Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr.
| Decision Date | 08 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. CV–17–121,CV–17–121 |
| Citation | 537 S.W.3d 259 |
| Parties | Patricia CANNADY, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Anne Pressly, Deceased, Appellant/Cross–Appellee v. ST. VINCENT INFIRMARY MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee/Cross–Appellant Sarah Elizabeth Miller, Separate Appellee Jay Holland, M.D.; Candida Griffin, Separate Cross–Appellants |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
McDaniel Law Firm, PLC, Jonesboro, by: Bobby McDaniel ; and Baker Schulze Murphy & Patterson, by: J.G. "Gerry" Schulze, for appellant.
Munson, Rowlett, Moore and Boone, P.A., by: Beverly A. Rowlett, Timothy L. Boone, and Sarah Greenwood, for appellee St. Vincent Infirmary Medical Center.
Taylor & Taylor Law Firm, P.A., Little Rock, by: Andrew M. Taylor and Tasha C. Taylor, for appellee Jay Holland.
Seddiq Law Firm, by: Justin Eisele, Benton, for appellee Candida Griffin.
Appellant Patricia Cannady, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Anne Pressly, appeals the order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of St. Vincent Infirmary Medical Center (St. Vincent). St. Vincent, Jay Holland, and Candida Griffin cross-appeal the denial of their motions for summary judgment as to Cannady's outrage claim. We have jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1–2(a)(7), because it is a second, or subsequent, appeal of this matter in this court. See Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. , 2012 Ark. 369, 423 S.W.3d 548 ( Cannady I ). We affirm on direct appeal and dismiss the cross-appeal.
On October 20, 2008, Cannady's daughter, Anne Pressly, was assaulted in her home and was hospitalized at St. Vincent where she died as a result of her injuries on October 25, 2008. Pressly was a news anchor for a Little Rock television station, and there was a high degree of public interest in the facts of her case. Holland was a physician practicing at St. Vincent but was not a St. Vincent employee. Griffin and Sarah Elizabeth Miller were St. Vincent employees.1
In a complaint filed October 16, 2009, Cannady alleged claims of invasion of privacy and outrage against St. Vincent, Holland, Griffin, and Miller.2 Cannady alleged that Holland, Griffin, and Miller each accessed Pressly's medical record with no legitimate reason, and that St. Vincent took no action to restrict access to medical records available through its electronic database system. Cannady filed an amended complaint on January 7, 2010, adding that Holland, Griffin, and Miller each pled guilty to a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1320d–6(a)(2), which governs the wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information.
St. Vincent answered and argued that any claim for invasion of privacy or outrage did not survive Pressly's death. Holland, Griffin, and Miller filed separate answers. St. Vincent filed a motion for summary judgment, again arguing that an invasion-of-privacy claim does not survive the death of the decedent, and that the claim for the tort of outrage also failed because it was based on the invasion of privacy. Holland, Griffin, and Miller each filed motions for summary judgment adopting St. Vincent's motion. The circuit court granted the motions, and Cannady appealed to this court. We affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the circuit court improperly dismissed the outrage claim solely because it was based on the same conduct as the invasion-of-privacy claim, which was extinguished by Pressly's death. We concluded:
However, neither St. Vincent nor the circuit court has cited to any authority for the proposition that two separate claims cannot be based on the same conduct. In addition, the outrage claim was not made on behalf of the decedent, but on appellant's own behalf, and the court failed to make any findings regarding whether sufficient facts existed to state a cause of action for outrage. Thus, we reverse the court's order on this point and remand for further proceedings.
Cannady I , 2012 Ark. 369, at 10–11, 423 S.W.3d 548.
Because the circuit court determined that St. Vincent could not be held vicariously liable for the conduct of employees when the claims against the employees failed, we also reversed as to the dismissal of the outrage claim against St. Vincent.
