action of the Commissioners Court, we must consider the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions granting and delimiting its powers. Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution provides that the Commissioners Court "shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed." Article XI, Section 2, provides that the construction of bridges and the laying out, construction and repairing of county roads shall be provided for by general laws.
The Constitution does not confer on the commissioners courts "general authority over the county business" and such courts can exercise only such powers as the Constitution itself or the statutes have "specifically conferred upon them". See Mills County v. Lampasas County, 90 Tex. 603, 606, 40 S.W. 403, 404; Anderson v. Wood, 137 Tex. 201, 203, 152 S.W.2d 1084, 1085. While the commissioners courts have a broad discretion in exercising powers expressly conferred on them, nevertheless the legal basis for any action by any such court must be ultimately found in the Constitution or the statutes.
There are no constitutional provisions relevant to this case except those we have referred to above. We must therefore examine the statutes to ascertain whether expressly or by necessary implication the Commissioners Court was authorized to do what it did in this case.
Article 2351, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, provides that each commissioners court shall:
Article 6703, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, provides in part: "The commissioners court shall order the laying out and opening of public roads when necessary, and discontinue or alter any road whenever it shall be deemed expedient."
Article 6713, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, provides in part that: "Except when road commissioners are employed, the county commissioners shall be supervisors of public roads in their respective counties, and each commissioner shall supervise the public roads within his commissioners precinct once each month."
Article 6736, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, reads as follows: "All moneys appropriated by law, or by order of the commissioners court, for working public roads or building bridges, shall be expended under the order of the commissioners court, except when otherwise herein provided, and said court shall from time to time make the necessary orders for utilizing such money and for utilizing convict labor for such purposes."
General authority to employ agents is conferred on the commissioners courts by the provisions of Article 1580, which reads as follows: ...
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Norris v. Housing Authority of City of Galveston
...only upon express authorization of the Board, i.e., by vote of that body as reflected in the minutes. See Canales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169, 214 S.W.2d 451, 453, 455 (1948) (noting that legislatively created entities only have those powers as the Constitution itself or the statutes have spe......
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Upton County, Tex. v. Brown
...together with such implied powers as are necessary to exercise the powers expressly conferred. Id., citing Canales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169, 214 S.W.2d 451 (1948); Clark v. Finley, 93 Tex. 171, 54 S.W. 343 (1899). In that connection, the Legislature has conferred upon a county commissioner......
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Judge Carlos Cascos
...ultimately in the constitution or statutes.” Guynes v. Galveston County, 861 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex.1993) (citing Canales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169, 214 S.W.2d 451, 453 (1948); Renfro v. Shropshire, 566 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e)). However, the Guynes court......
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Guynes v. Galveston County
...county business, the legal basis for any action taken must be grounded ultimately in the constitution or statutes. Canales v. Laughlin, 214 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex.1948); Renfro v. Shropshire, 566 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Civ.App.--Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). As the administrative head of c......