Candless v. United States

Decision Date18 May 1936
Docket NumberNo. 552,552
PartiesMcCANDLESS et ux. v. UNITED STATES
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Messrs. Julius Russell Cades and Urban Earl Wild, both of Honolulu, Hawaii, for petitioners.

Messrs. Homer S. Cummings, Atty. Gen., and Harry W. Blair, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States.

Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit brought in the United States District Court for the Territory of Hawaii by the government against petitioners to condemn 4,080 acres of land on the Island of Oahu for a federal public purpose. The territorial law provides that in such a suit the value of the land and the value of the improvements thereon must be separately assessed. A common-law jury was impaneled, heard the case, and returned a verdict for petitioners fixing the value of the land at $206,503.51, and the value of the improvements thereon at $14,000. Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict. On appeal to the court below, the judgment was affirmed (C.C.A.) 74 F.(2d) 596.

The questions for our consideration are whether the ruling of the trial court refusing to admit certain evidence and offers of evidence was erroneous, and, if so, whether the rejection of such evidence may be disregarded as not substantially prejudicial under section 269 of the Judicial Code as amended (28 U.S.C.A. § 391).

First. The lands sought to be condemned were i use, and had been used for many years, as a cattle ranch, although pineapples had been grown upon some small areas. The owners had in view the ultimate use of the lands for the growing of sugar cane, which would require the bringing of water from a distance for irrigation purposes. Testimony was introduced to the effect that upwards of 3,000 acres of the tract were suitable for growing cane, and would produce an average of 70 to 75 tons of sugar cane to the acre, from which could be extracted eight or nine tons of sugar to the acre; and that the contour of the land was favorable to irrigation, and its general condition such as to make it adaptable to the purposes of a sugar plantation. Petitioners offered to prove that they had been for many years negotiating for the development of a sugar plantation on the land; that there were three sources of water supply, from one or the other of which petitioners had every reason to expect water would have been developed for the lands in question had it not been for the present suit; that any prospective purchaser of the lands would, at the time this suit was brought, take into consideration the reasonableness of the possibility of securing a supply of water for the purpose of raising sugar cane; that sugar cane lands in the territory generally require the bringing of water from other lands for irrigation, and that the availability of water for such purpose is a factor in determining the value of prospective sugar cane lands; that such water in many instances is transported much greater distances than would be required in the pending case; that there are available artesian basins from which for many years fresh artesian water has been and is available, unused and flowing to waste, amounting to approximately 60,000,000 gallons per day; that petitioners own lands within these basins upon which wells may be sunk at distances of from eight to ten-and-one-half miles from the tract in question, and the water last described recovered; that it was practically and economically feasible to transport such water from the lands within these basins to the tract in question; that the cost of recovering and transporting such water would render the use of it economically feasible and profitable; and that such recovery and use of the water could be anticipated with reasonable certainty.

Petitioners offered further to prove that the surplus water could be captured and transported practicably and economically and used profitably for the cultivation of sugar cane; and that the cost of recovering the water and transporting it would be less per million gallons than that incurred for recovery and transportation of water to other cane lands on the Island of Oahu and other islands in the territory.

These offers, and evidence of a similar character sought to be elicited from witnesses, were rejected by the trial court upon the ground that the possibility of bringing water from outside sources was too remote and speculative.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the court gave the following instruction to the jury:

'In estimating the compensation to be paid to the owners of the land which the government here seeks to condemn, I instruct you that you must entirely disregard any possibility of bringing water to the land in question from any other land, excepting the land which the government here seeks to condemn and the 284 acre tract, Lot B 1 A.'

The 284-acre tract referred to is owned by petitioners, and adjoins the land sought to be condemned.

The rule is well settled that, in condemnation cases, the most profitable use to which the land can probably be put in the...

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