Canseco v. Spearman
| Decision Date | 09 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:17-cv-1133 DB P,2:17-cv-1133 DB P |
| Parties | EDGAR CANSECO, Plaintiff, v. M.E. SPEARMAN, Warden, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff alleges violations of his First Amendment and Equal Protection rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA").
Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.
Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff's trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to plaintiff's prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The in forma pauperis statute provides, "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Section 1983 "provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.
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At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was a state inmate housed at High Desert State Prison ("HDSP") in Susanville, California. He names the following individuals as defendants: HDSP Warden M.E. Spearman, HDSP Chief Deputy Warden T. Foss, HDSP Associate Warden H. Angela, and Does 1-100. They are sued in their official and individual capacities. Plaintiff brings suit for violations of his First Amendment and Equal Protection rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA").
Plaintiff's allegations may be fairly summarized as follows:
Though not explicit, the court assumes that plaintiff is a Muslim inmate. On April 4, 2016, plaintiff formally complained in a CDCR 602 inmate grievance on behalf of himself and other inmates of a HDSP policy that prevented "Close A" inmates1 from attending evening religious activities in the dining hall as required by the Islamic faith. This complaint was made in anticipation of upcoming religious observances during the holy month of Ramadan: the month of fasting with evening meals and the Eid ul Fitr post-Ramadan feast. Through the grievance, plaintiff sought permission for Close A inmates to be allowed in the dining hall until 2000 hours and for a memo issued to the correctional staff to permit Close A inmates in the dining hall.
The group grievance was submitted in April 2016 and assigned Log No. HDSO-B-16-01216. It was denied at the first level of review by defendant Associate Warden Angela on May 2, 2016, on the ground that, pursuant to institutional regulations in effect at the time, Close ACustody inmates are allowed program activities and assignments between the hours of 0600 and 1800 hours, unless extended by the warden to no later than 2000 hours. Since there was no mandate for the extension, the appeal was denied
The grievance was subsequently denied at the second level of review by defendant Chief Deputy Warden Foss on June 4, 2016, on the same grounds as denied by defendant Angela.
On September 8, 2016, the appeal was denied at the Director's level of review with citation to California Code of Regulations, tit. 15 § 3270, which provides that the primary objectives of correctional institutions is to protect the public, afford institutionalized persons with reasonable opportunity and encouragement to participate in rehabilitative activities, and to ensure the safety and security of the institution. Per this regulation, "The requirement of custodial security and of staff, inmate and public safety must take precedence over all other considerations in the operation of all the programs and activities of the institutions of the department."
During the processing of the group grievance, plaintiff claims he was unable to attend the July 22, 2016, Eid ul Fitr post-Ramadan feast in the dining hall following the month of fasting.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and damages.
Plaintiff has sued each defendant in his or her official capacity. "[A]n official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Unless waived, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court award of damages under § 1983 against a state, state agency, or state official sued in an official capacity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979). Moreover, neither a state nor a state official sued in an official capacity for monetary damages is a "person" for purposes of a § 1983 damages action. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, even if a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court, Will precludes a damages action against the state government entity or a state official sued in an official capacity for monetary damages. Id. For these reasons, plaintiff's claims for damages against defendants in their official capacity should be dismissed.
As for plaintiff's individual capacity claims, under § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 695 (1978).
Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Since a government official cannot be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability in § 1983 actions, plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing that the official has violated the Constitution through his own individual actions by linking each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff's federal rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
Liability may be imposed on supervisory defendants under § 1983 only if the supervisor: (1) personally participated in the deprivation of constitutional rights or directed the violations or (2) knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Defendants cannot be held liable for being generally deficient in their supervisory duties.
Plaintiff's complaint seeks to impose liability on defendant Warden Spearman solely for failing to properly train defendants Foss and Angela. See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 23. He asserts no allegations specifically linking this defendant to the alleged denial of his constitutional rights, and he further fails to include any allegations that there exists a CDCR policy or custom depriving Muslim inmates of participating in religious services. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim against this defendant fails.
Plaintiff has named 100 Doe defendants but is hereby advised that the court cannot order service of a Doe defendant because the United States Marshal cannot serve a Doe Defendant. Therefore, to the extent plaintiff states a claim against any Doe defendant, he will be required to identify him or her with enough information to locate the defendant for service of process. TheUnited States Marshal cannot initiate service of process on unknown defendants. Plaintiff will be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown (Doe) defendants. Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 978 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting...
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