Capital Associated Indus., Inc. v. Stein

• Citation: 922 F.3d 198
• Decision Date: 19 April 2019
• Docket Number: No. 17-2218,17-2218
• Parties: CAPITAL ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Josh STEIN, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of North Carolina; Nancy Lorrin Freeman, In her official capacity as District Attorney for the 10th Prosecutorial District of the State of North Carolina; J. Douglas Henderson, In his official capacity as District Attorney for the 18th Prosecutorial District of the State of North Carolina, Defendants – Appellees, and North Carolina State Bar, Intervenor/Defendant – Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

922 F.3d 198

CAPITAL ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. Josh STEIN, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of North Carolina; Nancy Lorrin Freeman, In her official capacity as District Attorney for the 10th Prosecutorial District of the State of North Carolina; J. Douglas Henderson, In his official capacity as District Attorney for the 18th Prosecutorial District of the State of North Carolina, Defendants – Appellees,andNorth Carolina State Bar, Intervenor/Defendant – Appellee.

No. 17-2218

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: December 13, 2018

Decided: April 19, 2019

ARGUED: Reid Lloyd Phillips, BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON, HUMPHREY, & LEONARD, L.L.P., Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Alan William Duncan, MULLINS DUNCAN HARRELL & RUSSELL PLLC, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jennifer K. Van Zant, Charles E. Coble, Craig D. Schauer, BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON, HUMPHREY & LEONARD, L.L.P., Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Stephen M. Russell, Jr., MULLINS DUNCAN HARRELL & RUSSELL PLLC, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee North Carolina State Bar. Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, Matthew W. Sawchak, Solicitor General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees Joshua H. Stein, Nancy Lorrin Freeman, and J. Douglas Henderson.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, DIAZ, Circuit Judge, and DUNCAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Gregory and Senior Judge Duncan joined.

DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

Capital Associated Industries, Inc. ("CAI") is a trade association representing North Carolina employers. As part of a plan to expand its membership, CAI wants to provide legal services to its members. But it cannot because state law forbids corporations from practicing law. Following unsuccessful lobbying efforts to change the law, CAI sued state prosecutors to enjoin the enforcement of state unauthorized practice of law ("UPL") statutes against it. After the North Carolina State Bar intervened to defend the statutes, the defendants obtained summary judgment. On appeal, CAI contends that North Carolina’s UPL statutes violate its constitutional rights to free association, free speech, and commercial speech; lack a rational basis; are void for vagueness; and violate the state constitution. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

A.

Since 1931, the State of North Carolina has forbidden corporations from practicing law. N.C. Gen Stat. § 84-5(a).¹ To address the unauthorized practice of law, the State Bar and state prosecutors may sue for an injunction, and prosecutors may bring misdemeanor charges. Id. §§ 84-37, 84-7, 84-8(a). The UPL statutes do, however, allow the practice of law by lawyer-owned professional corporations, public interest law firms, and in-house counsel representing their employers. Id. §§ 55B-8, 84-5.1.

CAI is a North Carolina nonprofit corporation that claims a tax exemption under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) as a trade association of employers. It has about 1,100 North Carolina employers as members and describes its mission as fostering successful employment relationships. CAI charges its members an annual fee adjusted for each member’s size. It competes with for-profit businesses in providing some services, such as recruiting, background checks, consulting, training, conferences, and affirmative action planning.

One of the most popular services it provides its members is a call center, where members can speak to CAI’s staff of human resources experts. The experts can advise on HR issues. But they can’t give legal advice, even if they are licensed attorneys. So, when legal issues arise, CAI’s HR experts have to steer the conversation elsewhere, end the conversation, or refer the member to outside counsel.

While it disclaims any interest in representing its members in court, CAI would like to help them draft legal documents (such as contracts or employee handbooks) and answer questions about employment and labor law. If it could practice law, CAI would offer most legal services without charge as part of its membership fees, but it would charge hourly fees for certain services.

CAI has spent years trying to change the UPL statutes as part of its "2X" development plan to double its membership and reach. In 2011, CAI’s lobbyists persuaded state lawmakers to introduce bills that would have allowed corporations to practice law. CAI tried and failed to get the State Bar to support the bills. The State Bar instead actively opposed the bills, and they were not enacted. CAI’s lobbying efforts met a similar fate in 2013. That same year, the State Bar adopted a proposed ethics opinion advising that CAI would violate the UPL statutes if it employed lawyers to give its members legal advice.

