Canen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

• Decision Date: 29 July 2015
• Docket Number: Civil No. 1:14–cv–00912 (APM)
• Citation: Canen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 118 F.Supp.3d 164 (D. D.C. 2015)
• Parties: Ronald Wayne Canen, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

118 F.Supp.3d 164

Ronald Wayne Canen, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 1:14–cv–00912 (APM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed July 29, 2015

Ronald Wayne Canen, Elhart, IN, pro se.

Lotte Canen, Elhart, IN, pro se.

Michael Salvatore Barranco, Treanor, Pope & Hughes, P.A., Towson, MD, Michael R. Sklaire, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, McLean, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Amit P. Mehta, United States District Judge

I.INTRODUCTION

PlaintiffsRonald Wayne Canen and Lotte Canen are no strangers to litigation over the foreclosure of their home in Elkhart, Indiana.This court is merely the latest forum in which they have appeared, following denials of relief in the Elkhart County Superior Court, the federal bankruptcy court, the district court for the Northern District of Indiana, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.Because other courts have recited Plaintiffs' extensive litigation history, this court will not describe it here, except when necessary to explain its reasoning.Nor will the court attempt to parse every possible claim advanced in the complaint.Sixty-eight pages long and interspersed with copies of various documents, the complaint is imprecise and difficult to comprehend.Plaintiffs, at least, have enumerated their claims.Those are the claims that the court will consider, and no more.

Each of the Canens' six claims arise from the foreclosure of their home, a process that began in 2004 and did not conclude until 2009.SeeCanen v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n,913 F.Supp.2d 657, 659–61(N.D.Ind.2012).The crux of their claims is that Defendants—two banks, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and U.S. Bank (collectively, the "Banks"), along with the Elkhart County Sheriff's Department and Sheriff Bradley Rogers individually (collectively, "Sheriff Rogers")—engaged in wrongdoing by improperly documenting and processing their loan; selling their initial mortgage; and foreclosing on their home.They assert six claims: (1) one count of violating 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,1985, and1986, as to which the Canens ask the court to declare unenforceable both the assignment of their mortgage to Wells Fargo and the notice of default filed in the state-court foreclosure action (Count One), Compl.¶¶ 49–55;(2) four counts of violating the Federal False Claims Act,31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., for which they seek damages and forfeiture (Counts Two through Five), Compl. ¶¶ 56–87; and (3) one count of violating a Consent Judgment entered in another case before this court in which Wells Fargo is a party, Consent Judgment, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp.,No. 12–cv–00361(D.D.C.Apr. 4, 2012)(Count VI), Compl.¶¶ 88–93.

After reviewing the parties' pleadings and briefs, the court grants Defendants' motions to dismiss with prejudice.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

To withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must find that the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868(2009)(quotingBell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929(2007) )(internal quotation marks omitted).A claim is facially plausible when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."Id.(citingTwombly,550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 )."Naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement" are not sufficient to support a complaint.Id . (alteration in original)(internal quotation marks omitted)(citingTwombly,550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).Factual allegations are not required to be "detailed," but pursuant to the Federal Rules, they must be more than "an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."Id.(citingTwombly,550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 )."[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not show[n]– that the pleader is entitled to relief," and the case can be dismissed.Iqbal,556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937(alteration in original)(internal quotation marks omitted)(citingFed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) ).

Although pro se complaints are held to a less strict standard than lawyer-drafted complaints, seeErickson v. Pardus,551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081(2007)("A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed ....")(citation omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted), a court need not make or accept inferences that are unsupported by allegations of fact, seeHenthorn v. Dept. of Navy,29 F.3d 682, 684(D.C.Cir.1994).Ultimately, a pro se plaintiff"must present a claim upon which relief can be granted."Id.(citation omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted).

III.DISCUSSION

A.Improper Venue.

Both the Banks and Sheriff Rogers argue that this court is an improper venue for the Canens' claims.The court agrees.The federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, provides three bases for grounding venue in a judicial district.Seeid.§ 1391(b).None apply here.Defendants do not reside here; none of the events or omissions that give rise to the Canens' claims occurred here; and venue is better laid in the Northern District of Indiana, where the events at issue occurred.

Nor does the alleged violation of the Consent Judgment provide venue.As Judge Howell concluded in a similar action claiming violation of the same Consent Judgment, McCain v. Bank of America,13 F.Supp.3d 45(D.D.C.2014), the Consent Judgment "simply does not create a private right of action allowing third parties"—like the Canens—"to bring claims for alleged violations of [it], let alone unrelated claims in this jurisdiction."Id. at 54(citations omitted).

Moreover, Plaintiffs have not addressed in their opposition brief Defendants' challenge to venue and therefore have conceded that their case is not properly before this court.SeeHopkins v. Women's Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries,284 F.Supp.2d 15, 25(D.D.C.2003)(citations omitted)("It is well understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.").

Although this court has the discretion to transfer this matter to a proper venue, see28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), it declines to do so because, as discussed below, Plaintiffs have not made out any viable claims, making transfer futile.SeeSimpkins v. District of Columbia,108 F.3d 366, 371(D.C.Cir.1997)(holding that dismissal, rather than transfer, is proper "when the outcome is foreordained").

B.Personal Jurisdiction as to Sheriff Rogers

This court does not have personal jurisdiction over Sheriff Rogers, a non-resident of the District of Columbia.The Canens cannot satisfy any of the bases available for long-arm jurisdiction under D.C. Code § 13–423(a).Sheriff Rogers (1) does not transact business in the District of Columbia; (2) has not contracted to supply services to this jurisdiction; (3) did not cause tortious injury in the District of Columbia; (4) did not cause tortious injury outside the District of Columbia while regularly engaging in or soliciting business here; and (5) does not have an interest in any real property in the District of Columbia that is a part of this dispute.Seeid.Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not responded to the Sheriff's challenge to personal jurisdiction and thus have conceded the argument.SeeHopkins,284 F.Supp.2d at 25.¹

C.Plaintiffs' Claims

1.Sections 1983,1985, and1986 claims against the Banks and Sheriff Rogers

Under Count I, the Canens seem to contend that the court can award injunctive relief and damages under Sections 1983,1985, and1986 for the alleged wrongful taking of their home without due process of law.This claim is not viable for a host of reasons.

First, insofar as the Canens seek to undo the state-court foreclosure order, seeCompl.¶ 54(requesting that the "Assignment of Mortgage""be declared unenforceable"), the claim is barred under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.Under that doctrine, " ‘a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights.’ "Liebman v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co.,15 F.Supp.3d 49, 55–56(D.D.C.2014)(quotingJohnson v. De Grandy,512 U.S. 997, 1005–06, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775(1994) );see alsoExxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454(2005)("The Rooker–Feldman doctrine ... is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.").As in Liebman, where the plaintiff similarly challenged a state-court foreclosure order, the Canens' claim that the Indiana state court's forfeiture order was unlawful under federal law is barred under Rooker–Feldman .SeeLiebman,15 F.Supp.3d at 55–56.

Plaintiffs contend that Rooker–Feldman does not apply here because "the state court ruling did not address ... the issues raised in the case at bar," specifically their claims for violating the Consent Judgment and the False Claims Act.Opp'n to Defs.' Bradley D. Rogers and the Office of the Sheriff of Elkhart County's Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15at 27–28.²But Plaintiff confuses Rooker–Feldman with the law of preclusion.SeeExxon Mobil,544 U.S. at 293–94, 125 S.Ct. 1517.The proper inquiry under Rooker–Feldman is whether the plaintiff is...