Capac Bus Drivers Ass'n v. Capac Community Schools Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 01 April 1985 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 75112 |
| Citation | 140 Mich.App. 542,364 N.W.2d 739 |
| Parties | , 23 Ed. Law Rep. 1031 CAPAC BUS DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, Charging Party-Appellee, v. CAPAC COMMUNITY SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Penzien & Davis by Bernard P. Penzien, Imlay City, for charging party-appellee.
Thrun, Maatsch & Nordberg, P.C. by Kevin S. Harty and David J. Riewald, Lansing, for respondent-appellant.
Before MACKENZIE, P.J., and BEASLEY and KIRWAN *, JJ.
The Board of Education for the Capac Community Schools (Board) appeals as of right from a decision and order of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) which found the Board in violation of Sec. 10(1)(e) of the public employment relations act (PERA), M.C.L. Sec. 423.210(1)(e); M.S.A. Sec. 17.455(10)(1)(e), for refusing to bargain collectively with appellee Capac Bus Drivers Association (Association).
The Association is the exclusive representative of school bus drivers employed by appellant Board. A collective bargaining agreement was entered into by the parties on February 12, 1981, for the period from August 21, 1980, through August 20, 1982. The termination clause of this agreement contains the following automatic-renewal language:
"This agreement and its provision shall become effective August 21, 1980, and remain in full force and effect through August 20, 1982, and thereafter for successive two (2) years unless notice of termination is given in writing by either authorized party to the other thirty days prior to its normal date of renewal". Article XIII.
Thus, the contract provided that it would automatically renew for a two-year period unless written notice of contract termination was given by either party 30 days prior to August 20, 1982.
On September 1, 1982, the Association sent a letter to the Board in care of the superintendent of schools stating that it was ready to negotiate a new contract. In a response dated September 2, 1982, the superintendent wrote that, upon his receipt of a list of the Association's negotiating team and current officers, he would contact it with regard to possible negotiation dates. This information was provided by the Association on September 6, 1982, and shortly thereafter the parties agreed on dates for two negotiating sessions.
Prior to the first meeting, set for September 23, the Association delivered a list of proposals to the superintendent's office for board review. While reading the proposals the superintendent became aware of the automatic renewal provision in the 1980-1982 contract and, after comparing dates, decided that, because the Association's notice was untimely, the contract had been automatically renewed.
The September 23 meeting involved a presentation by the Association of its list of proposals. While there appears to be some dispute as to what was actually said by the superintendent at this meeting regarding the automatic renewal provision, the record indicates that although the phrase "automatic renewal provision" was not mentioned by the superintendent, he did indicate that he felt the 1980-1982 contract was still in effect.
The superintendent contacted counsel for the Board on the next day, September 24, concerning the interpretation of the automatic renewal language. At the second scheduled meeting, September 30, the superintendent provided the Association's representatives with a letter stating that the contract had become automatically renewed pursuant to Article XIII and therefore all the provisions in the 1980-1982 contract concerning hours, wages, and other conditions of employment would remain in full force and effect. Further discussion at the meeting was limited to implementation or clarification of the existing contract. Shortly after this meeting, the Association initiated a grievance which ultimately resulted in the filing of an unfair labor practice charge against the Board.
The MERC hearing officer, in an opinion dated June 3, 1983, found that the Board had "promptly notified" the Association of its position with regard to the untimely notice and therefore held that the Board was not remiss in the bargaining duties, as a valid agreement was already in place. This was subsequently overturned by the MERC on November 10, 1983.
On appeal to this Court the Association agrees that its notification of September 1, 1982, was sent 43 days after the deadline which the automatic renewal clause provided and was therefore untimely. The Association argues, however, that the actions of the Board following its receipt of the notification in effect waived the 30-day notice requirement. As a result, the 1980-1982 contract was not automatically renewed and the Board, by refusing to discuss economic concerns, unlawfully failed to bargain with the Association in violation of the PERA, specifically M.C.L. Sec. 423.210(1)(e); M.S.A. Sec. 17.455(10)(1)(e), which provides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for a public employer or an officer or agent of a public employer * * * to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of its public employees * * * ".
In reviewing a final decision of an administrative agency, we are mindful of the limited role afforded us on appeal. Out of due deference for agency expertise on matters within its jurisdiction, an appellate court may reverse the final decision of an administrative agency only where it is found to be contrary to law or unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Const.1963, art. 6, Sec. 28; M.C.L. Sec. 423.216(e); M.S.A. Sec. 17.455(16)(e); Chrysler Corp. v. Sellers, 105 Mich.App. 715, 307 N.W.2d 708 (1981). If there is no dispute as to underlying facts, questions presented on appeal are to be treated as matters of law. Chrysler Corp., supra, p. 720, 307 N.W.2d 708.
Although there appear to be no Michigan judicial opinions directly on point, the waiver issue in this context has been addressed on numerous occasions by both the MERC and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
In Body Crafters Federal Credit Union, 5 MERC Lab Op 906 ...
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