B.

After two failed bids to achieve its goals through legislation, CAI turned to the courts. It challenged the UPL statutes in federal district court, naming as defendants the attorney general of North Carolina and certain district attorneys. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would prevent enforcement of North Carolina’s UPL laws against it. It pleaded five claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (concerning due process, free association, free speech, vagueness, and commercial speech) and one claim under the state constitution.

The district court allowed the State Bar to intervene as a defendant. It then denied CAI’s motion for a preliminary injunction and the defendants’ motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. Capital Associated Indus., Inc. v. Cooper , 129 F.Supp.3d 281 (M.D.N.C. 2015) ; Capital Associated Indus., Inc. v. Cooper , No. 1:15CV83, 2016 WL 6775484 (M.D.N.C. June 23, 2016). After discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment.

Before the district court, State Bar representatives expressed concerns about nonlawyers controlling litigation and receiving attorney fees, confidentiality, excessive fees, and the State Bar’s inability to discipline corporations. Regarding CAI, they worried about conflicts of interest due to its large base of members and the fact that its directors and officers don’t have to be lawyers and thus wouldn’t have obligations under the State Bar’s Rules of Professional Conduct.

To assuage these concerns, CAI filed declarations from three trade organizations practicing law in other states, and it outlined a plan to comply with ethics rules. CAI’s lawyers would control legal services, make decisions about conflicts of interest, and have sole access to privileged communications. But CAI’s directors and president would set the attorneys’ salaries and the legal department’s budget. And CAI declined to offer assurances that it would require its directors and officers to be attorneys.

Some of CAI’s members testified that allowing CAI to practice law would mean that they could obtain more efficient and cost-effective legal representation. But almost all those members said they had received legal advice from private attorneys. Just one member said it had gone without counsel in low-risk situations, but even it found counsel for more serious matters. And according to CAI’s President and CEO, no member has left CAI because it doesn’t offer legal services.

Addressing the cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court first held that CAI had standing because it faced "a credible threat of prosecution" if it practiced law.

Capital Associated Indus., Inc. v. Stein (CAI) , 283 F.Supp.3d 374, 380 (M.D.N.C. 2017).² The district court then turned to the merits and rejected all six of CAI’s claims, entering summary judgment for the defendants. Id. at 383–92.

This appeal followed.

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc. , 856 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2017). "[W]e apply the same legal standards as the district court, and view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. (quoting Roland v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. , 850 F.3d 625, 628 (4th Cir. 2017) ).

CAI framed all six of its claims as as-applied challenges, which test the constitutionality of a statute applied to the plaintiff based on the record. Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Insley , 731 F.3d 291, 298 n.5 (4th Cir. 2013). Thus, CAI was not required to prove that the UPL statutes are invalid in all circumstances. Id.

III.

We begin with CAI’s claim that the UPL statutes violate its freedom of association. CAI contends that it is an expressive association seeking to improve employment relationships in North Carolina and foster compliance with the law.³ By forbidding it from practicing law, CAI argues, the UPL statutes restrict its ability to carry out that expressive mission. We agree with the district court, however, that the UPL statutes do not unconstitutionally restrict CAI’s associational rights.

To support its argument, CAI relies on a line of cases beginning with NAACP v. Button , 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). In Button , the Supreme Court held that a Virginia law forbidding organizations from retaining attorneys to represent third parties infringed on the right of the NAACP and its members "to associate for the purpose of assisting persons who seek legal redress for infringements" of their civil and constitutional rights. Id. at 428, 83 S.Ct. 328.

The Court emphasized that for the NAACP, litigation is "not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment." Id. at 429, 83 S.Ct. 328. To win civil rights, the Court said, litigation may be the "sole practicable avenue" and the "most effective form of political association." Id. at 430–31, 83 S.Ct. 328. Thus, what was at stake was "secur[ing] constitutionally guaranteed civil rights," not commercial ends.

Id. at 442–43, 83 S.Ct. 328. And as the Court took time to emphasize, the law as applied against the...