Capillon v. Lengsfield
| Decision Date | 14 December 1936 |
| Docket Number | 16443 |
| Citation | 171 So. 194 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
| Parties | CAPILLON v. LENGSFIELD |
Rehearing denied Jan. 11, 1937. Writ of certiorari refused March 1, 1937.
Eraste Vidrine and James G. Schillin, both of New Orleans, for appellant.
Edward S. Spiro, of New Orleans, for appellee.
On September 18, 1934, at about 7:30 a. m., the plaintiff, a colored man named Bernard Capillon, was driving his Franklin automobile on Jefferson avenue in the direction of the Mississippi river. He alleges that as he approached the intersection of Jefferson avenue and St. Charles avenue, the traffic semaphore stationed at said intersection was green and that under the traffic ordinance of the city of New Orleans he was entitled to proceed across St. Charles avenue that he thereupon crossed the lake side roadway of St. Charles avenue, and the neutral ground of St. Charles avenue and after arriving at a point approximately in the center portion of the river side roadway of St. Charles avenue, his automobile was struck with violent force by the automobile of the defendant, H. W. Lengsfield, which had proceeded down St. Charles avenue in the direction of Canal street, and had attempted to cross the intersection of St. Charles avenue and Jefferson avenue on a red traffic signal light in violation of the city ordinance. Plaintiff further alleges that, as a consequence of the impact, his car was thrown out of control and proceeded on into the uptown river side roadway of Jefferson avenue past the intersection of St. Charles and Jefferson avenues, where it overturned.
He avers that he sustained grievous injuries, as a result of the collision, consisting of the loss of his left index finger, the loss of part of his left thumb and second finger, a severe nervous shock, contusions and bruises and a sprain of his right hip; that immediately after the accident he was taken to Charity Hospital where emergency treatments were performed and he was confined to said institution for a period of a day and a night; that later, on September 25, 1934, he returned to the hospital for further treatments and it was then discovered that his injured left hand had become infected and he thereafter placed himself under the care of his own physician who treated him for a period of three months. He further charges that his automobile was completely demolished in the crash and that he is entitled to recover the value thereof, which he fixes at $ 700. He also prays for the recovery of the sum of $ 3,000 for his physical injuries, $ 3,000 for his pain and suffering, $ 220 medical bills, and $ 20 for medicine purchased by him, or a total claim of $ 6,940.
The defendant answered and denied the averments of the petition respecting the negligence charged against him. He alleges that on the date of the accident he was proceeding down St. Charles avenue; that upon reaching the intersection of Jefferson avenue he brought his car to a complete stop on the right-hand side of the river side roadway of St. Charles avenue in obedience to the traffic semaphore which was red; that he remained stationary until the traffic semaphore changed to green (signifying his right to cross the intersection of Jefferson avenue), whereupon he shifted the gear of his automobile into first speed and proceeded into the center of the intersection where he was struck by plaintiff's car which was traversing the intersection in the direction of the river at a high rate of speed against the traffic signal and in direct violation of the city ordinance. He further pleads in the alternative that if the court should find him negligent in any particular then in that event the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which proximately caused the accident and the resulting damage. He further reconvenes for the sum of $ 48.60 which he represents to be the damage to his automobile resulting from the collision.
On the foregoing issues, the case was tried and the district judge, after hearing the evidence, found for the plaintiff in the full sum of $ 4,040 and assigned written reasons for judgment. The lower court did not pass upon the reconventional demand but its failure in this respect is tantamount to a rejection of the claim. From the adverse judgment, defendant has appealed
The complaint here is that the district judge erred, first, in finding the defendant guilty of fault and, second, in failing to hold that plaintiff was contributorily negligent. We shall discuss the alleged errors in their respective orders.
The evidence of the defendant himself shows that on the morning of the accident he was driving on St. Charles avenue in the river side roadway headed in the direction of Canal street; that as he approached the intersection of Jefferson avenue the traffic proceeding on St. Charles avenue was stopped for a red semaphore light which gave the right of way to the traffic proceeding in Jefferson avenue across St. Charles avenue. There was a Tulane Belt street car proceeding down St. Charles avenue which had stopped for this adverse traffic signal and there were at least one or more automobiles in the riverside roadway at the intersection waiting on the red light.
The river side roadway of St. Charles avenue is sufficiently wide for three automobiles to proceed abreast thereon. The traffic lane of said roadway nearest the neutral ground at the intersection of Jefferson avenue was occupied, at the time of the accident, by at least one automobile waiting on the adverse traffic signal and there was also one or more automobiles stopped in the middle or second traffic lane.
The defendant says that he pulled into the third traffic lane from the neutral ground and remained stationary until the signal light changed to green. He explains, and his testimony is borne out by other uncontradicted evidence, that when the signal light facing traffic proceeding in the direction of Canal street on St. Charles avenue at the intersection of Jefferson avenue changes from red to green, it does so without the intervention of the usual yellow caution light which is exhibited by most of the semaphores in the city of New Orleans. He further relates that when the signal light changed from red to green on the morning in question (entitling him to proceed) he placed the gear of his automobile in first speed and started to cross the intersection. He concedes that, at the time he started to cross, his view of Jefferson avenue traffic was obstructed by the presence of the automobiles and street car to his left and he claims that he started his car forward in order to obtain a better sight. When he had proceeded a distance of some seven feet into the intersection, the front left-hand side of his automobile collided with the plaintiff's car. He asserts that plaintiff's car was traveling at a high rate of speed.
The district judge was of the opinion that the defendant's own statement sufficiently exhibits that he did not exercise the proper care under the circumstances existing at the time of the accident. We agree with the court's finding on this point. It seems evident that the defendant started his automobile immediately after the signal light changed from red to green. At that time, his view of traffic proceeding across St. Charles avenue from the lake side to the river side was screened by the automobiles and street car which were adjacent to him on his left. The defendant frankly admits that he could not see and that he pulled out into the intersection to get a better view. In so doing, he placed himself directly in the path of the plaintiff's car. Even though the defendant was entitled to cross the intersection when the signal light changed to green, he did not have a right to proceed ahead of traffic already rightly in the intersection and he was not justified in assuming that the intersection was clear. On the contrary, the fact that the traffic to his left had not started forward at the time the light changed from red to green should have warned him that there were vehicles proceeding in the intersection which had not completely traversed the roadway.
The case of Thomas v. Roberts (La.App.) 144 So. 70 is strikingly similar to the case at bar with respect to the negligence of the defendant in this case. The only difference between that case and this one is that the defendant...
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