Cannon v. Licking Cnty.

Decision Date21 June 2019
Docket NumberCase No. 2:17-cv-004
PartiesBECKY CANNON, Plaintiff, v. LICKING COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

JUDGE GEORGE C. SMITH

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 26). Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 29) and Defendants have replied (Doc. 33). Defendants' Motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 16, 2016, Becky Cannon ("Ms. Cannon" or "Plaintiff") was at home with her husband, Dan Cannon ("Mr. Cannon"), when she became concerned that Mr. Cannon was suffering a medical emergency. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶ 13). Ms. Cannon called 911 to seek treatment for her husband. (Id.) Several minutes after she called 911, Emergency Medical Technicians ("EMTs") arrived at her home. (Id. at ¶ 14). The EMTs evaluated Mr. Cannon on the front porch of their home and found that he was not suffering from any medical conditions. (Id. at ¶ 16). Shortly thereafter, Deputy Jennifer Green ("Officer Green"), Deputy Robert Meek ("Officer Meek"), and Licking County Sheriff's Deputy Jim Dearing arrived at Ms. Cannon's home. (Id. at ¶ 17). While waiting for the EMTs to complete their work, Mr. Cannon informed Officer Green that Ms. Cannon was drinking earlier in the day. (Id. at ¶ 18). After learning that Ms. Cannon was intoxicated, Officer Green entered Ms. Cannon's home to speak with her. (Id. at ¶ 18). Ms. Cannon instructed Officer Green to leave her home, but Officer Green refused and Ms. Cannon became agitated. (Id. at ¶ 20). After refusing to leave Ms. Cannon's home, Officer Green threatened Ms. Cannon with arrest for disorderly conduct if she did not calm down. (Id. at ¶ 21). Ms. Cannon again asked Officer Green to leave her home, and Officer Green again refused. (Id. at ¶ 22). After a few moments, Officer Meek entered Ms. Cannon's home and she again asked the deputies to leave. (Id. at ¶ 23; Doc. 29, Resp. at 9). Officer Meek, thinking he couldn't help the situation, talked Officer Green into leaving the residence, and the officers then left the residence. (Doc. 29, Resp. at 9).

Ms. Cannon, who was upset, began to break plates and other small items inside her own home. (Id. at ¶ 25). Ms. Cannon's daughter, Samantha Hottinger ("Ms. Hottinger") was notified that the squad was at Ms. Cannon's home. (Doc. 25-13, Hottinger Dep. at 18). Ms. Cannon was babysitting Ms. Hottinger's children on the day of the incident. (Id. at 17-18). Ms. Hottinger headed to the house, removed her children from the house, and instructed a friend to call the police. (Id. at 22-25). Her friend called 911 and reported that Ms. Cannon was acting disorderly. (Doc 1, Compl. ¶ 29). Roughly five to ten minutes after they had left the residence, Officers Meek and Green were again dispatched to Ms. Cannon's home. (Id. at ¶ 28). Officer Green arrived first and entered Ms. Cannon's home. (Id. at ¶¶ 30-34). As before, Ms. Cannon instructed Officer Green to leave, and Officer Green refused. (Id. at ¶ 31). Ms. Cannon was shouting at Officer Green and calling her names such as "C and an [sic] F-ing B." (Doc. 26-2, B. Cannon Dep. at 94). Officer Green informed Ms. Cannon that she needed to calm down or she would be placed under arrest for disorderly conduct. (Id.).

Officer Meek then arrived at Ms. Cannon's home to assist Officer Green. (Doc. 1, Compl. at ¶ 33). At this time, Officer Green informed Officer Meek that Ms. Cannon needed to be arrested for disorderly conduct. (Doc. 26-2, B. Cannon Dep. at 94). Officer Green asked Ms. Cannon to place her arms behind her back. (Id. at 95). According to Ms. Cannon, she said "fucking arrest me" and threw her hands behind her back. (Id. at 95). Officer Green then applied one handcuff. (Id. at 95-96). Ms. Cannon "reflexively moved her arm slightly" as the handcuffs were being applied. (Doc. 1, Compl. at ¶ 35). Ms. Cannon contends that this was a reflexive reaction to the tight handcuffs. (Id). Officer Meek then stated "let me fucking get her" and executed a takedown maneuver to bring Ms. Cannon to the ground. (Id. at ¶ 36; Doc. 26-2, B. Cannon Dep. at 97). Ms. Cannon describes the action as a "body slam." (Doc. 26-2, B. Cannon Dep. at 94). The force of this takedown caused Ms. Cannon to briefly lose consciousness. (Id. at 100).

