Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. B057053,B057053
• Citation: 4 Cal.App.4th 857,6 Cal.Rptr.2d 151
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Cesar C. CANTU, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RESOLUTION TRUST CORP., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 151

6 Cal.Rptr.2d 151

4 Cal.App.4th 857

Cesar C. CANTU, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RESOLUTION TRUST CORP., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. B057053.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

March 17, 1992.

[4 Cal.App.4th 868] Cesar C. Cantu, in pro. per.

Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Raymond R. Kepner, F. Scott Page, David D. Marshall, Graham & James, Don A. Proudfoot, Jr., Andrew R. Hall, and Franklin R. Fraley, Jr., Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

FRED WOODS, Associate Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of dismissal by the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the Honorable Valerie Baker, Judge Presiding, following the sustaining of demurrers without leave to amend. We affirm.

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Cesar Cantu's ("Cantu") first amended complaint alleges that defendants Lincoln Savings & Loan Association ("Lincoln") ¹ and Robin S. Symes, its former president (the "Lincoln defendants"), through their attorneys, Parker, Milliken, Clark, O'Hara and Samuelian and Robert A. Gutkin (the "Parker defendants") improperly initiated an interpleader action by naming Cantu as a claimant.

Cantu alleges that the defendants tortiously prosecuted the interpleader action because (a) there were no competing claimants to the stake, and (b) they named Cantu as a claimant to the stake to create a false appearance of a controversy which did not exist, all in an effort to relieve Lincoln of funds to which it asserted no claim.

II. CONTENTIONS

Cantu's appeal presents, in essence, two fundamental contentions for this court to resolve: first, whether or not the defendants properly filed the interpleader action based on a dispute between claimants, other than Cantu, concerning control of the Nosotros accounts; and, second, assuming that the defendants properly filed the interpleader action, whether or not naming Cantu as a claimant constituted malicious prosecution, abuse of process, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The Parker defendants contend that a review of the pleadings and the judicially noticeable documents before the superior court--including Cantu's admissions at variance with his allegations--requires, as a matter of law, that this court affirm the ruling of the trial court sustaining without leave to amend defendants' demurrer to Cantu's amended complaint and dismiss Cantu's appeal.

III. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SYNOPSIS

A. Procedural Summary

On or about March 8, 1989, Cantu filed an unverified complaint alleging a single cause of action for malicious prosecution. The Parker defendants answered and the Lincoln defendants demurred. At the hearing on June 15, 1989, Judge John Zebrowski presiding, the court instructed the parties to attend a mandatory settlement conference before Judge Robert Weil prior to any resolution of the demurrer. Judge Zebrowski further indicated that he would reschedule the hearing on Lincoln's demurrer should the parties fail to resolve their differences at the mandatory settlement conference.

During the July 19, 1989, mandatory settlement conference, after it became apparent that the parties could not settle the Thereafter, the Lincoln defendants scheduled October 30, 1990, as the date for the hearing on the original demurrer to the complaint. Shortly before the hearing, Ed Barker, Esq., counsel for Cantu, conceded that the demurrer was well taken, and the lower court, now Judge Ronald Sohigian presiding, sustained the demurrer, but granted Cantu leave to amend his malicious prosecution cause of action. Cantu never sought leave to amend his complaint to add new causes of action. Nevertheless, although the first amended complaint reflected only minor changes to Cantu's cause of action for malicious prosecution, it set forth two entirely new causes of action for abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

dispute, Judge Weil ordered the parties to arbitration even though the case was not yet at issue [4 Cal.App.4th 870] and Judge Zebrowski had yet to rule on Lincoln's demurrer. On March 28, 1990, the parties arbitrated Cantu's claim. The arbitrator issued his decision on June 18, 1990, ruling for the defendants and awarding Cantu nothing. Cantu then requested trial de novo and, in accord with the arbitration order of the mandatory settlement conference judge, the parties attended a continuation of the mandatory settlement conference at which they again could not resolve the dispute.

On or about December 14, 1990, the Lincoln defendants filed another general demurrer to Cantu's first amended complaint. All defendants demurred to all three causes of action in the first amended complaint, and joined in the others' demurrer. On January 3, 1991, the demurrers were heard by the trial court, now Judge Valerie Baker presiding. Judge Baker sustained both demurrers on all the grounds the defendants raised. Cantu now appeals from Judge Baker's ruling.

