Cannon v. Haverty Furniture Co.
| Decision Date | 10 December 1935 |
| Docket Number | 14189. |
| Citation | Cannon v. Haverty Furniture Co., 179 S.C. 1, 183 S.E. 469 (S.C. 1935) |
| Parties | CANNON v. HAVERTY FURNITURE CO. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; M. M Mann, Judge.
Action by F. A. Cannon against the Haverty Furniture Company.Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Murphy & Cain, of Columbia, for appellant.
William A. Gunter and C. T. Graydon, both of Columbia, for respondent.
This action, instituted in the court of common pleas for Richland countyFebruary 21, 1934, is a suit by F. A. Cannonplaintiff, against the defendant, Haverty Furniture Company for recovery of damages against the defendant in the sum of $10,000, alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff on account of his alleged false imprisonment in the Richland county jail as the result of the wrongful acts charged against the defendant.In answer to the allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant alleged, in effect, that the plaintiff's imprisonment was "in pursuance of the terms of an order by the presiding Judge of the Richland County Court in the case of Haverty Furniture Company, present defendant versus F. A. Cannon, the present plaintiff, which case terminated with a judgment against the said Cannon providing for his apprehension and arrest in the event he failed to comply with the terms thereof, and that such judgment constituted a complete and adequate defense to the within action until it be invalidated by the court issuing it."
Issues being joined, the case was tried at the fall, 1934, term of said court before his honor, Judge M. M. Mann, and a jury resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $500 actual damages and $1,000 punitive damages.From the judgment entered on the verdict for the said sum, the defendant, pursuant to due notice, has appealed to this court.
For the purpose of better understanding the contention of the parties, we shall state, in substance, the allegations set forth in the pleadings, bearing on the issues raised.
According to the allegations of the plaintiff, as set forth in his complaint, at the time of the commencement of this action he was a resident of the city of Columbia, county of Richland, but at some time prior thereto was a resident of, and resided in, the county of Lexington, this state; that the defendant is now, and was at the times hereinafter mentioned, a corporation under the laws of this state, having its principal place of business in the city of Columbia, and that the plaintiff was formerly employed by the defendant as collector and repossession agent, and while so employed by the defendant, he collected and turned over to the defendant large sums of money and numerous articles which he repossessed for their account; that it was customary for the plaintiff to come into the office of the defendant at the end of each week or on the following Monday to check up and balance the accounts between the parties as nearly as was practical to be done, but contends that it was almost impossible to have a final accounting on any given day under the contract of employment because, under such contract, the plaintiff was entitled to commissions on money sent in direct from the customer to the defendant, if as a result of his calls upon such customer he was entitled to such commission under the contract, and the plaintiff had no way to determine such account except as to the records of the defendant.
It is the further contention of the plaintiff that under the above-mentioned employment agreement the plaintiff worked during the week beginning May 1, 1933, and collected various sums of money and repossessed for the defendant certain articles of furniture, as he had customarily done during the preceding weeks and months; "that on Friday, May 5, 1933, while so engaged and employed and while about the defendant's said business the plaintiff was driving or having driven an automobile in the City of Sumter, S. C., and that the said automobile got out of control and ran into and against a house and did considerable damage thereto and as a result thereof this plaintiff was informed and believed that suit would be instituted against the defendant herein in the sum of $500.00 unless the damages were repaired promptly and not later than Monday, May 8th, at 12 o'clock and settlement therefor effected."Whereupon out of the moneys collected for the defendant by the plaintiff in connection with said business the plaintiff paid to the owner of the said damaged premises the sum of $20 cash and the further sum of $12 for material and labor in repair and in settlement of the said damages.Thereafter the plaintiff, as usual came in Columbia Saturday, May 6, 1933, and reported to the defendant at its said office in the city of Columbia what had occurred and was informed that he could not be checked up before the following Monday.In this connection the plaintiff informed the defendant of the damages to the said house, and further informed defendant's agents in charge of said office that, because of the attention he would have to give the said settlement to be made in the city of Sumter, he would not be able to check up on Monday, and he then and there notified the defendant that he would be back in the city of Columbia on Wednesday, May 10, 1933; that on Tuesday, May 9, 1933, the plaintiff was approached by a Mr. Price, agent for the defendant, in Sumter, S. C., who made demand on the plaintiff to surrender all moneys, accounts, receipts, and duplicate receipt books, and any and everything in plaintiff's possession which belonged to the Haverty Furniture Company; that plaintiff informed Mr. Price that he did not have all accounts with him;
In this connection the plaintiff further alleged, in effect, that on May 31, 1933, the defendant notified the plaintiff that he(the plaintiff) was entitled to certain other credits which he had not been given, and another statement of balance due as shown by the records, amounting to $72.44, was submitted to him, and which he(the plaintiff) signed, assuming the amount fixed therein to be correct as far as the record accounts were concerned, and the plaintiff again inquired in reference to the other credits which he claimed due, and he was again informed that the said Mr. Rustin would have to pass upon them.Some time thereafter the defendant's said Mr. Snow called at the plaintiff's boarding house and advised him to go to see Mr. Prince, the new credit manager of the defendant, stating that additional credits had been found to which he(the plaintiff) was entitled, and which reduced the balance as shown by the record to about $42.The plaintiff at that time requested the defendant's said agent to prepare a new paper showing the proper balance and stating that he would sign the same.The plaintiff also at that time, asked about the other credits to which he considered himself entitled, and was again informed by the said Mr. Snow that the same had not been passed upon.This statement requested was never presented to the plaintiff, showing the new balance, and the plaintiff heard nothing further from the matter until a letter was received from Mr. Murphy an attorney for the defendant, demanding payment of the sum of $72.44.Upon receiving the letter from Mr. Murphy, the plaintiff went to see Mr. Murphy and fully informed him of the things and matters above referred to, and stated to Mr. Murphy that he did not owe the defendant anything, but in order to avoid litigation and getting settlement, if he could he would sell a certain filling station which he had for the purpose of settling the alleged account.
The plaintiff further alleges, in effect, that not later than September 25, 1933, he moved to Lexington county and resided in the said county of Lexington until the 28th day of January, 1934, on which date he moved back to the city of Columbia; that during the plaintiff's absence from the city of Columbia, and while he was a resident of the said county of Lexington, according to plaintiff's allegations, the defendant, without just cause or excuse, and with no notice whatsoever to the plaintiff and without due process of law, with no opportunity to be heard or defend himself, falsely, fraudulently, willfully, and maliciously obtained from a court which had no jurisdiction an order of arrest, and thereupon, on January 31, 1934, caused the plaintiff to be falsely arrested and...
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... ... Cannon v. Haverty Furniture Co., 179 S.C ... 1, 183 S.E. 469, and Miller v. White, 172 S.C. 333, ... ...
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... ... The proof of service ... contains none of the defendant adversely criticized in ... Cannon v. Haverty Furniture Co., 179 S.C. 1, 14, 183 ... S.E.2d 469. The defendant was not misled or ... ...
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Matheson v. McCormac
... ... The case in this ... respect is ruled by the case of Cannon v. Haverty ... Furniture Co., 179 S.C. 1, 183 S.E ... [195 S.E. 129] ... ...