Cantamessa v. Cantamessa

• Decision Date: 14 February 1991
• Citation: Cantamessa v. Cantamessa, 565 N.Y.S.2d 895, 170 A.D.2d 792 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
• Parties: Lorenzo CANTAMESSA, Appellant, v. Jo Ann CANTAMESSA, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 895

565 N.Y.S.2d 895

170 A.D.2d 792

Lorenzo CANTAMESSA, Appellant, v. Jo Ann CANTAMESSA, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Feb. 14, 1991.

Maher & Brofman (Susan Bauer Brofman, of counsel), Carmel, for appellant.

Joseph J.A. Tringali, Eastchester, for respondent.

Before WEISS, J.P., and MIKOLL, YESAWICH, LEVINE and MERCURE, JJ.

MERCURE, Justice.

Appeals (transferred to this court by order of the Appellate Division, Second Department) (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Sweeny, Jr., J.), entered September 6, 1989 in Putnam County, which, inter alia, granted defendant's motion to vacate a judgment of divorce, and (2) from an order of said court, entered November 29, 1989 in Putnam County, which granted defendant's motion for resettlement.

Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1976. Plaintiff commenced an action for divorce in July 1984. On January 11, 1989, the parties and their attorneys appeared for trial in Supreme Court and, following numerous and lengthy discussions, entered into a stipulation of settlement in open court, thereafter incorporated into a judgment of divorce. The stipulation provided, inter alia, that plaintiff was to retain title to the parties' marital residence and his interest in the Top Job Sanitation Company; defendant was to receive a lump-sum payment of $106,000 and was to retain her pension and certain items of personalty. The parties waived their rights to maintenance. After placing the foregoing terms on the record, Supreme Court questioned defendant, who stated that she understood the terms, that she had been provided with enough time to discuss the settlement with her attorney, and that she was satisfied with both the agreement and her attorney's representation. Subsequently, defendant moved to set aside the stipulation and the judgment of divorce upon the grounds that the terms of the stipulation were inequitable and unconscionable and that she was coerced by comments made by the Trial Judge. The motion was granted. This appeal by plaintiff ensued.

The courts of this State favor stipulations of settlement and will not lightly cast them aside, especially where, as here, they are made in open court (see, Bossom v. Bossom, 141 A.D.2d 794, 795, 529 N.Y.S.2d 1022), by parties who are represented by counsel, and after engaging in negotiations between themselves and in consultation with the court for several hours prior to the time the terms are placed on the record (see, Golfinopoulos v. Golfinopoulos, 144 A.D.2d 537, 538, 534 N.Y.S.2d 407, lv. dismissed 74 N.Y.2d 793, 545 N.Y.S.2d 108, 543 N.E.2d 751). As the Court of Appeals stated in Christian v Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 71, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817, 365 N.E.2d 849, "[j]udicial review is to be exercised circumspectly, sparingly and with a persisting view to the encouragement of parties settling their own differences". Nonetheless, due to the existence of a fiduciary relationship between husband and wife, stipulations of settlement should be closely scrutinized (see, Paruch v. Paruch, 140 A.D.2d 418, 420, 528 N.Y.S.2d 119) and will be set aside upon the demonstration of good cause, such as mistake, fraud, duress or overreaching (see, Perl v. Perl, 126 A.D.2d 91, 95, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372; Grunfeld v. Grunfeld, 123 A.D.2d 64, 509 N.Y.S.2d 928), or when found to be unconscionable (see, Christian v. Christian, supra, 42 N.Y.2d at 71, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817, 365 N.E.2d 849; Grunfeld v. Grunfeld, supra, 123 A.D.2d at 68, 509 N.Y.S.2d 928).

Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that defendant's assertions constitute an insufficient basis on which to vacate the stipulation of settlement. While the parties were encouraged to accept the stipulation, the record does not demonstrate that the Trial Judge exerted undue pressure or engaged in coercive measures (see, Anderson v. Anderson, 90 A.D.2d 763, 455 N.Y.S.2d 304; cf., Schunk v. Schunk, 84 A.D.2d 904, 905, 446 N.Y.S.2d 672). Defendant's allegations are belied by the plain language of the court's inquiry and the fact that defendant was not "pressured" into settling the matter over the previous 4 1/2 years it was in litigation. Furthermore, defendant's claimed...