B. Factual Summary

Nosotros had maintained savings and checking accounts with Lincoln's Los Angeles branch since March 1986. William M. Zamora, as President of Nosotros, opened the accounts (the "Nosotros accounts" or the "stake"). As of October 2, 1986, the signature cards for these accounts authorized Lincoln to release funds to only Mr. Zamora and Roberto A. Jiminez of Nosotros. On or about October 2, 1986, an individual named Manny Diaz visited a Lincoln branch claiming that Nosotros authorized him to change the signature cards. As of that date, the Nosotros accounts contained approximately $14,000. Mr. Diaz requested that Lincoln delete Mr. Zamora's name from the signature card and add Mr. Diaz' name and the names of several other individuals.

On October 8, 1986, Mr. Zamora visited the same Lincoln branch and produced a copy of a preliminary injunction (the "Zamora injunction") issued in December 1985 as part of a superior court action entitled Nosotros v. Cortez, case number C577490 (the "Zamora action"). The Zamora injunction enjoined, inter alia, Mr. Diaz from interfering with Mr. Zamora's rights, privileges and duties as president of Nosotros and appeared to prohibit Mr. Diaz' attempt to change the signature card for the Nosotros accounts.

On notice of the competing claims between, inter alia, Messrs. Zamora and Diaz to signatory authority, Lincoln then froze the Nosotros accounts and advised the affected parties of its action, including Maria C. Davoli, Esq., Mr. Zamora's counsel. Ms. Davoli confirmed that the Zamora injunction was still in effect.

Two weeks later, on October 21, 1986, Cantu called David Thompson, Esq., Lincoln's corporate counsel, asked for Lincoln's address for the stated purpose of starting legal proceedings against Lincoln, and claimed that Lincoln had wrongfully put a hold on the Nosotros accounts. Prior to this contact, Lincoln had no idea of Cantu's involvement in the Nosotros dispute. On October 27, 1986, only six days later, Lincoln was served with a complaint which sought, inter alia, injunctive relief and $5 million in punitive damages from Lincoln and others, including Mr. Zamora (the "Nosotros Action" and the "Nosotros Complaint"). The Nosotros Complaint alleged repeatedly that Mr. Zamora had urged Lincoln to freeze the Nosotros accounts when On October 28, 1986, Lincoln, through the Parker defendants, filed a complaint in interpleader pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 386-386.6, entitled Lincoln Sav. & Assn. v. Nosotros, case number C622602, naming Nosotros, Cantu, Mr. Zamora, Mr. Diaz, Mr. Jiminez, Tony Cortez, Rick Castro, Manny Castro, Ralph Camarillo, and Richard Rodriguez as claimants. Each individual claimant in the interpleader action was alleged to be, and was, affiliated with Nosotros. The interpleader action allegedly arose from the dispute between Nosotros members, or its internal factions, over control of Nosotros and the Nosotros accounts.

he presented the Zamora injunction to Lincoln.

Lincoln alleged, in substance, that it had no interest in the disputed Nosotros accounts, but that it could not release control of the stake to any of the claimants without risking liability to the other claimants. Lincoln sought injunctive relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 386, subdivision (f) to block the claimants from filing suits against it with respect to the stake and to stay the Nosotros action. The interpleader complaint sought no damages from Cantu or any other claimant. When Lincoln filed the interpleader complaint, it also deposited the stake with the court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 386, subdivision (c).

The court granted a temporary restraining order (the "TRO") in favor of Lincoln on October 28, 1986. On November 7, 1986, Cantu filed an opposition to the TRO and the requested preliminary injunction. Cantu's opposition contained extensive arguments on behalf of Nosotros to the effect that Lincoln had falsely, erroneously and fraudulently frozen the Nosotros accounts in improper reliance on statements made by Mr. Zamora--referred to as the "President"--and the Zamora injunction. On November 14, 1986, the court granted the relief Lincoln sought and, on November 21, 1986, issued a preliminary injunction (the "Lincoln Injunction") which, inter alia, stayed the Nosotros action. The Lincoln injunction was never vacated. It remained in effect, despite Cantu's protests, until the court released the Nosotros accounts from its jurisdiction as a result of a settlement between Nosotros, Mr. Zamora, and all claimants named in the interpleader action, except for Cantu, who refused to participate. On November 9, 1988, Lincoln dismissed the interpleader action with prejudice against all claimants. On November 22, 1988, a dismissal of the Nosotros action was filed and entered by the court.

IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether or not, as a matter of public policy under California law, a plaintiff in interpleader may incur tort liability to a named claimant in an interpleader...