Canupp v. Children's Receiving Home of Sacramento

• Decision Date: 20 April 2016
• Docket Number: CIV. NO. 2:14-01185 WBS EFB
• Parties: Tina Canupp, Plaintiff, v. Children's Receiving Home of Sacramento; and Does 1 to 25, inclusive, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

181 F.Supp.3d 767

Tina Canupp, Plaintiff,

v.Children's Receiving Home of Sacramento; and Does 1 to 25, inclusive, Defendant.

CIV. NO. 2:14-01185 WBS EFB

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed April 20, 2016

Natalia D. Asbill, Perkins & Associates, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiff.

Anthony C. Oceguera, Holden Law Group, Auburn, CA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WILLIAM B. SHUBB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Brief Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Tina Canupp began working as the Health and Wellness Manager for defendant Children's Receiving Home of Sacramento ("CRH") on October 31, 2010. In December 2013, she experienced back pain and anticipated having back surgery. To accommodate this disability, she went on leave protected by the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 –2654, and California Family Rights Act ("CFRA"), Cal. Gov't Code § 12945.2. CRH calculated that her leave under the FMLA and CFRA would expire on January 11, 2014. Because plaintiff could not resume working by that date, CRH provided plaintiff with an additional thirty days of personal leave. When plaintiff did not return to work at the expiration of her personal leave, CRH terminated plaintiff.

Plaintiff initiated this action, alleging that CRH failed to reasonably accommodate her disability and terminated her when she was still entitled to FMLA and CFRA leave in retaliation for her disability. Plaintiff also alleges that CRH terminated her in retaliation for reports she had made to the California Department of Social Services, Division of Community Care Licensing ("DSS") about alleged sexual misconduct by staff at CRH. In her Complaint, plaintiff alleges the following claims: (1) disability discrimination in violation of subsection 12940(m) of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12940 –12951 ; (2) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of subsection 12940(n) of FEHA; (3) failure to provide reasonable accommodation in violation of subsection 12940(m) of FEHA; (4) retaliation in violation of California Labor Code section 1102.5 ; (5) interference with entitlements protected by CFRA; (6) interference with entitlements protected by the FMLA; (7) retaliation in violation of CFRA; (8) discrimination in violation of the FMLA; and (9) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (Docket No. 2.)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, CRH now moves for summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims and her requests for injunctive relief, back pay, and front pay. (Docket No. 25.) Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment on her failure to engage in the interactive process claim under subsection 12940(n) of FEHA and CRH's affirmative defenses of after-acquired evidence, unclean hands, good faith/bad faith, and undue hardship. (Docket No. 27.)

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party's favor.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the non-moving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to "designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ). To carry this burden, the non-moving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence ... will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge ... ruling on a motion for summary judgment ...." Id. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court "must review the evidence submitted in support of each cross-motion [in a light most favorable to the non-moving party] and consider each party's motions on their own merits." Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1097 (W.D.Wash.2004).

III. Analysis

A. FEHA Claims

1. Subsection 12940(m): Reasonable Accommodation

Under subsection 12940(m) of FEHA, it is unlawful for an employer "to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability

of an applicant or employee" unless the accommodation would "produce undue hardship." Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(m) ; see alsoCal. Gov't Code § 12926(u) (defining "undue hardship"). "The elements of a reasonable accommodation cause of action are (1) the employee suffered a disability, (2) the employee could perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation, and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the employee's disability." Nealy v. City of Santa Monica, 234 Cal.App.4th 359, 373, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 9 (2d Dist.2015). The first element in this case is undisputed as the parties agree plaintiff suffered a disability for purposes of FEHA.

FEHA defines "essential functions" of a job as "the fundamental job duties of the employment position." Cal. Gov't Code § 12926(f). Essential functions do not include "marginal functions," which are those functions that, "if not performed, would not eliminate the need for the job or that could be readily performed by another employee or that could be performed in an alternative way." Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11065(e)(3).

Under FEHA, the following non-exhaustive reasons may render a job function essential:

(A) ... the reason the position exists is to perform that function.

(B) ... the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed.

(C) The function may be highly specialized, so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function.

Cal. Gov't Code § 12926(f)(1). FEHA provides that "[e]vidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to, the following:"

(A) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential.

(B) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job.

(C) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function.

(D) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function.

(E) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement.

(F) The work experiences of past incumbents in the job.

(G) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.

Id.§ 12926(f)(2).

a. Essential Functions of Plaintiff's Position

At her deposition, plaintiff testified that the duties of the Health and Wellness Manager were described during her interview as follows:

That I would oversee the staff and the health and wellness department, that I would provide assessments for youth in the clinic and oversee the physician and the psychiatrist, that I would be over the kitchen and the kitchen staff, and that I would be over the medication assistants, provide incidental care to the youth, and then maintain compliance inside the medical clinic and in the kitchen.

(Canupp Dep. at 52:4-15.)

While working as CRH's Health and Wellness Manager, plaintiff estimated that she devoted about eighty percent of her daily time to providing direct medical care to the youth at CRH. (Id. at 63:9-17, 66:12-19.) She agreed that providing this care "basically" required her to be present at the clinic and that the care included performing health assessments and responding to health care emergencies. (Id. at 63:18-25.) Plaintiff further testified that she spent approximately five percent of her daily time performing indirect medical care, such as overseeing and reviewing her staff's filling out of medical charts. (Id. at 66:3-67:9.) Plaintiff described some of her additional duties as training and hiring employees in the clinic and kitchen and training CRH staff on first aid, CPR, and OSHA. (Id. at 69:21-70:25.) Plaintiff's descriptions of her duties are consistent with those identified by CRH's executive director, David Ballard, (Ballard Dep. at 62:8-63:13), and CRH's clinical manager, Anna Naify, (Naify Dep. at 50:25-51:14).

Despite the undisputed evidence about plaintiff's primary responsibilities, plaintiff argues that all of her responsibilities were only "marginal" because "they could be readily performed by another employee." Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11065(e)(3). According to plaintiff, none of her duties were essential because CRH was able to reshuffle her responsibilities to account for her unanticipated absence, did not hire a new nurse until June 2014, and the new nurse worked only part time.

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