Cantin v. Young
| Citation | 742 A.2d 1246 |
| Decision Date | 03 November 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-267.,99-267. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | Lynn CANTIN v. Douglas YOUNG. |
Present AMESTOY, C.J., DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.
Defendant Douglas Young moves to dismiss the appeal filed by the Office of Child Support (OCS) because OCS has exceeded its power to act. We grant the motion.
Lynn Cantin and Douglas Young were divorced in 1993. In 1998, Cantin petitioned the court for a modification of child support, after she was notified that Young was to receive a workers' compensation award.
Several hearings were held in the matter at which OCS participated, assisting Cantin. After a decision was rendered in July 1998, defendant requested a reconsideration, which was decided by the magistrate in his favor. OCS appealed from that decision; Cantin did not. Defendant moved to dismiss the appeal because OCS was not a party, and was exceeding its statutory authority. The court denied the motion, and decided the appeal, substantially affirming the magistrate's decision. On OCS's appeal to this Court, defendant has again moved to dismiss the appeal, on the same grounds.
We must first address the basis for the family court's decision. It found that defendant had failed to object to OCS's participation during the hearings before the magistrate, and therefore was barred from objecting on appeal. We do not agree that defendant waived his right to object to OCS participation as a party. It was not until OCS filed its appeal that it became apparent that OCS was not merely assisting Cantin, as her representative, but was acting as an independent party. Thus, we reach the merits of defendant's motion.
At the outset, we emphasize that this is not a case in which the support obligee—Cantin—has assigned her rights to OCS. See 33 V.S.A. § 4106. Defendant agrees that in that circumstance OCS is the party in interest and can appeal from an adverse decision. Here, OCS is acting pursuant to its responsibility to provide "[u]pon application of the parent of a minor child ... [a]ny ... services required to be provided under Title IV-D." 33 V.S.A. § 4102(c)(6) "Title IV-D" refers to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, which requires that states implement programs to assist in obtaining spousal and child support from absent parents. See 42 U.S.C. § 651. The state is required to provide "all appropriate IV-D services" in non-assignment cases. 45 C.F.R. § 302.33(a)(5). We have reviewed the federal statute and implementing regulations and can find no requirement that the state child support agency have the power to independently seek court action, apart from a parent it is assisting, except where there is an assignment of support. Indeed, the statutory requirement that the state have a periodic review process for child support orders specifically applies only to modification requests made by "either parent," except in assignment cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(10)(A).
Assuming the power that OCS seeks is not specified or required in federal law, OCS suggests that it can be found in Vermont statutes. We agree that the Legislature could grant OCS the power to intervene in support establishment and modification proceedings, acting independently, and not for either parent. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill.2d 414, 223 Ill.Dec. 647, 680 N.E.2d 380, 387 (1997) (). We cannot find, however, that it has done so. The most relevant statutes are 15 V.S.A. §§ 658(b) and 660(a). The former statute allows a request for support to be made "by either parent, by a guardian, or by the departments of social and rehabilitation services or social welfare, or by the office of child support, if a party in interest." OCS was added as a permissible party to file a support petition in 1990, see 1989, No. 220 (Adj.Sess.), § 21, but like the departments of social welfare and social and rehabilitation services, its power is limited to instances in which it "is a party in interest." See 15 V.S.A. § 658(b). We believe the effect of the proviso is to limit its power to cases in which it holds an assignment of support rights. If it could initiate any support case, the proviso language would be unnecessary. See In re Lunde, 166 Vt. 167, 171, 688 A.2d 1312, 1315 (1997) ().
This interpretation is reinforced by § 660, which deals with modification proceedings, the type of proceeding before us....
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Cantin v. Young
...agreed with father, dismissed the appeal filed by OCS, and granted mother thirty days to file her own notice of appeal. Cantin v. Young, 170 Vt. 563, 742 A.2d 1246 (1999). 3. Section 653 was added to Title 15 during the adjourned session of the 1985 Legislature by Act 180, An Act Relating t......
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Wood ex rel. Eddy v. Eddy
...in the statute. Because we will not construe a statute to render a significant part of it pure surplusage, Cantin v. Young, 170 Vt. 563, 564, 742 A.2d 1246, 1247 (1999) (mem.), we must conclude that § 1101(1)(C) alone provides the definition of abuse relevant to relief from abuse hearings i......
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OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT LEWIS v. Lewis, 03-354.
...is a party in interest in this case because neither agency holds an assignment of support rights from mother. See Cantin v. Young, 170 Vt. 563, 564, 742 A.2d 1246, 1247 (1999) (mem.) (holding that OCS is not a party in interest in a child support proceeding where OCS has not received an ass......