Canteen Serv. Co. Of Ind.polis Inc. v. Ind. Dep't Of Transp.
| Citation | 932 N.E.2d 749 |
| Decision Date | 20 August 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 82A04-0908-CV-466.,82A04-0908-CV-466. |
| Parties | CANTEEN SERVICE COMPANY OF INDIANAPOLIS, INC., Appellant-Plaintiff, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
G. Michael Schopmeyer, Michael E. Dirienzo, Kahn, Dees, Donovan & Kahn, LLP, Evansville, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, David L. Steiner, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Canteen Service Company of Indianapolis, Inc. (“Canteen”) appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of the Indiana Department of Transportation (“INDOT”) on Canteen's claim for damages from an alleged inverse condemnation. Canteen raises two issues for our review:
1. Whether Canteen's previous sale of its property adjacent and contiguous to First Avenue extinguished its right of direct access to First Avenue; and
2. Whether INDOT's relocation of Canteen's entrance to First Avenue by 210 feet, and by way of a frontage road, amounted to a “taking” under Indiana law.
We hold that the trial court's finding that Canteen had sold fee simple title to the land it used for direct access to First Avenue is supported by the evidence and therefore not clearly erroneous. We also hold that INDOT's reconfiguration of Canteen's access to First Avenue did not amount to a taking under Indiana law. Thus, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
In 1965, the owner of real property located at 2400 North First Avenue in Evansville (“the Property”) granted a ten-foot-wide easement along the Property's entire eastern border, parallel and adjacent to First Avenue, to the City of Evansville. Canteen subsequently became the owner of the Property and, in 1976, Canteen agreed to grant the City an additional easement. The 1976 easement covered a forty-five foot wide eastern segment of the Property parallel to the 1965 easement and First Avenue. However, Canteen reserved a five-foot wide, unencumbered strip of property between the 1965 and the 1976 easements.
In the late 1970s, the City built a public frontage road, Beverly Avenue, over and along the 1976 easement. Beverly Avenue lay on the eastern side of Canteen's property. To the east of Beverly Avenue was the parallel First Avenue, and in between the two easements lay the unencumbered five-foot gap. Canteen's property had direct access to First Avenue, across Beverly Avenue and the five-foot gap.
In 2001, Canteen sold to the State, for the sum of $16,550, the fee simple title underlying the 1965 easement, the unencumbered gap between the 1965 and 1976 easements, and the eastern 18.98 feet of the 1976 easement. Canteen's 2001 Warranty Deed “specifically acknowledge[d] that the Real Estate conveyed herein [wa]s conveyed in fee simple and that no reversionary rights whatsoever shall remain with [Canteen]....” Appellant's Addendum Exh. 1 at 1. The real estate Canteen sold to the State included the drive Canteen had used as its direct access to First Avenue.
Sometime after the 2001 sale, INDOT began construction on Project Number DSB-012-2(010) (“the Project”), which called for a modification of the intersection of State Road 66 and First Avenue and improvements along First Avenue. Around April of 2006, INDOT's construction on the Project resulted in the removal of Canteen's direct access to First Avenue. INDOT relocated Canteen's entrance about 210 feet to the south, which resulted in Canteen's customers and employees having to drive along more frontage road and past neighboring, competing businesses to access Canteen's site.
On October 15, 2007, Canteen filed its complaint for inverse condemnation against INDOT. Canteen alleged that INDOT's elimination of Canteen's direct access to First Avenue-by requiring use of an access or frontage road and by moving Canteen's entrance to First Avenue 210 feet to the south-constituted a taking of Canteen's right of ingress and egress to its property. On December 29, 2008, the court held a bench trial and, after a second hearing on March 30, 2009, the court entered its findings, conclusions, and judgment in INDOT's favor on July 20. In particular, the court concluded that Canteen's 2001 sale of the eastern 33.98 feet of the Property was a “closed transaction[ ] for which just compensation has been paid.” Appellant's App. at 9-10. The court also concluded that, even if Canteen had retained a right of access to First Avenue across the land it had sold, the State's relocation of the entrance 210 feet to the south did not amount to a taking under Indiana law. This appeal ensued.
