Cantrell v. United States, Civ. A. No. 4464.
| Decision Date | 05 May 1965 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 4464. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Willie H. CANTRELL, Plaintiff, v. The UNITED STATES, C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of Treasury, Mortimer M. Caplin, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, and Frederick J. Lawton and Robert E. Hampton, Members U. S. Civil Service Commission, Defendants. |
Willie H. Cantrell, pro se.
John C. Williams, U. S. Atty., James D. McCoy, III, Asst. U. S. Atty., Greenville, S. C., for defendants.
Summons and complaint in the above matter was filed December 23, 1963. It appears from the record that, on April 7, 1952, while plaintiff was employed by the Internal Revenue Service, he sustained certain personal injuries in the course of his employment. As a result of the said injuries he was examined by the Civil Service Commission, adjudged to be totally disabled to perform his regular duties, and was involuntarily discharged from his employment in August 1957. He was subsequently examined by the Federal Employment Compensation Bureau for the purpose of establishing extent of his disability in order to compute his monthly retirement income. The Federal Employment Compensation Bureau determined plaintiff to be only 50 percent disabled, which was later increased to 61 percent.1
In his complaint plaintiff alleges that he should have been examined pursuant to the provisions of Ch. 15, Title 5 U.S. C.,2 to decide the extent of his disability caused by personal injuries, and that the Civil Service Commission under Chapter 30, Title 5 U.S.C. Civil Service Retirement Act was without authority to determine the extent of his disability, thereby rendering his involuntary retirement unlawful, as provided in Section 652 of Title 5 U.S.C.
In his prayer plaintiff asks that his discharge be cancelled, that he be reinstated in his regular employment, and that he receive back pay from August 1957, including all raises and increases from date of his separation.
The action is brought pursuant to Section 1009 of Chapter 19, Title 5 U.S.C.3
Plaintiff filed motion for summary judgment on January 20, 1964, alleging essentially that the Civil Service Commission was without authority to determine his disability. On February 27, 1964, defendant filed amended motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment, upon grounds that: 1 plaintiff has failed to allege any grounds for relief on which the court should act in reviewing the administrative determination in this case; and that plaintiff's request for relief under section 652 of Title 5 U.S.C. should be denied because plaintiff was not dismissed without pay; 2 laches on part of plaintiff in testing his removal; and 3 privilege as to money damages against defendants Dillon and Caplin.4
Motion for summary judgment was heard by the court with only counsel for defendant appearing to present oral argument.5
Court scrutiny in disability retirement cases is limited to instances in which there has been a substantial departure from important procedural rights, a misconstruction of the governing legislation, or some error which goes to the heart of the administrative determination. See Ellmore v. Brucker, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 236 F.2d 734, cert. den. 352 U.S. 955, 77 S.Ct. 329, 1 L.Ed.2d 244 1956; Murphy v. Wilson, 99 U.S.App. D.C. 4, 236 F.2d 737 1956; Smith v. Dulles, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 6, 236 F.2d 739, cert. den. 352 U.S. 955, 77 S.Ct. 329, 1 L.Ed.2d 244 1956.
However, in this case plaintiff does not ask the court to review any of the proceedings by the Civil Service Commission in determining his disability. The issue before the court here is whether the Civil Service Commission, under the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act Chapter 30, Title 5 U.S.C., had authority to examine plaintiff to determine the extent of his disability, or whether this function was exclusively within the authority of the Employee's Compensation Bureau, under the provisions of Chapter 15 of Title 5 U.S.C., since plaintiff's disability was the result of personal injuries received in the course of his employment.
Section 2257(a), Chapter 30, Title 5 U.S.C., provides, in part, that:
"Any employee who completes five years of civilian service and who is found by the Commission emphasis ours United States Civil Service Commission to have become disabled shall, upon his own application or upon application by his department or agency, be retired * * *."
Section 2251(g), Chapter 30, Title 5 U.S.C., provides:
"The terms `disabled' and `disability' shall mean totally disabled for useful and efficient service in the grade or class...
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...States, 397 F.2d 303, 307, 184 Ct.Cl. 542 (1968); Matricciana v. Hampton, 416 F.Supp. 288, 289 (D.Md.1976); Cantrell v. United States, 240 F.Supp. 851, 853 (W.D.S.C.1965), aff'd, 356 F.2d 915 (4th Cir.1966). The genesis of the "Scroggins formula" actually predates the Gaines decision quoted......
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...352 U.S. 955, 77 S.Ct. 329, 1 L.Ed.2d 244 (1956); Matricciana v. Hampton, 416 F.Supp. 288, 289 (D.Md.1976); Cantrell v. United States, 240 F.Supp. 851, 853 (W.D.S.C.1965), aff'd, 356 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966). Thus, under this so-called Scroggins rule, courts treat section 8347(c) as limitin......
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Parodi v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
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