Cane v. Worcester County, Md., Civ. No. Y-92-3226.

Decision Date07 January 1994
Docket NumberCiv. No. Y-92-3226.
Citation840 F. Supp. 1081
PartiesHoniss W. CANE, Jr., et al., v. WORCESTER COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

C. Christopher Brown, Baltimore, MD and Deborah A. Jeon, Cambridge, MD, for plaintiffs.

James Richard Dennis Collins, Ocean City, MD; Edward H. Hammond, Jr., Ocean City, MD and Benjamin E. Griffith, Cleveland, MS, for defendants.

OPINION

JOSEPH H. YOUNG, Senior District Judge.

Honiss W. Cane, Jr., Fannie Birckhead, James L. Purnell, Sr. and Saunders Marshall ("plaintiffs") have sued Worcester County, Maryland, George M. Hurley, John E. Bloxom, Reginald T. Hancock, Floyd F. Basett and Jeanne Lynch ("defendants"), and the Worcester County Board of Commissioners ("Board"), alleging that the system for electing members to the Board violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act by discriminating against African-American voters.

Worcester County Government

Worcester County is a predominantly rural county located in the southeastern part of Maryland. It borders the states of Delaware and Virginia as well as the Atlantic Ocean. The County contains four incorporated towns: Berlin, Ocean City, Pocomoke and Snow Hill. According to the 1990 Census, Worcester County has an African-American population of 7,448 persons or 21.26% of the total population of 35,028 persons. The African-American voting age population of the County is 5,237 persons or 19.16% of the total voting age population of 27,331 persons. The African-American population is concentrated in four areas of the county: Pocomoke, Stockton, Snow Hill and Berlin.

The Board serves as the legislative and governing body of the County. Its members are elected at-large1 under a residency district system. The entire electorate of Worcester County votes on candidates for each of the five seats. Four of the seats correspond to the County's residency districts. Candidates are required to reside in the appropriate district. The fifth member, the commissioner-at-large, must be a resident of the County, but is not subject to a district residency requirement. The five candidates who receive the most votes in the general election are elected to the Board.

The plaintiffs allege that the system for electing the Board violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). Based on the theory of "vote dilution," the plaintiffs' claim alleges that under the current election system, the votes of African-American citizens are diluted when compared to the votes of the white majority.

DISCUSSION

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides:

(a) No voting ... practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color ...
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes ... are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representative of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.

42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp.1991).2

The § 2 amendments make clear that a violation of the section can be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone, rather than having to show a discriminatory purpose, and establish that the relevant legal standard is the "results test." Under the results test, courts can invalidate "at-large" electoral systems if plaintiffs prove that the system operates to "dilute" the vote of minority voters, or limits their opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). This test challenges those at-large systems which work to systematically exclude minority-preferred candidates, on the theory that in an at-large system, "where minority and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates, the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the choices of minority voters." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2766, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986).

In setting forth the elements for a successful § 2 challenge, the plaintiffs must prove three preconditions: 1) the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district; 2) the minority group is politically cohesive; and 3) the majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it, in the absence of special circumstances, usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766-67. Although these three factors are preconditions to a § 2 claim, "the essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by African-Americans and white voters to elect their preferred representative." Id. at 47, 106 S.Ct. at 2764.

A. Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact

The first factor requires the minority group to prove that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to create a majority, if it were voting in a single-member district. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. Plaintiffs have presented two alternative district configurations,3 each having a majority African-American voting age population within a five-district plan.4 The African-American population is spread throughout several regions of the County, but it is concentrated in several small pockets which can be connected to create a district with a majority African-American voting age population of 58% to 62%. See McGhee v. Granville County, 860 F.2d 110, 115 (4th Cir.1988) (county's proposed remedial single member district plan contained seven districts, the two minority districts had 67.5% and 51.8% minority voting age populations and thus met the relevant standard); Solomon v. Liberty County, 899 F.2d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1023, 111 S.Ct. 670, 112 L.Ed.2d 663 (1991) (the evidence showed the African-Americans would constitute a majority of a district's voting age population); Westwego Citizens for a Better Government v. Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991) (proposed plan showed the district would have an African-American majority of 59.1% of the total population and an African-American voting majority of 52.8%).

