Candler v. Sec'y

• Decision Date: 25 October 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:15-cv-8-J-34JRK
• Parties: KEVIN E. CANDLER, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

KEVIN E. CANDLER, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:15-cv-8-J-34JRK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

October 25, 2017

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Kevin E. Candler, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on January 6, 2015, by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In the Petition, Candler challenges a 2009 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for dealing in stolen property. Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Respondents' Answer in Response to Order to Show Cause and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response; Doc. 20) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On May 20, 2015, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause and Notice to Petitioner (Doc. 7), admonishing Candler regarding his obligations and giving Candler a time frame in which to submit a reply. Candler submitted a brief in reply. See Petitioner's Response to Respondents' Answer (Reply; Doc. 25). This case is ripe for review.

II. Procedural History

On September 22, 2008, the State of Florida charged Candler with burglary (counts one and four), resisting an officer with violence (count two), and dealing in stolen property (count three). See Resp. Ex. A at 87-88, Third Amended Information. Candler proceeded to a jury trial in June 2009, see id., Transcript of the Jury Trial (Tr.), at the conclusion of which, on June 17, 2009, the court found him guilty of resisting an officer without violence, a lesser included offense of count two, and dealing in stolen property (count three), and not guilty of burglary (counts one and four), as charged in the Information. See id. at 138-41, Verdicts. On July 23, 2009, the court sentenced Candler to a term of imprisonment of thirty years for dealing in stolen property, and to a term of imprisonment of twelve months (with credit for 365 days for time served) for resisting an officer without violence. See id. at 158-64, Judgment.

On direct appeal, Candler, with the benefit of counsel, filed a brief, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress as to the impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification. Resp. Ex. B. The State filed an answer brief. Resp. Ex. C. On August 2, 2011, the appellate court affirmed Candler's conviction per curiam, see Candler v. State, 66 So.3d 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Resp. Ex. D, and the mandate issued on August 18, 2011, see Resp. Ex. E. On February 14, 2012, Candler filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the appellate court. See Resp. Ex. R. He asserted that appellate counsel was ineffective because she failed to argue on direct appeal that the trial court erred when it denied Candler's motion for judgment of acquittal on the insufficiency of the evidence as to dealing in stolen property. The appellate court denied the petition on the merits on March 8, 2012, see Candler v. State, 135 So.3d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Resp. Ex. S, and later denied his motion for rehearing on April 17, 2012, see Resp. Exs. T; U.

On June 18, 2012, Candler filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court. See Resp. Ex. J. The court transferred the case to the circuit court on August 23, 2012, for its consideration as a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. See Resp. Ex. K. He filed an amended motion for post-conviction relief (Rule 3.850 motion) on October 22, 2012. See Resp. Ex. L at 1-24. In his Rule 3.850 motion, he asserted that counsel was ineffective because he failed to: present a more artful motion for judgment of acquittal (ground one), and object to the trial court giving a faulty jury instruction (ground two). Additionally, he stated that the cumulative effect of counsel's errors entitled him to relief (ground three). The circuit court denied the Rule 3.850 motion on April 30, 2013. See id. at 25-91. On October 29, 2014, theappellate court affirmed the court's denial of post-conviction relief per curiam, see Candler v. State, 152 So.3d 567 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Resp. Ex. N, and later denied Candler's motion for rehearing on December 16, 2014, see Resp. Exs. O; P. The mandate issued on January 2, 2015. See Resp. Ex. Q.

During the pendency of the post-conviction proceedings, Candler filed a pro se petition for a new appeal in the appellate court on March 5, 2013. See Resp. Ex. F. He asserted that appellate counsel was ineffective because she failed to argue on direct appeal that the trial court erred in denying Candler's motion to dismiss based on a violation of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(g) (ground one), and that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to properly cross-examine and impeach Detective Ardizzoni (ground two). The appellate court denied the petition on the merits on March 27, 2013. See Resp. Ex. G. Candler filed a notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court on April 21, 2013. See Resp. Ex. H. The Florida Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on June 17, 2013. See Candler v. State, 118 So.3d 219 (Fla. 2013); Resp. Ex. I.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

The Petition appears to be timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 2245 (2017). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Candler's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeascorpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is "'greatly circumscribed' and 'highly deferential.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 834 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 1203 (2017); Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). Regardless of whether the last state court provided a reasoned opinion, "it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (citation omitted); see also Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, --, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013).¹ Thus, the state court need not issue an opinionexplaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 100.

If the claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous legal conclusions. As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a "contrary to" clause and an "unreasonable application" clause. The "contrary to" clause allows for relief only "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The "unreasonable application" clause allows for relief only "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous factual determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal courts to grant relief only if the state court's denial of the petitioner's claim "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court procee

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