Canto v. J.B. Ivey and Co., 91-539
| Citation | 595 So.2d 1025 |
| Decision Date | 09 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-539,91-539 |
| Parties | 17 Fla. L. Weekly D674 Joseph V. CANTO, Jr. et al., Appellants, v. J.B. IVEY AND COMPANY, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Joseph V. Canto, Gainesville, for appellants.
John M. Green, Jr. and Loren E. Levy, of Cone, Green & Kaster, P.A., Ocala, for appellees.
Appellants Joseph V. Canto, Jr., and Samantha C. Canto appeal from a judgment against them in their tort action against appellees, J.B. Ivey and Company ("Ivey") and JoAnn Williams. They claim the verdict form was ambiguous and compelled a verdict against them on counts I and III, alleging false imprisonment, and negligent hiring against Ivey, respectively; that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for appellees on counts II, IV, and V, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress against Ivey, defamation by employee Williams, and defamation by Ivey based on statements of Williams and employee Kirsten Aalto; and that the trial court erred in holding prior to trial that appellants had not made a proper showing under Section 768.72, Florida Statutes (1989), that they were entitled to punitive damages against the corporate appellee. We affirm on all points.
On November 16, 1986, Joseph Canto, Jr., then eleven years old, and Samantha Canto, then sixteen, went shopping at Ivey's Department Store in Gainesville. After entering the store, they stopped at a display table to look at metallic chain-link belts. A videotape taken by a security camera shows the children stopping at the display table, handling the jewelry and exchanging conversation while looking around, and Samantha handing something to Joseph, which he placed in his pocket. Williams stopped the children as they were leaving the store and told them she had reason to believe that they had stolen something and to follow her to the security office. The sheriff's report discloses that Williams called the sheriff's office soon thereafter, but that an officer did not arrive for another hour. Another employee, managing agent Kirsten Aalto, arrived at the security office and aided Williams. The children were released by the officer about two hours after they were initially detained by Williams. No merchandise was found on the children.
The children, through their parents, filed a five-count complaint for damages, alleging that Williams and Aalto interrogated the children in an intimidating manner, denied the childrens' requests to use the bathroom and to call their parents, and characterized the children as "delinquents" and "shoplifters." Appellants asked for damages incurred for psychological counseling and treatment of the children after the incident, and punitive damages.
After trial but before jury deliberation, the court directed a verdict against appellants on counts II, IV, and V. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Ivey on counts I and III.
As to appellants' first argument, regarding the defective jury verdict, Ivey had raised the defense at trial that it was immune from liability for false imprisonment pursuant to Section 812.015, Florida Statutes (1989). Subsection (3)(a) thereof provides:
A law enforcement officer, a merchant, a merchant's employee, or a farmer who has probable cause to believe that retail or farm theft has been committed by a person and that he can recover the property by taking the person into custody may, for the purpose of attempting to effect such recovery or for prosecution, take the person into custody and detain him in a reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time.... In the event the merchant, merchant's employee, or farmer takes the person into custody, a law enforcement officer shall be called to the scene immediately after the person has been taken into custody.
Appellants first claim that the verdict form submitted to the jurors was an improper statement of the law and could have confused them, because it asked whether Ivey employees detained the children "in an unreasonable manner and without probable cause to believe that they had committed retail theft." (Emphasis added.) Appellants contend that liability could be imposed if the merchant's employees failed to comply with any of the requirements of subsection (3), and that the jury should have been asked whether Ivey's employees restrained the children "without probable cause or in an unreasonable manner or for an unreasonable length of time." We disagree that the verdict form's failure to include this language constitutes reversible error.
Section 812.015(5) provides:
A merchant, merchant's employee, or farmer who takes a person into custody, as provided in subsection (3) ... shall not be criminally or civilly liable for false arrest or false imprisonment when the merchant, merchant's employee, or farmer has probable cause to believe that the person committed retail theft or farm theft.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, Ivey could not be liable under count I for false imprisonment if the jury determined there was probable cause for the detention. Hood v. Zayre Corp, 529 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). Although the verdict form should have omitted the phrase "in an unreasonable manner and," we do not consider its inclusion to be reversible error. The judge instructed the jurors that if they found at any time during the detention there was no longer probable cause to detain the children, they should find for the plaintiffs. We consider that this instruction clarified any possible confusion the verdict form may have engendered.
As to appellants' second issue, the Cantos contend the trial court erred in directing a verdict against them on their claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. We agree that the trial court erred in concluding that a corporate employer cannot be held vicariously liable for an intentional act of its employee. Dieas v....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Std. Jury Instructions in Civil Cases -- Report No. 09-01
...an assertion of the store's rights in a legally permissible way, and was privileged “as a matter of law.” In Canto v. J.B. Ivey & Co., 595 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), two children were detained by a merchant who suspected them of shoplifting; citing McCarson and the Restatement (2......
-
Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co.
...appellees to show that the ruling was correct. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979); Canto v. J.B. Ivey and Co., 595 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Persuaded, as we are, that the trial court's decision was correct based on the evidence adduced, we must affir......
-
In re Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Case—-Report Number
...an assertion of the store's rights in a legally permissible way, and was privileged “as a matter of law.” In Canto v. J.B. IvyIvey & Co., 595 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), two children were detained by a merchant who suspected them of shoplifting; citing McCarson and the Restatement......
-
Fillmore v. Maricopa Water Processing Systems, Inc.
...interference by relying on similar principles of agency as those recognized by Arizona courts. See, e.g., Canto v. J.B. Ivey & Co., 595 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla.App.1992) (holding that corporate employer could be vicariously liable for employee's defamation and intentional infliction of emotio......
-
Defamation & privacy
...Florida, Inc., 510 So.2d 972, 975 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), rev. denied , 518 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 1987). See also Canto v. J.B Ivey and Company , 595 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Qualified privilege protects defamatory statements made by private individuals to the police or to the state’s a......
-
Intentional torts
...evidence that shows the defendant did no more than assert legal rights in a legally permissible way. Canto v. J.B. Ivey and Company , 595 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). See Also Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277, 279 (Fla. 1985). 2. Defamation Privilege: The ......
-
Negligence cases
...manner constitutes a privilege that precludes an action based on reckless or even outrageous conduct. Canto v. J.B. Ivey & Co. , 595 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). §2:10.5 Related Matters 1. Asbestos, Inhalation of: Embedding of asbestos fibers in the lungs satisfies the impact rule.......