De Canas v. Bica

• Decision Date: 26 July 1974
• Citation: 115 Cal.Rptr. 444,40 Cal.App.3d 976
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2102, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,243, 76 Lab.Cas. P 53,598 Leonor Alberti De CANAS and Miguel Canas, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Anthony G. BICA et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 42739.

Page 444

115 Cal.Rptr. 444

40 Cal.App.3d 976, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2102,

10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,243, 76 Lab.Cas. P 53,598

Leonor Alberti De CANAS and Miguel Canas, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Anthony G. BICA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 42739.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

July 26, 1974.

Hearing Denied Oct. 24, 1974.

California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., William D. Farber, Santa Maria, Robert B. Johnstone, El Centro, Cynthia A. Mertens, Michael L. Stern, Migrant Legal Action Program, Inc., Burton D. Fretz, Santa Maria, Howard Scher, Robert S. Catz, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Robert L. Trapp, Jr., Santa Maria, William S. Marrs, Richmond, for defendants and respondents.

COMPTON, Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered upon the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend their complaint for damages and injunctive relief.

The complaint in essence alleges that plaintiffs are farm workers who have been discharged from employment and have not been rehired because defendants, farm labor contractors, contend that they have a sufficient labor supply. According to the allegations of the complaint that labor supply consists of aliens who are illegally within this country and defendants knowingly hire such illegal aliens in the stead of qualified lawful residents of the United States.

Plaintiffs' attempt to obtain redress is bottomed on Labor Code section 2805, which provides criminal penalties for persons who 'knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.' According to plaintiffs a violation of this statute constitutes an act of unfair competition which may be enjoined pursuant to Civil Code section 3369. ¹ The claim for damages is premised on tortious interference with plaintiffs' right to pursue a livelihood.

The trial court's ruling on the demurrer was squarely based on its holding that Labor Code section 2805 is unconstitutional. Both sides agree that the constitutionality of that section is controlling of the issues presented.

Plaintiffs' claim to equitable relief was treated and disposed of in Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 9 Cal.App.3d 588, 88 Cal.Rptr. 443, where the Court of Appeal, after a lengthy discourse on the conflicting policy considerations, refused to enjoin the hiring of illegal aliens and concluded that the problem was one that required the attention of the Federal government. Of course, Diaz was decided in 1970, prior to the enactment of Labor Code section 2805. The decision there rested on the general balancing of equitable considerations.

The question presented here is whether the result of Diaz is now to be rejected because the state Legislature has specifically legislated on the subject. The answer to that question in turn rests upon whether the State of California, within the framework of our system of Federalism, can properly legislate on a subject which admittedly is one of primary Federal concern. (Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581.) We think that California cannot so legislate.

Labor Code section 1850 which purported to prohibit the hiring of aliens on public works in California, was struck down by the California Supreme Court in Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California, 71 Cal.2d 566, 79 Cal.Rptr. 77, 456 P.2d 645, as being an interference with the regulatory scheme enacted by Congress to control immigration. True, section 1850 addressed itself to all aliens whether legally or illegally within the nation's borders, while section 2805 deals only with illegal aliens. Such distinction, however, is not such as to detract from the force of Purdy & fitzpatrick's strong language to the effect that in the area of immigration and naturalization, congressional power is exclusive.

The Federal Congress has the specific delegated power to regulatle foreign commerce, make treaties and establish rules for naturalization and it has as an incident of national sovereignty the implied power to control the conditions for admission of foreign nationals into the country. (Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 12 S.Ct. 336, 35 L.Ed. 1146.) No area of governmental activity is more uniquely suited to Federal regulation than the control of immigration.

Pursuant to its authority, the Congress of the United States has enacted a comprehensive scheme for controlling immigration and naturalization which includes regulation of employment of aliens. (8 U.S.C., § 1101 et seq.) At this writing, ² however, the Congress has not imposed upon private employers the burden of determining, in terms of the immigration laws, the status of prospective employees.

Has Congress by its inaction in this latter regard intended that such augmentation of its regulations be open to adoption by the several states? We are of the opinion that the answer is plainly 'No.' To the contrary, it would appear that until now Congress has specifically and intentionally declined to add sanctions on employers to its control mechanism.

The controlling principles are set forth in United States Supreme Court decisions involving labor management disputes in which the National Labor Relations Board had declined to assert jurisdiction but had also not ceded jurisdiction to the...