The defendants claim that it is not possible to draw a district which contains an African-American voting majority that is reasonably compact and argue that such a district would be too winding and irregular in shape to be acceptable under the governing standards. However, compactness is a relative concept which must be interpreted in light of § 2's "laudatory national mission" of opening the political process to minorities. See Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F.Supp. 1459, 1465-66 (M.D.Ala.1988); Neal v. Coleburn, 689 F.Supp. 1426, 1435 (E.D.Va.1988).

The plaintiffs' proposed Plan 1 is not unreasonably irregular in shape, considering the population dispersal within the County. The plan merely affirms the existing racial divisions in the County. While the plan does entail running the newly created districts across other voting district lines and through towns, this is unavoidable because of the heavy white population and the need to achieve a majority African-American population in one of the districts. The districts may not be symmetrical, but they are compact. They do not rely on districts that run through several "tentacle-like corridors" nor are the district's boundary lines so unreasonably irregular, bizarre or uncouth as to approach obvious gerrymandering. They are in line with the configurations of electoral districts that have been approved in other cases.

B. Racially Polarized

Racially polarized voting represents "a consistent relationship between the race of the voter and the way in which the voter votes," Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46, n. 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2764 n. 11, and is politically or substantively significant if a cohesive minority electorate is typically unable to elect its preferred candidate in the face of majority opposition. Id. at 55, 106 S.Ct. at 2768. However, there is no simple doctrinal test for determining whether a certain level of racially polarized voting is legally significant. Id. at 57, 106 S.Ct. at 2769. "Discrete inquiries into minority and white voting practices" is necessary to determine whether a given district experiences legally significant racially polarized voting. Id. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 2769.

1. Politically Cohesive

Plaintiffs must show that African-Americans are sufficiently cohesive in their voting behavior to be treated as a group with common political interests. To prove this, plaintiffs must show that "a significant number of minority group members usually vote for the same candidates." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 2769 (emphasis added).

At trial, the plaintiffs relied upon the testimony of Theodore S. Arrington, Ph.D., Professor of the Department of Political Science at the University of North Carolina. The Court qualified Dr. Arrington as an expert to testify on voting behavior, political analysis, party politics and racial voting patterns. To counter Dr. Arrington's testimony, the defendants presented testimony from Ronald E. Weber, Ph.D., Professor of Government and Political Science at the University...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Cane v. Worcester County, Md., Civ. No. Y-92-3226.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • April 4, 1994
    ...the governing body of Worcester County, prevented minorities from electing a candidate of their choice.1 See Cane v. Worcester County, 840 F.Supp. 1081, 1090 (D.Md.1994). This Court's decision was based on the Worcester County electoral system that was used to elect the current county commi......
  • Cane v. Worcester County, Md.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • January 6, 1995
    ...that the terms of the Order are complied with and to provide assistance to the parties if necessary. SO ORDERED. 1 Cane v. Worcester County, 840 F.Supp. 1081 (D.Md.1994). The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the Court's finding that Bill 93-6, an effort to modify the invalidated electoral syste......
  • Gause v. Brunswick County, N.C., 95-3028
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • July 9, 1996
    ...for relief under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Cane v. Worcester County, 35 F.3d 921, 925 (4th Cir.1994) (quoting Cane v. Worcester County, 840 F.Supp. 1081, 1087 (D.Md.1994)), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1097 (1995); accord Jeffers v. Tucker, 847 F.Supp. 655, 661-62 (E.D.Ark.1994). Furthermore......
  • Cane v. Worcester County, Md.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • September 16, 1994
    ...court issued a memorandum opinion dated January 7, 1994, containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Cane v. Worcester County, Md., 840 F.Supp. 1081 (D.Md.1994). The district court concluded that the County's former electoral scheme violated Sec. 2 of the Voting Rights Act and o......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT