Capano v. Dunne
| Decision Date | 26 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Docket: 1984CV00460-C |
| Parties | CHRISTIAN CAPANO v. MICHAELA DUNNE, AS SHE IS CHAIRPERSON OF THE FIREARM LICENSING REVIEW BOARD (AND A CONSOLIDATED CASE) |
| Court | Massachusetts Superior Court |
Dates: January 26, 2021
Present: Robert B. Gordon Justice of the Superior Court
County: SUFFOLK, ss.
The plaintiffs in these consolidated cases, Christian Capano (“Capano”) and Ian Sisson (“Sisson”) (together, the “Plaintiffs”), appeal from decisions by the defendant, Firearm Licensing Review Board (the “Board”), denying the restoration of the Plaintiffs’ respective licenses to carry a firearm. Now before the Court are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings filed by Capano, Sisson, and the Board pursuant to Superior Court Standing Order 1-96, G.L. c. 30A, § 14, and Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(c). For the reasons which follow, the Plaintiffs’ motions shall be ALLOWED and the Board’s motions shall be DENIED.
In Massachusetts, operating under the influence of alcohol (“OUI”) is a misdemeanor punishable by up to two and one-half years imprisonment. G.L. c. 90, § 24. Based on the offense’s maximum term of imprisonment, state law prohibits individuals who have been convicted of OUI from obtaining a license to carry a firearm (“LTC”). See G.L. c. 140, § 131(d)(i)(B) (). The prescribed maximum term of imprisonment likewise prohibits individuals convicted of OUI from carrying firearms under federal law, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (), unless the OUI conviction “has been expunged, or set aside” or is one for which the person convicted “has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored . . . unless such . . . restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (“Section 921(a)(20)”).
Under state law, LTC applicants disqualified on account of a conviction for OUI can petition the Board to review their eligibility to carry firearms “after the passage of 5 years from conviction, . . . release from confinement, commitment, probation, or parole supervision for such conviction . . . whichever is last occurring ” G.L. c. 140, § 130B(b). If, by a two-thirds vote, the Board finds that the OUI conviction is the petitioner’s “sole disqualifier”2 for an LTC and, “by clear and convincing evidence, that the petitioner is a suitable person to be a firearm identification card or license to carry holder,” the Board “shall determine that the petitioner’s right or ability to possess a firearm is fully restored in the commonwealth with respect to such conviction . . . and that such conviction shall not prohibit such petitioner from applying to a licensing authority for a firearm identification card or license to carry.” G.L. c. 140, § 130B(d).
General Laws chapter 140, § 131(d) provides that a “determination of unsuitability shall be based on: (i) reliable and credible information that the applicant or licensee has exhibited or engaged in behavior that suggests that, if issued a license, the applicant or licensee may create a risk to public safety; or (ii) existing factors that suggest that, if issued a license, the applicant or licensee may create a risk to public safety.” The Supreme Judicial Court has stated that an applicant may also be “unsuitable” to possess an LTC if the applicant is disqualified based on any of the disqualifying circumstances or criteria expressly identified in G.L. c. 140, § 131. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Adams, 482 Mass. 514, 533 & n.11 (2019) (); Chief of Police of City of Worcester v. Holden, 470 Mass. 845, 859 (2015) (); Firearms Records Bureau v. Simkin, 466 Mass. 168, 180 (2013) ().3
The Plaintiffs are Massachusetts residents with previous convictions for OUI.4 In 2017, the Plaintiffs submitted separate petitions to the Board seeking review of their eligibility for an LTC. Over the course of several days in 2017 and 2018, each Plaintiff appeared before the Board and presented evidence in support of his petition. In January, 2019, the Board issued written findings of fact and decisions denying the Plaintiffs’ petitions.
In its findings of fact, the Board opined that each Plaintiff had taken responsibility for his offense, rarely drank alcohol at present, was responsible in his use of firearms, and had presented credible testimony that “suggested a favorable determination of suitability.” The Board nonetheless concluded that it could do nothing to change the fact that the Plaintiffs would remain prohibited from carrying firearms under federal law, which, in turn, rendered them unsuitable to possess firearms under Massachusetts law.5 The Board’s conclusion in this regard rested on an opinion issued by the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (the “ATF”). Based on its interpretation of Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007), the ATF determined that restoring an individual’s right to possess a firearm under state law does not restore the civil rights contemplated by the “civil rights restored” provision of Section 921(a)(20), the provision of the statute quoted ante that exempts certain convictions from federal firearms disqualification.
After receiving the Board’s decisions, the Plaintiffs timely filed the instant appeals. Before this Court, the Plaintiffs argue that the Board’s decisions should be reversed pursuant to the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act, G.L. c. 30A, because they are based upon an error of law.
General Laws c. 30A, § 14 grants a right of judicial review to “any person or appointing authority aggrieved by a final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding[.]” Paragraph seven of Section 14 permits the Court to “affirm the decision of the agency, or remand the matter for further proceedings before the agency; or . . . set aside or modify the decision . . . if it determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision is” unconstitutional, exceeds the agency’s authority, based on an error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence, or arbitrary and capricious. See G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7).
As the parties appealing the administrative decision, the Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating the decision’s invalidity. Merisme v. Board of Appeals on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 470, 474 (1989). The Court is required to “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as the discretionary authority conferred on it” by statute. G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7). The Court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency, nor may the Court disturb the agency’s findings of fact. Guarino v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 393 Mass. 89, 92 (1984). The Court’s sole function “is to determine whether the [agency] applied correct legal principles in reaching its decision.” Id.
The Plaintiffs’ appeals turn on a single issue: does the restoration of an individual’s right to possess a firearm under state law constitute a restoration of civil rights within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)?6 For the reasons which follow, the Court agrees with the Plaintiffs that it does.
The parties’ arguments rely principally on their respective interpretations of certain language in Logan v. United States, which held that the “civil rights restored” exemption set forth in Section 921(a)(20) does not encompass “state-court convictions that at no time deprived the offender of civil rights[.]” 552 U.S. at 26. Before undertaking its analysis of this issue, the Supreme Court briefly recited the history of Section 921(a)(20), acknowledging that while the statute “does not define the term ‘civil rights,’ courts have held, and [the] petitioner agree[d], that the civil rights relevant under [the statute] are the rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury.” Id. at 27-28. The Board, echoing the position since adopted by the ATF, argues that the foregoing language affirmatively restricts the rights triggering the “civil rights restored” provision of Section 921(a)(20) to the enumerated rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury. The Plaintiffs counter that the language in question constitutes “passive” dicta and, as such, does not represent the decisional restriction advanced by the Board. The Plaintiffs contend that, in addition to the three rights recited in Logan, a state’s restoration of an individual’s right to keep and bear arms constitutes the restoration of a “civil right” within the purview of Section 921(a)(20). The Plaintiffs have the better argument.
As set forth ante, Logan considered whether the “civil rights restored” exemption applied to state court convictions that did not result in the loss of any rights. The petitioner, who had only been convicted of state law misdemeanors, did not dispute that his convictions had not triggered the loss of any rights, and expressly conceded that the relevant civil rights under Section 921(a)(20) were the rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury. Logan, 552 U.S. at 28. Because the petitioner did not dispute that his post-conviction civil rights had remained...
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