Canteen appeals the trial court's judgment after the court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). When a court has made special findings, we review the judgment using a two-step process. Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind.1997). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact. Id. Second, we must determine whether those findings support the trial court's conclusions. Id. Findings will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id.
In order to determine that a finding or conclusion is clearly erroneous, an appellate court's review of the evidence must leave it with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In applying this standard, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Crawley v. Oak Bend Estates Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 753 N.E.2d 740, 744 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (citation and quotation omitted), trans. denied. Rather, we consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. We may affirm the judgment on any legal theory supported by the findings. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 695 N.E.2d 920, 923 (Ind.1998).
Further, Canteen appeals from a negative judgment. See Curley v. Lake County Bd. of Elections & Registration, 896 N.E.2d 24, 32 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied. It must, therefore, establish that the trial court's judgment is contrary to law. Id. A judgment is contrary to law only if the evidence in the record, along with all reasonable inferences, is without conflict and leads unerringly to a conclusion opposite that reached by the trial court. Id. Thus, Canteen carries a heavy burden on appeal.
Canteen first asserts that the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that Canteen's 2001 property sale was a bar to Canteen's claim for inverse condemnation. As Canteen's counsel clarified at oral argument, in selling the land to the State Canteen believed it had retained a right to access First Avenue directly across the land sold, and Canteen was surprised by the State's later decision in 2006 to relocate that access. Canteen also contends that the State had an affirmative duty to state expressly in the 2001 Warranty Deed that the sale would extinguish Canteen's direct access to First Avenue.
INDOT responds as follows:
After the State purchased the land in fee simple from Canteen in 2001, Canteen had no land abutting First Avenue, and Canteen's property was located west of Beverly Avenue. As a result of the warranty deed of 2001 and the previous public road easements in favor of the City of Evansville and the construction of Beverly Avenue, Canteen retained no easement or access point abutting First Avenue. Canteen's right of access to the road system after the 2001 deed was by way of Beverly Avenue. Thus Canteen's argument ... has no factual basis.
We must agree with INDOT. The 2001 Warranty Deed plainly evinces a sale of fee simple title of the land in question to the State. “Fee simple” is defined as “[a]n interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by law, endures until the current holder dies without heirs.” Black's Law Dictionary 630 (7th ed. 1999). In other words, Canteen's sale of the fee simple title conveyed all of its right, title, and interest in the land to the State.
Additionally, we cannot agree with Canteen's argument that the State has an affirmative duty to state in the deed that the sale would permanently extinguish Canteen's right of access to First Avenue. As described in more detail below, the State's relocation of the entrance 210 feet directly south did not extinguish Canteen's right of access to First Avenue. Rather, Canteen's right of access to First Avenue after the 2001 sale was by way of a frontage road, Beverly Avenue. The trial court's judgment on this issue was not clearly erroneous.
Even if Canteen had retained an interest in direct access to First Avenue, the relocation of the entrance was not a taking under Indiana law. Our Supreme Court recently considered inverse condemnation actions based on a change in access to property. In particular, the court discussed Indiana law as follows:
Indiana law has specifically addressed the damages to adjacent landowners from reconfigured highways. Many of the principles applicable ... come from this Court's opinion in State v. Ensley, 240 Ind. 472, 164 N.E.2d 342 (1960)....
... The [ Ensley ] Court explained that “acts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers and not directly encroaching on private property, although their consequences may impair its use or value, do not constitute a ‘taking’ within the purview of [Indiana Constitution article I, section 21].” Id. [at 482, 164 N.E.2d at 346.] “Any injury so caused is deemed to be remote and inconsequential, and thus not compensable in the absence of an express statute to the contrary.” Id. at 482, 164 N.E.2d at 346-47....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
AAA Fed. Credit Union v. Ind. Dep't of Transp.
...entered findings and conclusions prior to judgment, we review the judgment in two steps. Canteen Serv. Co. of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Ind. Dep't of Transp. , 932 N.E.2d 749, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We first determine whether the evidence supported the findings, then whether the findings sup......
-
Jablonski v. City Of Bloomington
...is not surprising that the City cannot bring to court its representative from thirty-eight years ago. Under these facts, I would conclude 932 N.E.2d 749that the statute of limitations bars the plaintiffs' claims against the City.--------Notes: 1An action for inverse condemnation requires: “......