On remand, St. Vincent, Holland, and Griffin again filed motions for summary judgment. St. Vincent argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because the conduct alleged to give rise to the tort of outrage was not, as a matter of law, the type of conduct that would support such a claim under Arkansas law; Arkansas does not recognize a cause of action when the defendant's conduct is directed to a third person; and even if Arkansas were to recognize such a cause of action, summary judgment would still be appropriate because Cannady was not present when the allegedly outrageous conduct occurred. St. Vincent further argued that it could not be held vicariously liable for the conduct of Griffin and Miller because the conduct was not committed within the scope of their employment. Both Holland and Griffin argued that the conduct alleged is not the type of conduct that will support a claim for the tort of outrage under Arkansas law. Holland and Griffin also argued that Arkansas does not recognize a cause of action when the defendant's conduct is directed to a third person and that even if Arkansas were to recognize such a cause of action, Cannady was not present when the alleged outrageous conduct occurred.
In response, Cannady argued the law of the case precluded consideration of any issue except whether the conduct alleged rose to the level of outrage. Cannady further argued that the conduct alleged was sufficiently extreme and outrageous for an outrage claim.
The circuit court found that the arguments made by St. Vincent, Holland, and Griffin in their second motions were not barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine and denied the motions as to the outrage claim, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the conduct of Holland, Griffin, and Miller was sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support a claim of outrage, whether the conduct was directed to a third party, and whether the plaintiff was present at the time the conduct occurred. The court granted St. Vincent's motion as to its vicarious liability, concluding that the conduct of Griffin and Miller was outside the scope of their employment, was for their own desires, and was not authorized or ratified by St. Vincent. Although the order did not dispose of all claims, the circuit court certified the case for an immediate appeal pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1), citing the novel issues presented and the possibility of avoiding a trial altogether. Cannady appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in ruling that St. Vincent's motion was not barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine and in granting St. Vincent's motion on the ground that the conduct of Griffin and Miller was outside the course and scope of their employment. St. Vincent, Holland, and Griffin filed cross-appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred in not granting summary judgment on the underlying outrage claim.
The law is well settled regarding the standard of review used by this court in reviewing a grant of summary judgment. See Repking v. Lokey , 2010 Ark. 356, 377 S.W.3d 211. A circuit court will grant summary judgment only when it is apparent that no genuine issues of material fact exist requiring litigation and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The burden of proof shifts to the opposing party once the moving party establishes a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, and the opposing party must demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. Id. After reviewing the undisputed facts, the circuit court should deny summary judgment if, under the evidence, reasonable minds might reach different conclusions from the same undisputed facts. Id. On appeal, this court determines if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party leave a material question of fact unanswered. Id. This court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Id. This review is not limited to the pleadings but also includes the affidavits and other documents filed by the parties. Id.
The circuit court granted St. Vincent's motion for summary judgment with respect to its argument that it could not be liable for actions taken by Griffin and Miller because they were acting outside the scope of their employment when they viewed Pressly's medical records. Cannady first argues that the circuit court erred in finding the law-of-the-case doctrine did not preclude consideration of St. Vincent's argument that it could not be held vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees because they were acting outside the scope of their employment. We addressed the doctrine of the law of the case in Green v. George's Farms, Inc. , 2011 Ark. 70, at 7–8, 378 S.W.3d 715, 720 :
The doctrine of law of the case prohibits a court from reconsidering issues of law and fact that have already been decided on appeal. Cadillac Cowboy, Inc. v. Jackson , 347 Ark. 963, 69 S.W.3d 383 (2002). The doctrine provides that a decision of an appellate court establishes the law of the case for the trial upon remand and for the appellate court itself upon subsequent review. Clemmons v. Office of Child Support Enforcement , 345 Ark. 330, 47 S.W.3d 227 (2001). The law-of-the-case doctrine also prevents consideration of an argument that could have been raised at the first appeal and is not made until a subsequent appeal. First Commercial Bank v. Walker , 333 Ark. 100, 969 S.W.2d 146 (1998). The doctrine serves to effectuate efficiency and finality in the judicial process, and its...
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