Cape v. Plymouth Congregational Church

• Decision Date: 04 December 1906
• Citation: 130 Wis. 174,109 N.W. 928
• Parties: CAPE ET AL. v. PLYMOUTH CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH ET AL.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

130 Wis. 174

109 N.W. 928

CAPE ET AL.

v.PLYMOUTH CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH ET AL.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Dec. 4, 1906.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Iowa County; E. Ray Stevens, Judge.

Action by Alice Cape and others against the Plymouth Congregational Church and others. From a decree in favor of defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded.

This is the same action in which the complaint was sustained upon demurrer in 117 Wis. 150, 93 N. W. 449. It has since been tried and findings filed presenting, as is claimed, widely variant facts from those stated in the complaint. The original deed, in trust, under which both parties claim, is the same set forth in the former case. The findings declare, however, that instead of a secession of a majority of the members of the old Dodgeville Methodist Society, there occurred an incorporation of that society into the Dodgeville Primitive Methodist Church, and them a vote by an overwhelming majority of the members of such corporation that the corporation itself sever its relations with the Primitive Methodist Church or Western Conference, of which the old society had been a member, and ally itself with the denomination of the Congregational Church, and thereafter merely a change of name of the corporation to the Plymouth Congregational Church, and that the defendant corporation is the same society as that which, prior to 1897, occupied the church property, and of which the plaintiffs were members and officers. There is also a finding to the effect that the church building on the premises in question was burned in 1879, and rebuilt in 1880 by general subscription of citizens of Dodgeville and surrounding country, which were made, not with any understanding that the premises should be forever used as a place of worship by the said Dodgeville Primitive Methodist Society, but with the understanding that such edifice would be erected, controlled, and used agreeably to the terms contained in the original trust deed; also, “that a Congregational church is a separate, independent, self-governing religious body, owing no obedience or allegiance to any other church, synod, conference, council, or supervisory judicatory whatever; that each such Congregational church selects its own pastor, adopts its own creed and decides upon and establishes its own forms of worship;” and that since the incorporation of the defendant there has been no change in the creed, doctrines or forms of worship used by such church when it called itself the Dodgeville Primitive Methodist Society. It appeared, substantially without dispute, that immediately after such incorporation, and upon affiliation with Congregational churches, which was done by formal public act, a considerable number of the members of the old Primitive Methodist Society withdrew from affiliation therewith, and organized and attempted to maintain a society of the Primitive Methodist denomination in affiliation with, and subordination to, the general synod or conference of that faith, and have so continued up to the present time, and with considerable persistency have been endeavoring to regain control and possession of the premises now in controversy, meanwhile holding meetings at stated intervals, first at the residence of the several members; but later in the city hall. The court finds that the plaintiffs, and those associated with them, are at present unable to furnish public religious services in the church edifice, even if they are given possession of it. So far as other findings materially vary the situation, the substance of them will appear in the opinion. The trial court decided that there had been no diversion of the property from its legitimate uses, and rendered judgment dismissing the complaint, from which plaintiffs appeal.Spensley & McIlhon, T. M. Priestley, and Carter & Mason, for appellants.

Aldro Jenks and J. P. Smelker, for respondents.

DODGE, J. (after stating the facts).

Of course the former decision has become the law of this case, and must control any situation not materially variant from that set forth by the complaint and then considered. Euting v. Ry. Co., 120 Wis. 651, 98 N. W. 944. The variation most strenuously urged is that, instead of secession by certain members from the society, the society itself made whatever change occurred by incorporating, changing its name, withdrawing from affiliation with and subordination to the Western Conference of the Primitive Methodist Church, and allying itself with the Congregational denomination; all by majority vote of its members in meeting duly assembled. Let this fact be conceded for the purposes of the argument, what is the result? The same authorities cited in the former opinion to deny the right of seceding members, though a majority, to take with them the property of the society also deny the power of the officers, or any majority of a religious corporation, no matter how fully invested with all corporate powers, to divert its property from the uses defined and limited “by the grant of such property to it or the purposes of its organization as regards the particular religious faith it was organized to promote.” Franke v. Mann, 106 Wis. 118, 130, 81 N. W. 1014, 1018, 48 L. R. A. 856. A religious corporation holding property charged with a trust for certain purposes can no more divert it to other and inconsistent uses, even by due corporate action, than can any other trustee. When such use is for the promotion of the doctrines and discipline of some particular denomination, courts will prevent diversion to the support of a different and inconsistent one, if even a single individual legally interested objects. Fadness v. Braunborg, 73 Wis. 293, 41 N. W. 84; Franke v. Mann, supra; Den v. Bolton, 12 N. J. Law, 206; Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 679, 20 L. Ed. 666;First C. P. C. v. Congregational Soc., 23 Iowa, 567. Under the rule above stated doubtless the property which courts are to protect against diversion must be subject to some limitation upon its use. Whether limitation results from the mere denominational characterof the religious corporation or society holding it, is perhaps doubtful, but unnecessary of decision here; for other facts conclusively appear. If it be assumed that the Primitive Methodists Society held rights in this real estate as the appointee under the deed from Jabez Wilson, then they held them for denominational purposes, for the authority given by that deed to the trustees named therein was to appoint, not an individual corporation or society, but some religious denomination, to exercise what may be called the ecclesiastical possession over the premises, namely, the occupation for religious services on Sunday and on Wednesday evenings. Hence any appointment of the Primitive Methodists would necessarily imply a limitation of such use to the doctrines and purposes of that denomination. Further than this, however, the rights of the old Primitive Methodists Society were, up to the time of the incorporation, held by it as a subordinate member of the Western Primitive Methodists Conference, a synodical religious organization, and subject to its discipline and regulations. Among such we find section 253, to the effect that all property is held subject to the uses of each society “when not inconsistent with the discipline and usages of the Primitive Methodists Church;” and section 271, providing that should any society having property cease to exist, or exist contrary to the usages and discipline of the Primitive Methodists Church, then its property should pass to the conference trustees to be held for the benefit of any organized Primitive Methodists Society in the place where the real estate is situated; or, if this be impracticable, then to be held for the general purposes of the church and under the direction of the annual conference. These clearly restrict the use of the property in question to a society subject to the discipline and supporting the doctrine of the Primitive Methodists denomination.

The next question seriously controverted is whether any diversion from such restricted use has occurred. This is answered in the negative by respondents and, apparently, by the trial court, on the strenght of the finding that no change in doctrine or forms of worship has been had. This, however, does not cover the whole question. To constitute one a member of a church or an individual society a member of a general synodical organization, at least two things are essential: A profession of the accepted faith, and a submission to its government. Den v. Bolton, supra. The Primitive Methodist Church clearly belonged in the third classification of ecclesiastical bodies promulgated by Miller, J.,...