CANYON LAKE PARK v. LOFTUS DENTAL

• Decision Date: 29 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 23379.,23379.
• Citation: 700 N.W.2d 729,2005 SD 82
• Parties: CANYON LAKE PARK, L.L.C., a South Dakota Limited Liability Company, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. LOFTUS DENTAL, P.C., Ronald J. Loftus, Cheryl A. Loftus, and Leola Loftus Allen, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

700 N.W.2d 729

2005 SD 82

CANYON LAKE PARK, L.L.C., a South Dakota Limited Liability Company, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. LOFTUS DENTAL, P.C., Ronald J. Loftus, Cheryl A. Loftus, and Leola Loftus Allen, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 23379.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs on April 25, 2005.

Decided June 29, 2005.

Aaron D. Eiesland of Johnson Eiesland Law Firm Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.

Alan L. Smoot of Smoot & Utzman, P.C., Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendants and appellants.

SABERS, Justice.

[¶ 1.] Canyon Lake Park, L.L.C. (Canyon Lake) brought a declaratory action against Loftus Dental, P.C. to determine the rights of the parties under an express easement. The trial court ruled in favor of Canyon Lake. Loftus appeals and we affirm.

Facts

[¶ 2.] This case involves the interpretation of an easement affecting adjacent parcels of commercial property located along Jackson Boulevard in Rapid City, South Dakota. A fitness center existed on one parcel and a dental clinic on the other. The fitness center was owned and operated by LBM, Inc. Dr. Ron Loftus, a local dentist, was the president of LBM, Inc. and also the owner of the dental clinic, Loftus Dental. A continuous asphalt parking lot spanning both parcels provided parking for the two businesses.

[¶ 3.] After a number of years in operation, a creditor of the fitness center initiated a foreclosure action on the business. As part of negotiations with the creditor, Dr. Loftus and his business partners agreed to grant an easement just prior to LBM, Inc.'s conveyance of the property to a third party. The easement provides ingress, egress, and parking on the portion of the parking lot located on the dental clinic property for the benefit of the fitness center property. Therefore, the fitness center parcel is the dominant tenement while the dental clinic parcel is the servient tenement.

[¶ 4.] The easement, dated November 25, 1987, provides in relevant part:

WHEREAS, it is the desire of the parties that an agreement for a perpetual and permanent easement be placed in writing for ingress, egress and parking over, upon, and across the above-described properties;

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. That a perpetual and permanent easement for ingress, egress and parking is hereby created for the benefit of LBM, its employees, agents, customers, and tenants, as located and described on the area of the servient estate referred to as "ASPHALT PARKING" on Exhibit "A" which is attached hereto and incorporated by this reference as if fully set forth herein 2. That the expenses of maintenance, repair and snow removal shall be allocated between the parties based upon appropriate use;

3. That this easement and agreement is superior and paramount to the rights of Anderson, Loftus, Loftus Allen and First Federal in the servient estate, and that the parties intend the easement created herein to be a covenant running with the land, binding upon the parties hereto and their heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns.

The "above-described" property consists of the entire property and parking lot. At the time the easement was granted, both the fitness center and the dental clinic were in compliance with the local zoning ordinances in regard to the number of parking spaces required for those types of businesses.

[¶ 5.] After the sale, the fitness center building continued to be operated as a fitness center until it was eventually sold to Canyon Lake in January, 2001. Canyon Lake converted the upper level of the building into office space. The Johnson Eiesland Law Firm (Johnson Eiesland) occupies approximately two-thirds of the upper level and leases out the remaining office space.

[¶ 6.] Canyon Lake intends to remodel the lower level of the building into additional office space. In order to obtain the necessary building permits, Canyon Lake had to demonstrate that adequate parking would be available.¹ As the successor-in-interest of the rights of LBM, Inc., Canyon Lake argues that under the terms of the easement its rights are superior and paramount to those of Loftus Dental and it should be allowed to count as available parking that portion of the parking lot located on the dental clinic parcel. Loftus Dental disagrees, claiming that the original intent of the easement was only to grant the dominant tenement "shared use" of the servient tenement's parking lot.

[¶ 7.] Canyon Lake initiated a declaratory action against Loftus Dental for a determination of the parties' respective rights under the terms of the easement. The trial court concluded that Canyon Lake has superior and paramount rights over Loftus Dental in regard to ingress, egress, and parking on the servient estate. Loftus Dental appeals.

