Cano v. Davis
| Decision Date | 22 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 01-08477 MMM(RCX).,CV 01-08477 MMM(RCX). |
| Citation | 191 F.Supp.2d 1140 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | Mario CANO; Paula Rangel; Maria Calleros; Norma E. Ramirez; Margo Munoz; Bennie G. Corona; Myron Garcia; Frank Diaz; Consuelo E. Rodriguez; Jose Ruelas; Racquel Torres; Enrique F. Aranda; Josephine Santiago; Antonio M. Lopez; Jose R. Pacheco; Luis Natividad; Marisol Natividad; Luis Garcia; Luz Palomino; Silvia Palomino; Ignacio Leon; Joaquin Galan; Ernesto Bustillos; Cathy Espitia; Salvadoran American Leadership and Educational Fund, Plaintiff(s), v. Gray DAVIS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of California; Cruz Bustamante, in his official capacity as Lieutenant Governor of the State of California; Bill Jones, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of the State of California; John Burton, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the California State Senate; Robert Hertzberg, in his official capacity as Speaker of the California State Assembly, Defendant(s). |
BEFORE: REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, MORROW and SNYDER, District Judges.1
ORDER DENYING MOTION OF DEFENDANT JOHN BURTON AND INTERVENOR CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE REQUESTING ABSTENTION IN FAVOR OF PENDING STATE COURT ACTIONS
In September, 2001, the State of California adopted new state and federal legislative district lines based on the data obtained from the 2000 census. Soon thereafter, plaintiffs filed this action challenging the legality of four of those districts: two Los Angeles County congressional districts in the San Fernando Valley, one congressional district in San Diego County, and a State Senate district in south-eastern Los Angeles County. Plaintiffs claim that all four of these southern California districts violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, in that they deny Latinos the opportunity to elect representatives of choice. Plaintiffs also contend that the three challenged congressional districts violate the Equal Protection Clause, both because the districts were drawn with the intent to dilute the effect of Latino votes, and because the three congressional districts are racial gerrymanders that violate Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). Defendants deny all of plaintiffs' claims.
Two actions challenging entirely different aspects of the redistricting plan were filed in state court in northern California by other plaintiffs. In the first, Andal v. Davis, Sacramento Superior Court No. 01-CS-01397, the plaintiffs allege that the state and federal legislative districts in San Joaquin County violate the California constitution as well as reapportionment standards set forth by the California Supreme Court. The Andal plaintiffs primarily contend that the manner in which the districts in San Joaquin County and the City of Stockton were drawn deny voters in that county and city effective representation because the districts divide local communities of interest, insufficiently respect county and city boundary lines by dividing those areas into several districts, and violate California law by splitting census tracts. In the second state court action, Kennedy v. Davis, Santa Clara Superior Court No. CV-803679, another set of plaintiffs raises similar state law claims regarding the manner in which districts in Santa Clara County were drawn. One of the recently enacted redistricting laws, SB 802, provides that any challenge to Assembly district lines must first be presented to the California Supreme Court, by a petition for a writ of mandate. In both Andal and Kennedy, plaintiffs filed such petitions, but both petitions were denied. The plaintiffs subsequently filed actions in the Superior Courts located in their respective counties
In light of the two pending state cases, defendant John Burton and defendant-intervenor California State Senate have asked this court to stay the proceedings in this action pursuant to the doctrine of deferral established by the Supreme Court in Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941).2 For the reasons set forth below, we deny the motion.
The Pullman doctrine is "an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it." County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163 (1959). In Pullman, the Supreme Court held "that federal courts should abstain from decision when difficult and unsettled questions of state law must be resolved before a substantial federal constitutional question can be decided." Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984).3 In the reapportionment context, federal courts are required "to defer consideration of disputes involving redistricting where the State, through its legislative or judicial branch, has begun to address that highly political task itself." Growe, 507 U.S. at 33, 113 S.Ct. 1075; see also Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409, 85 S.Ct. 1525, 14 L.Ed.2d 477 (1965).
