Cannon v. Williams

• Decision Date: 21 September 1942
• Docket Number: 14237
• Citation: 22 S.E.2d 838,194 Ga. 808
• Parties: CANNON v. WILLIAMS et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

22 S.E.2d 838

194 Ga. 808

CANNON v. WILLIAMS et al.

14237

Supreme Court of Georgia

September 21, 1942

Judgment Adhered to, after Rehearing Nov. 10, 1942. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A petition for interpleader, by a holder of funds or property, will lie when there are two or more conflicting claims thereto of such a character as to render it doubtful or dangerous for the holder to act, under close disputed questions of fact or debatable questions of law which have not been adjudicated by the courts. As against general demurrer, the averments showed a proper petition. The overruling of such a demurrer of one claimant merely determines the right of the stakeholder to maintain his petition, and does not establish the superiority of the other claim as the law of the case.

2. To constitute a valid gift, there must be: (a) an intention by the donor to transfer to the donee an immediate present interest, and not a mere future interest, or to make a testamentary gift; (b) an acceptance by the donee, which, if the gift is of substantial benefit, will be presumed; (c) either an actual or constructive delivery of the article or chose in action by a transfer of its dominion to the donee, or by a writing, based upon a good consideration, delivered to the donee or to a trustee to hold for him; and (d) in an alleged gift by a writing founded on a good consideration, such consideration must either be based on love and affection toward a near relative by consanguinity or affinity or one to whom a natural duty exists, or be based on a strong moral obligation arising from some antecedent legal obligation, although then unenforceable, or from some present equitable duty.

3. A gift causa mortis is one made during a last illness or in peril of death, and carries an immediate though revocable contingent interest in the property, as distinguished from absolute title. The full title is intended to pass only in case of death. As a consequence of this condition affixed by law, the gift is automatically revoked by the recovery or escape of the donor from the illness or peril, and is revocable at the option of the donor during his lifetime. Otherwise gifts causa mortis are subject to the rules governing gifts inter vivos.

(a) The technical rule governing gifts by check, draft, or a written assignment of funds held by a third person, which may in some cases differ from the rule governing ordinary personalty, and which generally requires payment or acceptance of the instrument by the holder of the fund before the gift attaches, is met, in a case of assignment, by a delivery of the writing to and its retention by the holder of the fund, thus recognizing his liability to the donee under the assignment.

(b) Such a delivery of a gift causa mortis to a third person as trustee for the donee not only complies with the rule governing gifts by check, draft, or written assignment of funds in the hands of a third person, but dispenses with a receipt of the gift by the donee himself before the donor's death. In the absence of controverting circumstances, the person to whom such a delivery is made will be presumed to take as trustee for the donee, and not as mere agent for the donor.

4. Although the representative of the donor's estate may hold the donee of a gift causa mortis liable for such portion of the gift as may be necessary to pay debts, if other assets are insufficient, the burden of proving such a deficiency rests on the representative of the estate, since at the death of the donor title to the gift vests in the donee, rather than in the executor or administrator, and the representative has no right to possess or administer the gift unless such a contingency is shown to exist.

5. Applying the preceding rules to the undisputed evidence relating to the alleged gift causa mortis, the court erred in directing the verdict, against the validity of the gift, in favor of the claimant administratrix, and in refusing a new trial to the donee.

H. P. Williams, a brother of John M. Williams, who died on March 26, 1941, filed a petition for interpleader against the widow, Mrs. Annie Camp Williams, as administratrix of the estate, and R. E. Cannon, husband of a daughter of decedent by a former marriage. It was alleged that decedent had 'on deposit [with petitioner] prior to' and at the death of decedent 'a sum of money in the amount of $3,091.93, which said money was left there by' decedent; that on March 19, 1941, decedent left with petitioner a letter, instructing him to turn said money over to Cannon after decedent's death; that Cannon claimed this money as a gift, and had notified petitioner to pay it to no one else; that the administratrix also had notified him that she was entitled to the fund for administration; that petitioner holds it in trust simply as a stakeholder, cannot safely pay it to either party, as it is dangerous for him to act 'until the respective rights of said parties have been determined'; and he prays for such a determination.