[¶ 8.] 1. Whether the appeal is barred due to Loftus' failure to object to the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and whether this Court is bound by a limited standard of review.

[¶ 9.] Canyon Lake asserts that Loftus' appeal is barred due to his failure to object to the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, Loftus contends that he did object to the trial court's findings because he submitted his own proposed judgment. Furthermore, Loftus argues that since the parties submitted stipulated facts for the trial court to consider, the parties have waived the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, Loftus asserts that findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court should be considered superfluous.

[¶ 10.] The record shows that in a joint letter to Circuit Court Judge Fuller, attorneys for both parties submitted a signed stipulation of facts for his consideration. Specifically, the letter, which is dated February 12, 2004, states:

As agreed on the record at the status hearing held before you on Wednesday, February 11, 2004, at 11:00 a.m., both the counsel for the plaintiff and the counsel for the defendant agree that the attached stipulated facts are being presented to the court, along with the parties' trial briefs and exhibits thereto, for the purpose of the court determining of the respective rights of the parties under the easement agreement, as written. Further, as also agreed to on the record at the same hearing by counsel for the parties, the easement agreement is a valid unambiguous agreement of the parties, and therefore its meaning must be found by the Court within its four corners.

(emphasis ours). Although Judge Fuller accepted the parties' stipulated facts, he also entered his own findings of fact and conclusions of law, and invited either party to submit their own proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in the event they objected to his findings. While both parties submitted their own proposed judgment for the trial court's consideration, neither party specifically objected to Judge Fuller's findings of fact or conclusions of law, nor did they submit their own findings of fact or conclusions of law.

[¶ 11.] Even if Loftus' submittal of a proposed judgment did not effectively preserve his right to appeal, this Court has held that the failure of an appellant to object to findings of fact and conclusions of law does not require the dismissal of the appeal. GMS, Inc. v. Deadwood Social Club, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 442, 443 (S.D.1983). Rather, "[t]he failure of an appellant to object to findings of fact and conclusions of law and to propose his or her own findings, limits review to the question of whether the findings support the conclusions of law and judgment." Premier Bank, N.A. v. Mahoney, 520 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D.1994) (quoting Huth v. Hoffman, 464 N.W.2d 637, 638 (S.D.1991)). See also Selway Homeowners Ass'n v. Cummings, 2003 SD 11, ¶ 14, 657 N.W.2d 307, 312

(holding that since the appellant failed to either object to findings of fact or conclusions of law proposed by the appellee, or propose findings of fact and conclusions of law of their own, this Court's review was whether the findings supported the conclusions of law and judgment). Therefore, Canyon Lake's assertion that Loftus' appeal should be barred is without merit.

[¶ 12.] As to Loftus' argument that this Court is not bound to a limited review due to the fact that the parties submitted stipulated facts to the trial court, state law provides that findings of fact and conclusions of law are waived "by entering into a stipulation of facts for consideration by the court." SDCL 15-6-52(b). This Court has held that when the matter is presented to the trial court on a written stipulation of facts entered into by all parties, any findings of fact or conclusions of law entered by the trial court are superfluous. Asmussen v. Schmidt, 87 S.D. 53, 55, 202 N.W.2d 857, 858 (1972). See also Cary v. City of Rapid City, 1997 SD 18, ¶ 3, 559 N.W.2d 891, 892

; Dave Gustafson & Co., Inc. v. South Dakota State Highway Commission, 88 S.D. 557, 558, 225 N.W.2d 594, 595 (1975) (noting that findings are superfluous in a stipulated case); State v. Western Surety Co., 26 S.D. 170, 178, 128 N.W. 173, 176 (1910) ("Clearly where all the facts are stipulated, and there is no issue to be tried by the court, no findings of fact are necessary, as there are no facts to be found; the parties having agreed and stipulated as to the facts.").

[¶ 13.] SDCL 15-6-52(a) as amended provides that "[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Here, the parties presented stipulated facts thereby waiving their rights to findings of fact and conclusions of law and the trial court nonetheless entered findings of fact. The court's findings of fact are superfluous and no deference need be given to them on review. Therefore, our review is not limited.

[¶ 14.] 2. Whether the trial court erred in...