Cantor v. Sunshine Greenery, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 January 1979
• Citation: 165 N.J.Super. 411,398 A.2d 571
• Parties: Edward A. CANTOR and Leo Masin, Partners, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. SUNSHINE GREENERY, INC., a New Jersey Corporation, Defendant, and William J. Brunetti, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 411

165 N.J.Super. 411

398 A.2d 571

Edward A. CANTOR and Leo Masin, Partners, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. SUNSHINE GREENERY, INC., a New Jersey Corporation, Defendant and William J. Brunetti, Defendant-Appellant.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued Jan. 16, 1979.

Decided Jan. 30, 1979.

Robert A. Bernstein, Cranford, for appellant William J. Brunetti (Bernstein & Mahoney, Cranford, attorneys).

Daniel J. O'Hara, Jr., Elizabeth, for respondents Edward A. Cantor and Leo Masin (Farer & Krueger, Elizabeth, attorneys).

Before Judges MICHELS and LARNER.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

LARNER, J. A. D.

This appeal involves the propriety of a personal judgment against defendant William J. Brunetti for the breach of a lease between plaintiffs and a corporate entity known as Sunshine Greenery, Inc., and more particularly whether there was a De facto corporation in existence at the time of the execution of the lease.

Plaintiffs brought suit for damages for the breach of the lease against Sunshine Greenery, Inc. and Brunetti. Default judgment was entered against the corporation and a nonjury trial was held as to the liability of the individual. The trial judge in a letter opinion determined that plaintiffs were entitled to judgment against Brunetti individually on the theory that as of the time of the creation of the contract he was acting as a promoter and that his corporation, Sunshine Greenery, Inc., was not a legal or De facto corporation.

The undisputed facts reveal the following: Plaintiffs prepared the lease naming Sunshine Greenery, Inc. as the tenant, and it was signed by Brunetti as president of that named entity. Mr. Cantor, acting for plaintiffs, knew that Brunetti was starting a new venture as a newly formed corporation known as Sunshine Greenery, Inc. Although Cantor had considerable experience in ownership and leasing of commercial property to individuals and corporations, he did not request a personal guarantee from Brunetti, nor did he make inquiry as to his financial status or background. Without question, he knew and expected that the lease agreement was undertaken by the corporation and not by Brunetti individually, and that the corporation would be responsible thereunder.

At the time of the signing of the lease on December 16, 1974 in Cantor's office, Brunetti was requested by Cantor to give him a check covering the first month's rent and the security deposit. When Brunetti stated that he was not prepared to do so because he had no checks with him, Cantor furnished a blank check which was filled out for $1,200, with the name of Brunetti's bank and signed by him as president of Sunshine Greenery, Inc. The lease was repudiated by a letter from counsel for Sunshine Greenery, Inc. dated December 17, 1974, which in turn was followed by a response from Cantor to the effect that he would hold the "client" responsible for all losses. The check was not honored because Brunetti stopped payment, and in any event because Sunshine Greenery, Inc. did not have an account in the bank.

The evidence is clear that on November 21, 1974 the corporate name of Sunshine Greenery, Inc. had been reserved for Brunetti by the Secretary of State, and that on December 3, 1974 a certificate of incorporation for that company was signed by Brunetti and Sharyn N. Sansoni as incorporators. The certificate was forwarded by mail to the Secretary of State on that same date with a check for the filing fee, but for some unexplained reason it was not officially filed until December 18, 1974, two days after the execution of the lease. ¹

In view of the late filing, Sunshine Greenery, Inc. was not a De jure corporation on December 16, 1974 when the lease was signed. See N.J.S.A. 14A:2-7(2). Nevertheless, there is ample evidence of the fact that it was a De facto corporation in that there was a Bona fide attempt to organize the corporation some time before the consummation of the contract and there was an actual exercise of the corporate powers by the negotiations with plaintiffs and the execution of the contract involved in this litigation. When this is considered in the light of the concession that plaintiffs knew that they were dealing with that corporate entity and not with Brunetti individually, it becomes evident that the De facto status of the corporation suffices to absolve Brunetti from individual liability. Plaintiffs in effect are estopped from attacking the legal existence of the corporation collaterally because of the nonfiling in order to impose liability on the individual when they have admittedly contracted with a corporate entity which had De facto status. See Vanneman v. Young, 52 N.J.L. 403, 20 A. 53 (E. & A.1890); Frawley v. Tenafly Transp. Co., 95 N.J.L. 405, 410-411, 113 A. 242 (E. & A.1920); Stout v. Zulick, 48 N.J.L. 599, 7 A. 362 (E. & A.1886); 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 109 at 505-506, § 111 at 513-514. In fact, their prosecution of the claim against the corporation to default judgment is indicative of their recognition of the corporation as the...