Cans v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 26 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 1-01-1588.,1-01-1588.
• Parties: CHICAGO ALLIANCE FOR NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO and Chicago Police Department, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

808 N.E.2d 56

348 Ill. App.3d 188

283 Ill.Dec. 506

CHICAGO ALLIANCE FOR NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO and Chicago Police Department, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

No. 1-01-1588.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division.

March 26, 2004.

Miller Shakman & Hamilton (Marc 0. Beem, Diane F. Klotnia and Michael S. D'Orsi, of counsel); Roger Baldwin Foundation of the American Civil Liberties Union (Harvey Grossman and Jane M. Whicher, of counsel), Chicago, for Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago, Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, Marc J. Boxerman, David A. Graver and Erika Dunning), for Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Presiding Justice FROSSARD delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety (CANS), brought this six-count complaint against defendants the City of Chicago (City) and the Chicago police department (Department) seeking equitable relief under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (FOIA or the Act) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2000)). After defendants produced most of the records sought by plaintiff in its complaint, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on counts I, II, III, and IV. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on count IV, and, following a bench trial, entered judgment in favor of defendants on counts I, II, and III. Plaintiff appeals the order granting summary judgment for defendants on count IV and the judgment after trial for defendants on counts I, II and III. Defendants cross-appeal fees awarded to plaintiff.

BACKGROUND

Count I sought, pursuant to section 9(b) of the Act (5 ILCS 140/9(b) (West 2000)), a writ of mandamus directing defendants to maintain all notices of denial in a single central office file open to the public and indexed according to the type of exemption asserted and, to the extent feasible, according to the types of records requested. Count II sought a writ of mandamus directing defendants to maintain and make available a detailed list of the types and categories of records under the Department's control pursuant to section 5 of the Act (5 ILCS 140/5 (West 2000)). Count III alleged defendants violated the Act by denying plaintiffs July 2, 1998, written request for copies of all FOIA requests to, and responses from, the Department from 1993 to the date of its request. Count III sought an injunction directing defendants to make available for inspection and copying all FOIA requests from January 1, 1993, to the date of judgment and the responses to those requests. Count IV alleged defendants violated the Act by denying plaintiffs request for "beat meeting forms," dispatch policy orders, and "beat integrity summaries" and sought an order directing the documents be made available. Counts V and VI requested overtime expenditures and district plans.

Defendants provided plaintiff with access to various documents—beat meeting forms (count IV), FOIA requests and responses to those requests (count III), and FOIA denial files (count I)—with redactions. Before disclosing beat meeting forms, defendants redacted names and addresses of "community liaisons" and participants. Defendants disclosed, pursuant to a protective order entered by the court on June 9, 1999, and an agreed order entered on August 20, 1999, FOIA requests and responses which the Department had in its possession. The protective order required defendants to produce these documents but restricted plaintiffs use of the information. The order barred plaintiff from disclosing names and addresses of individual FOIA requesters without leave of court and provided that requests and responses "shall be deemed constructively redacted.'" The order reserved plaintiffs right to challenge redactions, which applied only to individual requesters, not to organizations making FOIA requests. The Department began to maintain a file of notices denying FOIA requests (denial file) after plaintiffs initial request to inspect the file in May 1998 and provided plaintiff access to this file with names and addresses of FOIA requesters redacted. Defendants also tendered unredacted copies of the denials to plaintiff subject to the trial court's protective order.

Before trial, dispatch policy orders and beat summaries requested in count IV and all documents requested in counts V and VI were disclosed to plaintiff without redaction. Although defendants initially responded that many documents were exempt from disclosure or too burdensome to produce, they ultimately tendered most documents. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to unresolved issues in counts I, II, III and IV.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to counts III and IV alleged names and addresses of beat meeting participants and FOIA requesters were properly redacted pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of the Act. The Department's pamphlet entitled "Getting the Most From Your Beat Meeting" was attached to their "motion for summary judgment as to documents identified as privileged." That pamphlet stated "[b]eat meetings are regular meetings * * * where police and community residents meet to exchange information about conditions in neighborhoods, identify crime and disorder problems, and develop strategies to combat those problems." The pamphlet stated "[t]he purpose of the beat meeting is to allow beat residents, other stakeholders and police to discuss chronic problems on the beat and engage in problem solving."

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on counts I and II and a cross-motion for summary judgment on counts III and IV. Plaintiff attached exhibits to its cross-motion, including the Department's General Order 96-3, Addendum 5 (General Order 96-3) and a confidentiality agreement entered into by the Department and the Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium. General Order 96-3 provides the beat community meeting log "serves as the official record of the beat community meeting" and "feeds into the beat-planning and problem-solving process."

Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on counts I and II contending the Department's denial file complied with section 9(b) of the Act and its list of categories of records complied with section 5 of the Act. Defendants filed a response to plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment and attached to it the affidavit of Professor Wesley Skogan from the Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University (IPR). Skogan stated in his affidavit he was a political science and a faculty fellow at IPR, a public policy research organization. Since 1992, IPR, as part of the Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium, has monitored and evaluated the Community Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) program. For that evaluation, the City provided IPR with beat meeting forms including names and addresses of beat meeting participants. Skogan stated IPR agreed to and did in fact keep the disclosed information confidential.

After conducting a hearing, the court denied the parties' motions and cross-motions on counts I, II, and III and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on count IV stating:

"[T]he issue within count IV is whether the names of the Beat Meeting participants should be redacted from the Beat Meeting forms by the Chicago Police Department. Section 7(1)(b)[v] of the FOIA states that information exempted from disclosure under this subsection includes information revealing the identity of persons who filed complaints with or provide information to administrative, investigative, law enforcement or penal agencies. [Citation.] Referring to Section 7(1)(b), the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that when a public body claims that a requested document falls within one of these enumerated categories and is able to prove that claim, no further inquiry by the Court is necessary. * * * In the present case, participants at the Beat Meetings who are then listed in the minutes of those meetings are clearly providing information to law enforcement agencies. In fact that is one of the specific purposes of those meetings. Accordingly, this Court finds that the names of those participants are properly redacted on the Beat Meeting forms."

The court conducted a bench trial on what plaintiff and defendants agreed were the remaining issues in the case regarding counts I, II and III. The court identified those issues as follows:

1. Whether the Department's file of letters denying FOIA requests meets the requirements of section 9(b) of the Act;

2. Whether the Department's proposed list of "all types or categories of records under its control" satisfies section 5 of the Act; and

3. Whether the Department is entitled to redact, based on privacy, under section 7(1)(b) of the Act, the names and addresses of persons who make requests under the Act, "as those names and addresses appear in: (a) FOIA requests; (b) FOIA response letters; and (c) the [Department's file of letters denying FOIA requests."

It was stipulated at trial that various city departments and state agencies, including the Illinois State Police, Illinois Attorney General's office, Springfield police department, and Sangamon County sheriffs department, produced without redaction, FOIA requests and responses to requests.

Warren Friedman, a member of plaintiffs board of directors who had served as plaintiffs executive director for 17 years, testified for plaintiff regarding its purpose and how it sought to advance that purpose through FOIA requests. Friedman stated plaintiffs general purpose is "to work with community people and community organizations to make neighborhoods safer places to live for all residents." Monitoring government to ensure it acts in the public interest is critical to plaintiffs purpose. Friedman explained plaintiff sought information under the Act to "understand...