Canterbury v. Federal-Mogul Ignition Co., 3:06-cv-00044.

• Decision Date: 16 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 3:06-cv-00044.,3:06-cv-00044.
• Parties: Joseph C. CANTERBURY, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL-MOGUL IGNITION CO., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

483 F.Supp.2d 820

Joseph C. CANTERBURY, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL-MOGUL IGNITION CO., Defendant.

No. 3:06-cv-00044.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Davenport Division.

April 16, 2007.

Catherine M. Drexler, Gordon R. Fischer, Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.

Martha L. Shaff, Betty Neuman & McMahon, LLP, Davenport, IA, Robert W. Stewart, Lowenbaum Partnership LLC, Clayton, MO, for Defendant.

ORDER ON MOTIONS

PRATT, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant's First Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk's No. 42), filed November 29, 2006. Plaintiff filed a resistance to the motion (Clerk's No. 54) and Defendant replied (Clerk's No. 56). The matter is fully submitted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Joseph Canterbury ("Canterbury") filed the present action on September 12, 2005, in the Iowa District Court in and for Des Moines County, Iowa. Defendant removed the matter on October 11, 2005. Jurisdiction is proper under both 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1332.

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that he commenced employment with Federal-Mogul on October 11, 1999 as a metal working supply clerk. During the course of his employment, Plaintiff performed his job to the best of his abilities, never receiving any oral or written disciplinary warning during his entire employ. Eventually, Plaintiff received a promotion to the position of Pincell Suros Operator. Plaintiff is a Type II diabetic. On February 14, 2005, he was diagnosed with pneumonia and bronchitis and was absent from work from February 15-21, 2005, due to his illness and the side effects that illness imposed on his diabetes. Plaintiff notified his employer of his absences in accordance with Federal Mogul's absence policy, but was terminated on February 22, 2005. Plaintiff's Complaint asserts causes of action under two federal statutes, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq., and a state claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA").

Approximately two months after Plaintiff's discharge, on April 29, 2005, he filed a Voluntary Chapter 7 Petition for Bankruptcy. Plaintiff was represented in the Bankruptcy proceedings by Steven Hahn. On May 5, 2005, Plaintiff hired Gordon Fischer to represent him in bringing the present claims against Defendant. On May 18, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission ("ICRC"). Though Plaintiff never reported during the administration of his bankruptcy case that he had claims against Defendant, he was granted a discharge in the bankruptcy on July 26, 2005. Shortly thereafter, on September 8, 2005, Plaintiff was issued a Right to Sue letter by the ICRC. As noted, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the present action in state court on September 12, 2005.

Plaintiff was served by Defendant with interrogatories on March 8, 2006. In response to a question regarding other legal proceedings, Plaintiff replied that he was not a party to any other legal proceedings, despite the fact that he had recently been a party in the bankruptcy. Pursuant to a scheduling order filed in this case, the last day for Motions for Leave to Amend the Pleadings and for Leave to Add Parties was June 1, 2006. On November 2, 2006, however, Defendant learned that Plaintiff had failed to disclose his Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in response to Defendant's interrogatories. Counsel for Defendant emailed Gordon Fischer regarding this matter. On November 17, 2006, Plaintiff's Bankruptcy case was reopened after the Trustee was "advised that there is a previously undisclosed non-scheduled asset in the nature of Debtors' cause of action against Federal Mogul Ignition." See Case No. 05-03088-1mj7, Clerk's No. 14 (B.R.Iowa S.D.). On November 27, 2006, the Bankruptcy Trustee, Wesley Huisinga, requested that the Bankruptcy Court permit him to employ Gordon Fischer to prosecute Plaintiffs claims against Defendant on behalf of the Trustee. See id. Clerk's No. 19. The request was granted by the Bankruptcy Court on December 29, 2006. Id. Clerk's No. 22.

After the request by the Trustee to employ Mr. Fischer, but before the request was granted, Defendant filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert all causes of action raised in the Complaint, and asserting that Plaintiff is judicially estopped from presenting the present claims to the Court because he failed to schedule such claims in his Bankruptcy proceedings. On January 16, 2007, Plaintiff filed a resistance to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. On the same date, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to Substitute the Real Party in Interest Under Rule 17 (Clerk's No. 53), seeking to amend the Complaint to substitute Trustee Huisinga as the real party in interest in the case. Defendant filed a resistance (Clerk's No. 57) to Plaintiffs request to amend, and Chief Magistrate Judge Thomas Shields held a hearing on the motion on March 9, 2007. See Clerk's No. 81. To date, Judge Shields has not ruled on the pending Motion to Amend.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment has a special place in civil litigation. The device "has proven its usefulness as a means of avoiding full-dress trials in unwinnable cases, thereby freeing courts to utilize scarce judicial resources in more beneficial ways." Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991). In operation, the role of summary judgment is to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required. See id.; see also Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990). "[S]ummary judgment is an extreme remedy, and one which is not to be granted unless the movant has established his right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and that the other party is not entitled to recover under any discernible circumstances." Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 209 (8th Cir.1976) (citing Windsor v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 523 F.2d 891, 893 n. 5 (8th Cir.1975)). The purpose of the rule is not "`to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try,'" Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (quoting Sartor v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967 (1944)), but to avoid "useless, expensive and time-consuming trials where there is actually no genuine, factual issue remaining to be tried." Anderson v. Viking Pump Div., Houdaille Indus., Inc., 545 F.2d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir.1976) (citing Lyons v. Board of Educ., 523 F.2d 340, 347 (8th Cir.1975)).

The plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The precise standard for granting summary judgment is well-established and oft-repeated: summary judgment is properly granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir.1994). The court does not weigh the evidence nor make credibility determinations, rather the court only determines whether there are any disputed issues and, if so, whether those issues are both genuine and material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Wilson v. Myers, 823 F.2d 253, 256 (8th Cir.1987) ("Summary judgment is not designed to weed out dubious claims, but to eliminate those claims with no basis in material fact.").

It is the unusual case where the party shouldering the burden of proof prevails on a summary judgment motion. See Turner v. Ferguson, 149 F.3d 821, 824 (8th Cir.1998) ("Summary judgments in favor of parties who have the burden of proof are rare, and rightly so.").

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Once the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by affidavits or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original). An issue is "genuine," if the evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material.... Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Defendant's First Motion for Summary Judgment argues that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed because he has, at all times, lacked standing to bring his claims before the Court. Defendant first argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert his present claims...