Canfield v. State

• Decision Date: 25 July 2019
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-3124
• Citation: 128 N.E.3d 563
• Parties: Kristapher D. CANFIELD, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

128 N.E.3d 563

Kristapher D. CANFIELD, Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-3124

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED July 25, 2019

Attorney for Appellant: Emily Grothoff, Lawrence County Public Defender, Agency, Bedford, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Matthew B. MacKenzie, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Brown, Judge.

[1] Kristapher D. Canfield appeals his conviction for possession of methamphetamine as a level 5 felony. He raises four issues which we consolidate and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence; and

II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 9, 2018, Bedford Police Major Jeremy Bridges was advised by dispatch of an anonymous call regarding a male in a Taco Bell uniform outside the restaurant near the dumpster area of the parking lot who appeared to pull something from his waist and that the item might have been an illegal substance. He and Bedford Police Sergeant Blake Wade arrived at the Taco Bell within a couple of minutes, entered it, and identified Canfield based upon the description that was given by dispatch. Major Bridges went to the cash register and asked Canfield if he could speak with him, Canfield said that he needed to tell his manager, and Major Bridges told him that was fine. Canfield walked back to the food preparation area. Major Bridges observed him stand off to the left side of the area and that he "appeared to be digging around his waistband area." Transcript Volume II at 70. He heard something fall at one point which he later determined was a pizza box, and Canfield "kind of squatted down and then came back up shortly after" and "it was like he picked up something or had moved something." Id. Canfield then turned and approached Major Bridges while eating a slice of pizza. Major Bridges asked Canfield if he would step outside so that they would not disrupt the business, he agreed, and they and Sergeant Wade went outside.

[3] Major Bridges then advised Canfield of the complaint, asked him his name, and stated that he was going to go back in to speak to the manager to see if he could obtain consent to search where Canfield was last seen standing. When he told Canfield that he had reason to believe that Canfield possibly had tried to hide an item, he became extremely nervous and "started fidgeting really nervously" and "[h]is speech started speeding up, slowing down, it was just a nervous speech." Id. at 71. Major Bridges went back inside the restaurant.

[4] Sergeant Wade observed that Canfield appeared to be "very nervous," fidgety, agitated, "swaying a little bit," and was "trying to eat a piece of pizza in a rapid manner." Id. at 41. Canfield's actions made Sergeant Wade "feel like [he] should check his person for weapons since [he] was by [himself] with him." Id. at 45. Sergeant Wade stated: "You know, given your state of what you're doing, I'm going to pat you down for officer safety." Id. at 41. He pulled away the kitchen apron Canfield was wearing over the outside of his clothing, noticed that the fly of Canfield's pants was undone and pulled open, and asked him why. Canfield said, "I don't have anything on me." Id. Sergeant Wade concluded the outer pat-down of his pants pockets and waistband area.

[5] Meanwhile, Major Bridges advised the manager of the complaint and requested permission to go to the back where Canfield was seen digging in his waistband, and she granted him consent to search the area and walked him back through the food preparation area. He took a quick look around, noticed the pizza box, looked down under a wire rack, and saw a bag containing several smaller bags with white crystal powdery substance inside about six to seven inches under the shelving, which later tested positive for methamphetamine and weighed 4.23 grams. He picked up the bag, walked outside, and advised Canfield what he had found. Canfield began asking if he could speak to somebody and advised that he thought he could "get some big players." Id. at 82.

[6] Sergeant Wade transported Canfield to the Bedford Police Department where he was Mirandized. Canfield again requested to speak to a drug detective "advising that the items found had came from the plug or the source, that he can get some big players ...."¹ Id. at 84. Major Bridges asked Canfield how much he thought he had on him at the time, and he said three grams or so.

[7] On May 10, 2018, the State charged Canfield with possession of methamphetamine as a level 4 felony. It also filed a notice of intent to seek an enhanced penalty based upon a prior conviction.

[8] On July 17, 2018, Canfield filed a motion to suppress and asserted that the police illegally detained him, searched the area he was ordered to exit, and seized evidence from that search. In August 2018, the court held a hearing at which Major Bridges, Sergeant Wade, and Canfield testified, and on September 26, 2018, the court denied the motion to suppress. On October 25, 2018, Canfield filed a motion to certify the order for interlocutory appeal, which the court denied. That same day, the State filed a motion for leave to amend the information to modify the charge to a level 5 felony, and the court granted the motion.

[9] On October 30, 2018, a bench trial was held. During Major Bridges's testimony, Canfield's counsel asked the court to disallow any testimony about anything that occurred after Canfield was taken outside, which the court denied. The court admitted evidence that Canfield had a prior conviction for dealing in methamphetamine as a class B felony. It found him guilty of possession of methamphetamine as a level 5 felony and sentenced him to five years incarceration.

Discussion

I.

[10] The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence discovered inside the restaurant and Canfield's statements at the police station. Although Canfield originally moved to suppress the evidence, he now challenges the admission of the evidence at trial. Thus, the issue is appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence. See Guilmette v. State , 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014). Because the trial court is best able to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, we review its rulings on admissibility for abuse of discretion and reverse only if a ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. Carpenter v. State , 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014). The ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we consider de novo . Id. In ruling on admissibility following the denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court considers the foundational evidence presented at trial. Id. If the foundational evidence at trial is not the same as that presented at the suppression hearing, the trial court must make its decision based upon trial evidence and may consider hearing evidence only if it does not conflict with trial evidence. Guilmette , 14 N.E.3d at 40 n.1.

[11] Canfield raises arguments under: (A) the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and (B) Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

A. Fourth Amendment

[12] Canfield argues that the seizure, his detention, and the search of the restaurant violated the Fourth Amendment. He asserts that police went to the restaurant solely on the basis of an uncorroborated anonymous tip, that any casual encounter with police quickly evolved into an investigatory stop, that he had an expectation of privacy in his workplace, and that he did not have the ability to object to the search because he was physically separated by the police when consent was given by the manager. He also argues that, even if we accept the facts most favorable to the State, the contraband which Major Bridges found in the storeroom should have been suppressed under Indiana's doctrine of forced abandonment.

[13] The State argues that Canfield has no standing to contest the search of the restaurant storage room because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy where his methamphetamine was discovered hidden under a wire shelving unit. It asserts that, even if Canfield could challenge the search, his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because the restaurant manager consented to the search. It contends that Canfield's other arguments regarding the anonymous tip, his detention, and his abandonment of the methamphetamine do not change the analysis because they do not alter his standing to contest the search or the consent given by the manager. It also argues that he was not forced to abandon his property because he was not illegally seized.

[14] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...." U.S. CONST . amend. IV. If the search is conducted without a warrant, the State bears the burden to show that one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. M.O. v. State , 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind. 2016).

[15] One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is a voluntary and knowing consent to search. Bradley v. State , 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) ; Stallings v. State , 508 N.E.2d 550, 552 (Ind. 1987) ). "Authority to consent to a search can be either apparent or actual." Gado v. State , 882 N.E.2d 827, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied . "Actual authority requires a sufficient relationship to or mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access to or control of the property for most purposes." I...