At this point, Officers Meek and Green only secured one of Ms. Cannon's arms in the handcuffs. (Id. at 97). Once on the ground, Officers Meek and Green delivered several strikes with their hands and knees to Ms. Cannon's chest, side, and legs. (Doc.1, Compl. at ¶ 41). Additionally, Officer Green placed a knee on her back while trying to restrain her. (Doc. 25-1, Green Dep. at 106). After this incident, Officers Meek and Green removed Ms. Cannon from her home and took her to the Licking County jail where she remained until she was released on bail. (Doc.1, Compl. at ¶ 50). Several days later Ms. Cannon sought medical treatment at a hospital for her injuries, including soreness and bruising. (Id. at ¶ 57).

Ms. Cannon was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. (Id. at ¶ 51). Ms. Cannon pled guilty to the disorderly conduct charge and entered a pretrial diversion program of intervention in lieu of conviction for the resisting arrest charge. (Id. at ¶ 51).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Berryman v. SuperValu Holdings, Inc., 669 F.3d 714, 716-17 (6th Cir. 2012). The Court's purpose in considering a summary judgment motion is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter" but to "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists if the Court finds a jury could return a verdict, based on "sufficient evidence," in favor of the nonmoving party; evidence that is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative," however, is not enough to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 249-50.

The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of presenting the Court with law and argument in support of its motion as well as identifying the relevant portions of "'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). If this initial burden is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Cox v. Kentucky Dep't of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995) (after burden shifts, nonmovant must "produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be resolved by a jury").

In considering the factual allegations and evidence presented in a motion for summary judgment, the Court "views factual evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d502, 511 (6th Cir. 2009). But self-serving affidavits alone are not enough to create an issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. Johnson v. Washington Cty. Career Ctr., 982 F. Supp. 2d 779, 788 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (Marbley, J.). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support [the non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.

III. DISCUSSION

Ms. Cannon brings causes of action against Officers Meek and Green (in their individual capacities) under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for excessive force in violation of her federal constitutional rights. She also brings claims against Licking County alleging its deliberate indifference to excessive force and fabricating or omitting evidence in violation of her federal constitutional rights. Additionally, Ms. Cannon brings claims against Officers Meek and Green under Ohio state law for battery.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because, even with the facts viewed in a light most favorable to Ms. Cannon, qualified immunity protects Officers Meek and Green and Ms. Cannon cannot establish that Licking County is subject to municipal liability.

This Court will address each of these claims in turn. Before turning to Defendants claims of qualified immunity, this Court must consider whether Ms. Cannon abandoned her fabrication of evidence claims and whether Heck v. Humphrey bars the excessive force claims brought against Officers Meek and Green.

A. Abandonment of Fabrication of Evidence Claim

In the Sixth Circuit, "a plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment." Brown v. VHS of Michigan, Inc.,545 F. App'x 368, 372 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Hicks v. Concorde Career Coll., 449 F. App'x 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2011)).

Defendants moved for summary judgment on Ms. Cannon's fabrication of evidence claims. (Doc. 26, Defs' Mot. at 2-3). Plaintiff's Response to the Motion (Doc. 29) does not refute any of Defendants' arguments on this claim, nor does it discuss the fabrication of evidence claims in any way. For this reason, this Court deems Ms. Cannon to have abandoned her fabrication of evidence claims and Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is GRANTED.

B. The Heck v. Humphrey Hurdle

Defendants first raise the possibility of Heck barring the excessive...

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