The letter, addressed to petitioner, signed by decedent, and witnessed by a notary public with a seal, was as follows:

'Dear Paul: In case of death this letter is to instruct you to turn over any balance I may have with you to R. E. Cannon for disposal, except profit in 33 B/C of which I have sold to you as delivered, being farm cotton of Mrs. J. M.

Williams Ex., and profit of 33 B/C of which I have placed in July N. O., which you have placed in N. O., and is same profit mentioned first above. Any open business to be closed out on first market day after my death.'

Mrs. Williams, the widow, as administratrix, demurred generally to this petition, on the grounds, that it stated no cause for equitable relief; that the allegations did not show the nature, character, and foundation of the claims sufficiently to determine whether an interpleader was necessary; and that the allegations did not show 'the conflicting claims of the defendants [to be] of such character as to render it doubtful or dangerous for the plaintiff to act.' There was a special demurrer to particular paragraphs. No exception was taken to an order overruling the demurrers. The administratrix filed an answer, setting up that the letter was 'a mere direction to petitioner,' which 'was revoked' by decedent's death; that the letter gave to Cannon no right to the fund; and that she is the owner. Cannon filed an answer, setting forth that he, as a mortician, had furnished all funeral supplies at the death of decedent's first wife, on March 3, 1935, amounting to $600, for which he has never been paid; that, as all parties contemplated, he was requested to furnish and actually furnished the funeral supplies at the death of decedent, amounting to $662; and that he had paid additional doctors' and nurses' bills after decedent's death, in the sum of $99.42, as decedent 'contemplated he would do and expected this respondent to do.'

The judge directed a verdict for the administratrix; and entered a decree that petitioner pay to her the $3,091.93 in question, and that Cannon, the son-in-law, had no title therein. The court denied a new trial on motion based on the general grounds, and the special ground that it was error to direct a verdict for the administratrix, because there was no exception to the overruling of her demurrer to the petition, and that judgment became the law of the case; and because the averments of the petition and Cannon's answer were proved by uncontroverted evidence, which showed a valid gift in contemplation of death.

H. P. Williams, decedent's brother, a cotton merchant in Athens, testified: that on the morning of March 19, 1941, just before decedent went to a hospital for an operation (after which he died on March 26th), and just as the brother was about to leave the city, the decedent came down to see the brother, and told him: 'You know I have always told you to turn any balance here over to R. E. Cannon' (decedent's son-in-law, a resident of Rabun County), as decedent had previously requested; that decedent stated as 'the reason why he wanted me to give this money to * * * Cannon was that he buried his first wife, and he said, 'I guess he will bury me,'' which in fact Cannon had done and had paid other bills after decedent's death, 'a few days after the operation'; that Cannon had also previously helped decedent financially; that decedent said he could not live like he was, and was going to the hospital to have an operation, and left the quoted letter with the brother; that the $3,091.93 was all that decedent left with the witness; that the money for the 33 bales, mentioned in the letter, belonged to Mrs. Williams, the widow, for which the brother's check for $165 had been given to her, but had not been cashed; and that 'this has nothing to do with this amount involved here--it is not a part of this $3,091 under that letter instructing me to pay it to Cannon.'

A. M. Wilson, a nephew of the decedent and of his brother, testified that he worked for the brother, and heard the conversation between him and decedent the morning before decedent went to the hospital, and heard decedent speak of the operation and say, 'Turn over the balance I have over to R. E. Cannon * * * I will write you a letter'; that decedent then dictated and signed the quoted letter, and, after it was witnessed, delivered it immediately to the brother.

R. E. Cannon testified that he had previously buried decedent's first wife and decedent, paid their funeral expenses and other bills for decedent, in the amounts stated in his answer, and had not been reimbursed therefor.

Erwin & Nix, of Athens, and Thad L. Bynum, of Clayton, for plaintiff in error.

Jas. W Arnold, Rupert A. Brown, and ...