We use three criteria in determining whether to defer under Pullman. First, the complaint must "touch on a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open." Canton v. Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81, 498 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir.1974) (quoting Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498, 61 S.Ct. 643). Second, "it must be plain that the constitutional adjudication [in the federal case] can be avoided if a definite ruling on the state issue would terminate the controversy." Columbia Basin Apartment Ass'n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 801 (9th Cir.2001). Finally, the possibly determinative issue of state law must be "uncertain." Id.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has held that district courts must closely scrutinize a motion to defer adjudication of voting rights cases because of the importance of safeguarding the right to vote. Badham v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Northern Dist. of Calif., 721 F.2d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir.1983) ( ). Thus, "a district court must independently consider the effect that delay resulting from the abstention order will have on the plaintiff's right to vote." Id.; see also Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 697 (5th Cir.1981).
Here, there is no real dispute about two of the three Pullman criteria. The first requirement of the Pullman test is clearly met. Redistricting is undoubtedly a sensitive area of state policy. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) . The third prong of the test is satisfied as well. Plaintiffs in both state cases assert (among other claims) that the districts they challenge violate Art. XXI, § 2 of the California Constitution. That provision sets forth certain state redistricting standards, and has not yet been interpreted by the California Supreme Court.
However, it is not at all "plain" that a ruling on the state law issue would terminate the controversy here. Columbia Basin Apartment Ass'n, 268 F.3d at 801. Growe instructs that the court's inquiry in this regard should focus not on the similarity of the claims between the federal and state actions, but on the nature of the relief requested in each. 507 U.S. at 35, 113 S.Ct. 1075. The relief sought in both Andal and Kennedy is similar; it is local in nature and limited to the particular county in which the plaintiffs reside. The Andal plaintiffs seek a writ of mandate commanding the state to adjust the legislative and congressional district boundary lines in San Joaquin County and to not conduct an election there using the current lines. They also seek an order directing the state to renumber certain senatorial districts. The Kennedy plaintiffs seek a declaration that the redistricting plan embodied in SB 802/AB 632 is unconstitutional insofar as it partitions the South County area of Santa Clara County into different legislative districts. Those plaintiffs also seek an order directing the state to adjust the boundary lines of congressional district 11, Assembly district 27, and Senate district 51 so that in each case the South County area of Santa Clara County will fall entirely within a single district. Finally, the plaintiffs in Kennedy request an injunction preventing the state from utilizing the newly-drawn lines for any election in Santa Clara County.
The instant suit, by contrast, seeks relief limited to a different part of the state. Plaintiffs seek adjustments to the boundary lines of districts located only in Los Angeles and San Diego Counties.4 The nature of the relief requested here is therefore entirely different from that sought in the two state court suits: here, the relief pertains to counties geographically distant from the counties involved in the state court proceedings.
Defendant argues, however, that a ruling in favor of plaintiffs in either the Andal or Kennedy actions would have an impact on the matters at issue in this case because a favorable ruling for plaintiffs in either Andal or Kennedy would be based on principles that would apply state-wide and would thus require the redrawing of districts across the state, including those challenged by plaintiffs in this action. Further, defendant asserts that even if the legislature set out to redraw only the districts in San Joaquin and/or Santa Clara Counties that are challenged in the state court cases, there would be a ripple effect on the districts that plaintiffs challenge in this suit. Additionally, defendant notes that once the issue of redistricting is revisited...
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Cano v. Davis
...in the redistricting plan that would affect the districts challenged in this case, we denied the deferral motion. Cano v. Davis, 191 F.Supp.2d 1140 (C.D.Cal.2002) (per curiam). This court also decided motions asserting the legislative privilege of state legislators and their aides, filed in......
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Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n
...of social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open.” Cano v. Davis, 191 F.Supp.2d 1140, 1142 (C.D.Cal.2002) (quotation omitted). Second, it must be clear that the federal constitutional claim presented in the complaint “could ......