Candler v. Arya

• Decision Date: 28 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2:19-CV-0867-WBS-DMC,2:19-CV-0867-WBS-DMC
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: KEITH W. CANDLER, Plaintiff, v. ARYA, et al., Defendant.

KEITH W. CANDLER, Plaintiff, v. ARYA, et al., Defendant.

No. 2:19-CV-0867-WBS-DMC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

February 28, 2020

FINDINGS AND RECCOMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the Court are: (1) defendant C. Kelso's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 4); and (2) defendants A. Arya and B. Spelman' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8).

I. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff initiated this action in the Sacramento County Superior Court and defendant Kelso removed the action pursuant to 28 US.C. § 1442(a)(1), (3). See ECF No. 1 (notice of removal). Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) A. Arya; (2) B. Spelman; and (3) C. Kelso. See ECF No. 1-1 (plaintiff's state court complaint attached as Exhibit A to defendant Kelso's notice of removal).

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/ / / On March 4, 2016, plaintiff was involved in a physical altercation with another prisoner at the California State Prison in Sacramento. See ECF No. 1-1, pg. 7. The responding officers broke up the fight with blast grenades and pepper spray. Id. After this, plaintiff was placed in a holding cell, where he noticed that a bone in his thumb had broken and was sticking out of his skin. Id. at 8. On March 7, 2016, plaintiff was examined by defendant Spelman. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Spelman was negligent in his medical treatment by failing to provide adequate pain medication and failing to ensure that plaintiff received prompt X-ray scans. Id. On April 8, 2016, X-rays were taken of plaintiff's hand and revealed that he had in fact suffered a serious injury. Id. at 9.

Ten days later, plaintiff was seen by his primary care provider, defendant Arya. Id. Arya ordered a physical examination and a hand-brace for plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Arya was negligent in refusing to provide pain medication and that the hand-brace was an inadequate remedy to help plaintiff deal with the pain. Id. After this, plaintiff's condition continued to deteriorate until he was eventually scheduled for surgery on July 7, 2016, during which time plaintiff continued to suffer from chronic pain due to the dislocation of his thumb bone. Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff claims to have suffered physical, emotional, and mental distress as a result of the inadequate medical treatment of Arya and Spelman. Id. at 11.

Additionally, plaintiff claims that defendant Kelso is liable for his injuries due to his status as the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) Receiver appointed in Plata, et al. v. Schwarzenegger, N. Dist. Cal. case no. C01-1391-TEH, the person responsible for ensuring that prisoners in California receive adequate medical care. Id.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Defendant Kelso's Appointment as CDCR Receiver

Defendant Kelso summarizes his appointment as receiver as follows:

As a result of unconstitutional conditions in the California prison medical health care system, on February 14, 2006, the court in Plata appointed Robert Sillen as Receiver and charged him with "restructuring day-to-day operations [in the prison medical care system] and developing, implementing, and validating a new, sustainable system that providesconstitutionally adequate medical care to all class members as soon as practicable." RJN, Exhibit 1, ¶ II.A. The Plata court conferred upon the Receiver the responsibility "to control, oversee, supervise, and direct all administrative, personnel, financial, accounting, contractual, legal, and other operational functions of the medical delivery component of the CDCR." Id. Pursuant to the OAR [Order Appointing Receiver], the Receiver holds "all powers vested by law in the Secretary of the CDCR as they relate to the administration, control, management, operation, and financing of the California prison medical health care system. The Secretary's exercise of the above powers is suspended for the duration of the Receivership. . . ." Id., ¶ II.A. Unless state law is waived by Judge Henderson, the Receiver remains subject to, and is required to follow, state law in the exercise of his duties. Id., ¶ II.D. CDCR must indemnify the Receiver to the same extent that it must indemnify the Secretary of CDCR. Id., ¶ II.F. Significantly, in the exercise of his duties, "[t]he Receiver and his staff shall have the status of officers and agents of this Court, and as such shall be vested with the same immunities as vest with this Court." Id., ¶ II.F (emphasis added). On January 23, 2008, Kelso was appointed as the Receiver, subject to the rights and obligations of the OAR, and he has acted in that capacity since that time. RJN, Exhibit 2.

ECF No. 4-1, pgs. 10-11.

B. Current Action and Pending Motions

On February 4, 2019, plaintiff filed a civil action against the named defendants in the Sacramento County Superior Court. See ECF No. 1-1. On May 14, 2019, this action was removed to the United States District Court of the Eastern District of California. See ECF No. 1. On May 24, 2019, defendant C. Kelso filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6). See ECF No. 4. On June 13, 2019, defendants A. Arya and B. Spelman filed a joint FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative to revoke plaintiff's in forma pauperis (IFP) status. See ECF No. 8.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all allegations of material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9^th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555-56. The complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement to relief." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court generally may not consider materials outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9^th Cir. 1998); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9^th Cir. 1994). The court may, however, consider: (1) documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9^th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9^th Cir. 1994).

/ / / Finally, leave to amend must be granted "[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defects." Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9^th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9^th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

IV. DISCUSSION

In his motion to dismiss, defendant Kelso argues: (1) plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim against him upon which relief can be granted; (2) plaintiff's negligence claim is time-barred by California's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions; (3) plaintiff has failed to exhaust his claims under the California Government Claims Act (GCA), the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), or the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); and (4) defendant Kelso is immune from suit against him in his official capacity. In their separate motion, defendants Arya and Spelman argue: (1) plaintiff's claims are barred because he failed to exhaust under the GCA; and (2) plaintiff is not entitled to proceed IFP.

A. Failure to State a Claim

Defendant Kelso alleges that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the pleading requirements under FRCP 12(b)(6). Specifically, Kelso argues that:

First, Plaintiff has failed to allege that the Receiver has committed any specific acts or omissions which would give rise to liability. See generally Dkt. No. 1-1, pp 7-12. While it appears that Plaintiff is alleging claims against the Receiver arising out of the performance of his duties as Receiver for the California prison medical health care system, Plaintiff provides no other information or facts detailing how or why the

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