Cantin v. Maine School Administrative District No. 6, Docket No. 99-271-P-H (D. Me. 4/24/2000)

• Decision Date: 24 April 2000
• Docket Number: Docket No. 99-271-P-H.
• Parties: SARAH CANTIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MAINE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT NO. 6, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

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SARAH CANTIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.MAINE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT NO. 6, et al., Defendants.

Docket No. 99-271-P-H.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

April 24, 2000.

KIM MATTHEWS, ESQ., ME, KELLY L FUSCO, Individually and as next friend and parent of Sarah Cantin, plaintiff.

MELISSA A. HEWEY, DRUMMOND, WOODSUM, PLIMPTON & MACMAHON, PORTLAND, ME, MAINE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE, DISTRICTNO. 6, defendant.

RECOMMENDED DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DAVID M. COHEN, Magistrate Judge.

The defendants, Maine School Administrative DistrictNo. 6("the District"), Martha Corkery and Ansel Stevens, move for summary judgment on the remaining counts of the second amended complaint¹ in this action arising out of events at a middle school dance.I recommend that the court grant the motion.

I.Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)."In this regard, `material' means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if the dispute is resolved favorably to the nonmovant.By like token, `genuine' means that `the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party. . . .'"McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315(1st Cir.1995)(citations omitted).The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325(1986).In determining whether this burden is met, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor.Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 959(1st Cir.1997).Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, "the nonmovant must contradict the showing by pointing to specific facts demonstrating that there is, indeed, a trial-worthy issue."National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735(1st Cir.1995)(citingCelotex, 477 U.S. at 324);Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)."This is especially true in respect to claims or issues on which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof."International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 200(1st Cir.1996)(citations omitted).

II.Factual Background

The following undisputed material facts are appropriately supported in the summary judgment record.²The District operates public schools for several Maine towns, including a middle school known as Bonny Eagle Middle School ("BEMS"), of which defendant Stevens was principal at all relevant times.Affidavit of Ansel Stevens("Stevens Aff.")(Docket No. 19) ¶¶ 1-2.Defendant Corkery was a vice-principal of BEMS at all relevant times.Affidavit of Martha Corkery("Corkery Aff.")(Docket No. 20) ¶ 1.BEMS provides education for sixth, seventh and eighth grade students; each grade is housed in a separate wing or floor.StevensAff. ¶ 3.During the 1998/99 school year, the District operated a special education program for certain students at BEMS.Id.¶ 4.The program was overseen by a single special education teacher, Rosie Rinaldi, and included both sixth and seventh grade students.Id.It was located in the seventh grade wing and all of the students in the program were assigned to the seventh grade "Edinburgh Clan."Id.

Plaintiff Cantin was assigned to this program in the 1998/99 school year, which was her first year at BEMS.Id.¶ 5.During the 1997/98 school year, Cantin was a fifth grade student at the Hollis Elementary School.Deposition of Sarah E. Cantin("Cantin Dep."), filed with Motion of Defendants M.S.A.D. No. 6, Martha Corkery and Ansel Stevens for Summary Judgment, etc. ("Defendants' Motion")(Docket No. 17), at 4.Three other students in the program, Lacey, Amanda and Tonya, were also in their first year at BEMS, while students in the program named Melanie and Andrew were in their second year at BEMS.StevensAff. ¶¶ 5-6.PlaintiffKelly Fusco is the mother of plaintiff Cantin.Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts ("Plaintiffs' SMF")(Docket No. 28) ¶ 1;Defendants' Reply Statement of Fact ("Defendants' Reply SMF")(Docket No. 31) ¶ 1.

The first school dance of the 1998/99 school year at BEMS was held on October 9, 1998.StevensAff. ¶ 7.BEMS policy regarding school dances is set forth in the BEMS student handbook as follows:

Dances and activities are a privilege.School dances are held each year for seventh and eighth graders only.Because of limited capacity and our discomfort with supervising students we do not know, guests are not allowed to attend.Dances are from 7:00 — 9:30 p.m.

Student Assignment Book, Bonny Eagle Middle School, Exh. 1 to Stevens Aff., at 7.Students who are not in seventh or eighth grade are not permitted to attend dances and are asked to leave if they attempt to attend.StevensAff. ¶¶ 7-8.This is a common occurrence, particularly at the first dance of the school year.Id.¶ 8.All seventh and eighth grade students are permitted to attend, including students receiving special education services.Id.¶ 7.

Defendants Stevens and Corkery both attended the dance.Id.¶ 9;CorkeryAff. ¶ 2.Melanie also attended the dance.CorkeryAff. ¶ 4.Shortly after the dance began, Corkery was told that some sixth graders were present.Id.¶ 3.She reported this to Stevens.Id.Stevens told her that sixth grade students could not remain at the dance and instructed her to call the students' parents to have them picked up.StevensAff. ¶ 10.Corkery took four girls whom she believed to be sixth grade students, including Cantin and the three other girls who were in their first year in the special education program, to her office where she called their parents.CorkeryAff. ¶ 4.Corkery did not ask Melanie to accompany her to her office because Melanie was in her second year at BEMS.Id.At the time she made the telephone calls, and throughout the evening of October 9, 1998, Corkery believed that Cantin and the three other girls were in the sixth grade, as reflected on the student directory Corkery had.Id.¶¶ 4-6 & Exh. 1.Stevens also believed at the time that Cantin was in the sixth grade.StevensAff. ¶ 11.

Cantin told Corkery several times that she was a seventh grader.Affidavit of PlaintiffSarah Cantin("Cantin Aff.")(Docket No. 26) ¶ 10.Fusco, after she arrived at BEMS in response to Corkery's call, made known to Corkery and Stevens that Cantin was a seventh grade student.Affidavit of PlaintiffKelly Fusco("Fusco Aff.")(Docket No. 27) ¶¶ 22, 25.Cantin attended classes and socialized with other seventh grade students.Plaintiffs'SMF ¶ 10;Defendants' ReplySMF ¶ 10.She was issued a school identification card identifying her as a seventh grader.Id.Her Individual Education Plan identified her as a seventh grade student.Id.Neither Corkery nor Stevens made any attempt on October 9, 1998 to determine whether Cantin was in fact a seventh grader or whether she had been invited to the dance by her teacher and teacher's aide.Plaintiffs'SMF ¶ 16;Defendants' ReplySMF ¶ 16.

After the October 9, 1998 dance the District changed its policy to allow students in multi-age groups like the one attended by Cantin during the 1997/98 school year to attend school dances.StevensAff. ¶ 12.

III.Discussion

A.Disability (Counts I and II)

Count I of the second amended complaint alleges a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.Second Amended Complaint¶¶ 28-29.Count II alleges a violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 794. Id.¶¶ 30-31.In order to recover on either count, Cantin must establish that she was disabled within the meaning of the applicable statute.

Specifically, the ADA provides that:

no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12132.A "qualified individual with a disability" is defined as

an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).

The Rehabilitation Act provides that:

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . .. shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . .

29 U.S.C. § 794(a).The term "individual with a disability" is defined, for purposes of the plaintiffs' claims in this case, as

any person who —

(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities;

(ii) has a record of such an impairment; or

(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.

29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B).

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs cannot establish that Cantin meets either of these definitions.³In response, the plaintiffs rely solely on paragraph 32 of plaintiff Fusco's affidavit.Plaintiffs'SMF ¶ 5.As the defendants correctly point out, Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment(Docket No. 30)at 1-3, that paragraph of Fusco's affidavit is...