Cannon v. United States
Decision Date | 29 March 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 16256.,16256. |
Parties | Clifton L. CANNON, Sr., et al., Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Vance Custer, Bainbridge, Ga., E. P. Stapleton, Donalsonville, Ga., Custer & Kirbo, Bainbridge, Ga., of counsel, for appellant.
J. Sewell Elliott, Asst. U. S. Atty., Macon, Ga., Frank O. Evans, U. S. Atty., Macon, Ga., for appellee.
Before RIVES, TUTTLE and BROWN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs, appellants here, sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act1 for the wrongful death of Mrs. Cannon. An Army truck, driven by Pfc. Harold C. Leonard, turned abruptly in the path of an automobile in which Mrs. Cannon was riding as an invited guest, causing a collision resulting in injuries from which Mrs. Cannon died. The defendant, United States, claimed that Pfc. Leonard was not acting in line of duty, that is, within the scope of his employment, under such circumstances that the United States, if a private person, would be liable in accordance with the law of Georgia, in which State the collision occurred.
The facts relating to line of duty were without dispute, and were stated by the district court substantially as follows:
It seems to be settled that the phrase "line of duty" (28 U.S.C.A. § 2671, Footnote 1, supra) in the Act as applicable to military and naval personnel has no broader significance than "scope of his employment" as used in master and servant cases.2 This case is controlled by the Georgia doctrine of respondeat superior. Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857, 76 S.Ct. 100, 100 L.Ed. 761.
All of the cases recognize that, when a servant departs completely from the work assigned to him in order to accomplish some private mission of his own, he is no longer acting within the scope of his employment. It is a difficult and delicate task, however, to determine just when the erring servant is deemed to return to his employer's service, and there is a vast amount of literature upon that subject.3 The Georgia cases make a distinction between mere deviation and complete departure from the scope of the employment.4 The facts of each particular case determine in which category it lies.
1 Pertinent provisions of which are as follows:
28 U.S.C.A. § 2674: "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like...
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...`acting in line of duty,' 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671, is generally equated with traditional notions of scope of employment, Cannon v. United States, 5 Cir., 243 F.2d 71, 73, the phrase reflects that Congress had in mind, and so must we, the special factors characteristic of military activity and di......
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McGarrh v. United States
...Court of Appeals, and in each case the government was exonerated of liability.4 Applying Georgia law, the Court in Cannon v. United States, 243 F.2d 71 (5 Cir. 1957), ruled that a serviceman using an army truck deviated from the scope of his employment when he drove the truck on a personal ......
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Sample v. United States
...100, 100 L.Ed. 761. And the additional statutory words "in line of duty" do not change this basic common law test. Cannon v. United States, 5 Cir., 1957, 243 F.2d 71, 72. But since the relationship of a serviceman to his government is seemingly unique, the state court decisions dealing with......
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Hinson v. United States
..."acting in line of duty," 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671, is generally equated with traditional notions of scope of employment, Cannon v. United States, 5 Cir., 243 F.2d 71, 73, the phrase reflects that Congress had in mind, and so must we, the special factors characteristic of military activity and di......