Candler General Hosp., Inc. v. McNorrill, 73220

• Decision Date: 11 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 73220,73220
• Citation: 182 Ga.App. 107,354 S.E.2d 872
• Parties: CANDLER GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC. v. McNORRILL.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 872

354 S.E.2d 872

182 Ga.App. 107

CANDLER GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC. v. McNORRILL.

No. 73220.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 11, 1987.

Frank W. Seiler, Wiley A. Wasden III, Savannah, for appellant.

John W. Jones, Sage Brown, Noble L. Boykin, Jr., Savannah, for appellee.

CARLEY, Judge.

Appellee-plaintiff filed the instant action to recover for a physical injury he allegedly sustained while a patient in appellant-defendant's emergency room. With regard to appellee's injury, the allegations of his complaint were as follows: A "hospital orderly" in the employ of appellant "attempted to remove [appellee] from a stretcher. In so attempting to remove [appellee] from the stretcher, the said orderly could not sustain the weight of [appellee] and 'dropped' [appellee], causing injury to [appellee's] left knee." Based upon these allegations appellee advanced two legal theories in his complaint as authorizing a recovery against appellant. One theory of recovery was appellant's vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of its employee "in not procuring additional assistance or proper equipment for the removal of [appellee] from the stretcher...." The other theory of recovery was appellant's own direct negligence with regard to the alleged inadequacy of the equipment, facilities and personnel that it provided in its emergency room.

Appellant's answer denied the material allegations of appellee's complaint and raised numerous defenses. After the parties had engaged in discovery, appellant moved for summary judgment. Appellant supported its motion with the affidavit of its employee who had allegedly "dropped" appellee. That affidavit established that the employee was in fact a registered nurse and not an orderly as appellant had alleged. In his affidavit, the nurse gave the following version of the events that had occurred in the emergency room: He had received instructions from appellee's physician "to place a knee immobilizer on [appellee's] right knee and discharge [appellee] from the emergency department." In carrying out these instructions, he had first assisted appellee from a wheelchair to a "casting table" and, at that point, appellee had been "able to stand with all of his weight on his left leg, turn, and sit on the casting table." When appellee then complained that he had also hurt his left knee prior to coming to the emergency room, the nurse secured further instructions from the physician to place an ace bandage on appellee's left knee. After performing these nursing duties but "[b]efore helping [appellee] from the casting table back into the wheelchair, [the nurse] asked [appellee] if he could again stand with all of his weight on his left leg. [Appellee] stated that he could. [The nurse] then stood behind [appellee] and helped him to his feet. At that point, contrary to [appellee's] representation, he was unable to support himself and threw the whole weight of his body on [the nurse]." The nurse "was not able to fully support [appellee] so [he] slowly brought [appellee] to a sitting position on the floor." The nurse concluded his affidavit by stating that "[a]t all times material hereto in [his] treatment of [appellee], [he] exercised that degree of ordinary care that is in general use under the same, or similar, circumstances in hospitals in the area."

In opposition to appellant's motion, appellee filed his own affidavit. Appellee's version of the events in the emergency room differed significantly from the nurse's. According to appellee's affidavit, his injury occurred in the following manner: The nurse had "never asked [appellee] if [he] could support [his own] weight," and, when the nurse had first attempted to move him to the wheelchair, appellee had questioned whether the nurse "was physically capable of supporting [his 292 pound] weight and [he] specifically suggested that [the nurse] obtain additional assistance in so removing [him] from the stretcher." The nurse had responded by giving appellee assurances of being physically capable of supporting appellee's weight and he then proceeded to move appellee. However, "[u]pon so doing the nurse failed to support [appellee's] weight and dropped [him] causing [him] to strike [his] left knee forcefully on the floor and base of the stretcher."

The trial court conducted a hearing on appellant's motion for summary judgment. In its order, the trial court stated that it was appellant's "contention that summary judgment [was] proper on the basis of [the] expert testimony [in the nurse's affidavit] since this is a medical malpractice case in which [appellee] is required to submit expert testimony in order to recover." Although the trial court ruled that the instant case was a medical malpractice action, it also concluded that the "pronounced results" exception was applicable and therefore no expert medical testimony on behalf of appellee was required. See generally Killingsworth v. Poon, 167 Ga.App. 653, 307 S.E.2d 123 (1983). Finding that the conflicting versions of the events as recounted in the nurse's and appellee's affidavits created a genuine issue of material fact, the trial court denied appellant's motion for summary judgment but certified its order for immediate review. Appellant's application to this court for an interlocutory appeal was granted and the instant appeal results.

1. With regard to appellant's direct liability for appellee's injury, the complaint, as noted previously, alleged that appellant was itself negligent in furnishing inadequate equipment, facilities and personnel for patients in its emergency room. In determining whether a hospital itself has been negligent in connection with the facilities and services that it furnishes, the appropriate standard by which to measure those facilities and services is the so-called "locality rule." " 'A hospital owes to its patients only the duty of exercising ordinary care to furnish equipment and facilities reasonably suited to the uses intended and such as are in general use under the same, or similar, circumstances in hospitals in the area.' ... The facilities of a small county hospital cannot be measured against a larger, better equipped urban hospital. While a small county hospital may certainly be considered negligent in its handling of a patient, the care given a patient in such a hospital may only be measured against what can be determined as reasonable care under the same or similar circumstances." (Emphasis in original.) Smith v. Hosp. Auth. of Terrell County, 161 Ga.App. 657, 658-659, 288 S.E.2d 715 (1982). The affidavit of appellant's nurse does not purport to address the question of whether the facilities and services that were provided in appellant's emergency room were comparable to those furnished by such other hospitals as function under the same or similar circumstances as does appellant. Compare Smith v. Hosp. Auth. of Terrell County, supra at 659, 288 S.E.2d 715, noting that "the evidence in the case included testimony from experts familiar with various small county hospitals in other counties similar to Terrell County." Instead, the nurse's affidavit deals exclusively with his own conduct. As such, the affidavit relates only to the issue of appellant's asserted vicarious liability for the conduct of its nurse. There being no evidence adduced which was relevant to the issue of appellant's own direct liability for appellee's injury, the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment as to that theory of recovery. See generally Wade v. John D. Archbold etc. Hosp., 252 Ga. 118, 311 S.E.2d 836 (1984); Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Ross, 176 Ga.App. 221, 223(1), 335 S.E.2d 633 (1985); Candler Gen. Hosp. v. Joiner, 180 Ga.App. 455, 349 S.E.2d 756 (1986).

2. Were appelle...