Canutillo Independent School Dist. v. Leija, 95-50791

• Decision Date: 27 November 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-50791,95-50791
• Citation: 101 F.3d 393
• Parties: 114 Ed. Law Rep. 439 CANUTILLO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant, v. Martha LEIJA and Jerry Leija as next friends of Rosemarie Leija, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 393

101 F.3d 393

114 Ed. Law Rep. 439

CANUTILLO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant, v. Martha LEIJA and Jerry Leija as next friends of Rosemarie

Leija, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees.

No. 95-50791.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 27, 1996.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan.

8, 1997. ^*

Thomas E. Stanton, El Paso, TX, Mark Berry, El Paso, TX, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Michael Kuhn, Bracewell and Patterson, Houston, TX, Henry C. Hosford, Baskind, Samaniego & Hosford, El Paso, TX, for defendant-appellant.

David M. Feldman, Richard Alan Morris, Feldman & Associates, Houston, TX, for Texas Ass'n of Sch. Brds., Texas Ass'n of Sch. Administrators, and Texas Council of Sch. Attys., amicus curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before GARWOOD, BARKSDALE and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

This interlocutory appeal by the Canutillo Independent School District turns on whether, under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., a school district is strictly liable for its teacher's sexual abuse of a student; and, if not, whether another teacher's being told about the abuse is sufficient notice to the school district for possible liability under some other standard. We REVERSE the denial of the school district's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Title IX claim and REMAND.

I.

The school district is located in Canutillo, Texas, and receives federal financial assistance. At the Canutillo Elementary School, Rosemarie Leija was assigned in 1989 to the second-grade homeroom class of Pam Mendoza and the physical education/health class of Tony Perales.

Perales' classes were a part of the daily curriculum. Once a week, he taught health, which consisted primarily of showing movies to his students in a darkened classroom. Throughout the 1989-90 school year, Perales sexually molested Leija during these showings. One of Leija's classmates testified that, during this same time period, she was also molested in a similar manner by Perales.

In early 1990, Leija and the other student told Mendoza about some of Perales' actions. Mendoza spoke with each of the girls individually and told them to avoid Perales. Mendoza talked to Perales about the accusations, but she did not advise anyone else, such as the superintendent or principal. Later that spring, Leija told her mother that Perales had been touching her. Leija's mother discussed the matter with Mendoza at one of the regularly scheduled parent-teacher conferences, and Mendoza told her that she would look into the matter. Leija's mother did not discuss this with anyone other than her husband. According to Leija, Mendoza confronted her after the conference and threatened her with "trouble" if she was lying about her accusation.

Afterwards, Leija did not speak with anyone about the abuse until she began counseling sessions in 1993. Her parents, as next friends, then filed this action against the school district (CISD) and Perales under Title IX and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Summary judgment was granted CISD on the § 1983 claim.

During the trial of the Title IX claim, at the close both of Leija's case and of all the evidence, CISD moved for judgment as a matter of law on the basis that, inter alia, Leija had not produced evidence of discriminatory intent on its part. Both motions were denied, and the special interrogatories given the jury premised CISD's liability instead on a "negligent agent" theory:

Did Pam Mendoza, as an agent of [CISD], know or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should she have known, of the sexual harassment or abuse by Tony Perales against Rosemarie Leija?

Did Pam Mendoza take the steps a reasonable person would have taken under the same or similar circumstances to halt the The jury returned a verdict for Leija, awarding $1.4 million in compensatory damages.

sexual harassment or abuse by Tony Perales against Rosemarie Leija?

Post-verdict, CISD again sought judgment as a matter of law and moved, in the alternative, for remittitur. Among other things, it again maintained that Leija had not shown intentional discrimination on its part. In denying the motion, the district court changed course and held, in a most comprehensive opinion, that its instructions on liability were unnecessary because CISD was instead strictly liable for Perales' actions. 887 F.Supp. 947, 953 (W.D.Tex.1995). However, because the court was concerned that Title IX strict liability might expose school districts to "potential insolvency", it held also that damages should be limited to expenses for medical and mental health treatment and for special education. Id. at 956. And, because the damages special interrogatory was not so limited, the court treated CISD's remittitur motion as one for a new trial on damages and granted it. Id. at 957. The court later certified its order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) for immediate appeal, and this court granted CISD leave to do so.

II.

Although CISD presents several points, this interlocutory appeal turns on whether the liability standard under Title IX for teacher-student sexual abuse is strict liability; and, if it is not, whether the notice to Mendoza, a teacher, is sufficient to hold the school district liable. In so deciding, we review de novo the denial of CISD's motion for judgment as a matter of law, using the same standards as those applied by the district court. E.g., Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1300-01 (5th Cir.1994). Such judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is no "legally sufficient evidentiary basis" for a reasonable jury to have found for the prevailing party. Id. (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 50(a)).

Title IX provides in relevant part: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance...." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). There is an implied right of action under Title IX in favor of victims of discrimination on the basis of sex, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1964, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and monetary damages may be awarded for its intentional violation, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74-76, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1037-38, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992).

For purposes of this appeal, we assume that discrimination "on the basis of sex" includes sexual abuse of a student by a teacher. See id. at 75, 112 S.Ct. at 1037-38. CISD, unlike the amici, does not contend otherwise. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 477 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting) (citing Franklin for proposition that school accepting federal funds "render[s] itself potentially liable" to Title IX claims for teacher-student sexual harassment), cert. denied sub nom. Lankford v. Doe, 513 U.S. 815, 115 S.Ct. 70, 130 L.Ed.2d 25 (1994). But see Franklin, 503 U.S. at 62-63, 112 S.Ct. at 1030-31 (limiting question presented to "whether the implied right of action under Title IX ... supports a claim for monetary damages"); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1011 n. 11 (5th Cir.1996) ("[A]ny language in Franklin regarding teacher-student sexual harassment is pure dictum."), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 165, 136 L.Ed.2d 108 (1996).

A.

The district court was the first to adopt strict liability as the standard for school district Title IX liability for teacher-student sexual abuse. Three other standards have been utilized. We summarize them briefly before addressing, and rejecting, strict liability.

1.

The three approaches generally followed are those used for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq.; for Title VII of that Act, 42 U.S.C.

                §§ 2000e et seq.;   and pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219
                

a.

CISD urges that Leija must prove that the school district itself engaged in intentional sex-based discrimination. Its basis is the statement in Cannon that Title IX was "patterned" after Title VI. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694, 99 S.Ct. at 1956. As the Court noted, "the two statutes use identical language to describe the benefited class", id. at 694-95, 99 S.Ct. at 1957. Title VI provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Both statutes also utilize a similar "administrative mechanism" to terminate financial assistance to recipients "engaged in prohibited discrimination". Cannon, 441 U.S. at 695-96, 99 S.Ct. at 1957.

Moreover, our court recently described Title VI as the "model" for Title IX. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1012 n. 14. And, in Chance v. Rice University, 984 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.1993), a district court's application of Title VI standards to a Title IX claim was not held erroneous. Chance, however, involved a claim of discrimination in the promotion and compensation of professors at a university, not teacher-student sexual abuse; furthermore, an imputed liability standard was not at issue. 984 F.2d at 152.

To receive compensatory damages, a Title VI plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 584, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 3223, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983); id. at 608 n. 1, 103 S.Ct. at 3235 n. 1 (Powell, J., concurring); see Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70, 112 S.Ct. at 1035. Consequently, CISD asserts that it cannot be liable absent proof that it actually participated in Perales' discriminatory conduct. See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 864 F.Supp. 1111, 1117 (D.Utah 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,...