Canedo v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co.
| Decision Date | 17 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 17cv1879-LAB (KSC) |
| Citation | 341 F.Supp.3d 1116 |
| Parties | Armando CANEDO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PACIFIC BELL TELEPHONE CO., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
Andrea N. Jones, Coast Law Group, Encinitas, CA, for Plaintiffs.
David Dow, Jawid Habib, Littler Mendelson, San Diego, CA, for Defendants.
Hon. Larry Alan Burns, United States District JudgeDefendants removed this case from the Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego, relying on federal question jurisdiction. Although all the claims in the complaint are identified as arising under state law, Defendants argue that they are completely preempted by federal law because they all involve interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. The parties are not diverse, and no other basis for this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction is apparent. Plaintiffs then moved to remand.
Defendants argue Plaintiffs' claims arise under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) ("Section 301" or "§ 301"). They cite Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck , 471 U.S. 202, 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) and other cases as holding that Section 301 preempts all state-law causes of action that require the court to interpret or apply the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.
Plaintiffs were all employees of Pacific Bell and/or AT T. Defendants offer evidence that, during the time of Plaintiffs' employment there, they were covered by one of two collective bargaining agreements that, with regard to the claims here, were identical (the "CBA"). (Decl. of John Irelan in Support of Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss, ¶¶ 3–5.) The first of these was effective April 8, 2012 through April 9, 2016. The second and current CBA came into effect April 10, 2016. Defendants also offer excerpts of the 2012 CBA as Exhibit A to their Opposition, and have offered to submit the entire document if requested.
Plaintiffs allege that they all began working for Pacific Bell and/or AT T at various times from 1997 through 2010 as Splicing Technicians. At the time, they were all designated "Term" employees. Around March of 2015, they allege Defendant Betsy Farrell, a Vice President for AT & T, promised that she would formally designate Plaintiffs as "Regular" status employees and that they would not be terminated except "for Cause." Relying on this promise, Plaintiffs allege, they continued to work for Defendants. The "Regular" Splicing Technician positions that came open in San Diego at that time, however, were filled by other workers by November, 2015. (Irelan Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendants believe the vacancies were filled as required by the CBA. (Id. ) Both "Term" and "Regular" employees are job classifications under sections 4.03.B and 7.10.B of the CBA.
Then around June of 2016, Plaintiffs allege that a rumor of layoffs began circulating. Because they had not yet been designated as "Regular" employees and feared being laid off, Plaintiffs allege they complained to Defendants that Farrell’s promise had not been honored. The complaint does not say when they complained. Shortly after that, in late October, they were fired. The complaint implies that the firing was related to the complaints.
"The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute." California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc. , 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Here, that means Defendants must demonstrate that the Court has jurisdiction. See Gaus v. Miles , 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Until they do, jurisdiction is presumed to be lacking. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the Court must remand the case to state court if at any time before final judgment it appears the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. There is a "strong presumption" against removal jurisdiction, and jurisdiction must be rejected if any doubt exists as to the propriety of removal. Gaus , 980 F.2d at 566.
Even if Plaintiffs had not moved for remand, the Court would be under an independent obligation to examine whether removal jurisdiction exists. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (further citations omitted). Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived; even if Plaintiffs fail to point out jurisdictional flaws, the Court is obligated to raise them sua sponte. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). This obligation does not work the other way, however. The Court cannot properly engage in speculation in favor of jurisdiction, or deny remand for reasons Defendants never advanced. See Gaus , 980 F.2d at 566 ; Molina v. Pacer Cartage, Inc. , 47 F.Supp.3d 1061, 1062–63 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal jurisdiction typically exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp. , 410 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). "[A] case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). See also Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc. , 830 F.2d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 1987) () "This rule makes a plaintiff the ‘master of his complaint’: He may generally avoid federal jurisdiction by pleading solely state-law claims." Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp. , 410 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
A corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule, however, is the "complete preemption doctrine," which may "convert[ ] an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." Caterpillar , 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has explained that "if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law ... is pre-empted and federal labor-law principles ... must be employed to resolve the dispute." Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc. , 486 U.S. 399, 405–06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (footnotes and citations omitted).
But "not every dispute tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301." Id. at 413, 108 S.Ct. 1877 n.12 (citation and alterations omitted). The fact that the Court may have to examine the collective bargaining agreement to resolve the preemption issue is not enough. Cramer , 255 F.3d 683, 693. The only applications of state law that are preempted are those that necessarily require the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. "The plaintiff's claim is the touchstone for this analysis; the need to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff's claim." Id. at 691.
"[A]s long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the [collective bargaining] agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes."
Milne Employees Ass'n v. Sun Carriers, Inc. , 960 F.2d 1401, 1410 (9th Cir. 1992). "A provision in a collective bargaining agreement will not trigger preemption when it is only potentially relevant to the resolution of state law claims." Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. , 509 F.3d 978, 990–91 (9th Cir. 2007) (). The possibility that the Court might be required to or might choose to interpret the collective bargaining agreement to resolve the claim does not counsel against remand. Nor would it interfere with adjudication of any claims. See United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Rawson , 495 U.S. 362, 368, 110 S.Ct. 1904, 109 L.Ed.2d 362 (1990) ().
"[W]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must be either treated as a § 301 claim, or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law." Allis–Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck , 471 U.S. 202, 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (internal citation omitted). Importantly, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, the claim itself, not any defenses to that claim, must arise under the CBA. Federal defenses, including the defense of preemption, are not enough. Caterpillar , 482 U.S. at 392–93, 107 S.Ct. 2425. "Preempted" is not synonymous with "removable" and the fact that a claim is preempted does not necessarily mean it is removable. "[T]o remove a state law claim to federal court under the complete preemption doctrine, federal law must both completely preempt the state law claim and supplant it with a federal claim." Young , 830 F.2d at 997. In other words, if the claim is to be treated as a § 301 claim, it is removable. But if it is merely subject to dismissal because of the defense of federal preemption, it is not.
A number of older Ninth Circuit decisions take an expansive and sometimes apparently inconsistent view of § 301 preemption and resulting federal question jurisdiction. But the Ninth Circuit has narrowed some of those holdings in light of intervening Supreme Court precedent. See Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. , 255 F.3d 683, 692–93 (9th Cir. 2001), as...
To continue reading
Request your trial