Capital Associated Indus., Inc. v. Stein
Decision Date | 19 September 2017 |
Docket Number | 1:15cv83 |
Citation | 283 F.Supp.3d 374 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
Parties | CAPITAL ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES, INC., Plaintiff, v. Josh STEIN, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of North Carolina, et al., Defendants. |
Reid L. Phillips, Charles E. Coble, Jennifer K. Van Zant, Kimberly M. Marston, Craig D. Schauer, Brooks Pierce McLendon Humphrey & Leonard, Greensboro, NC, for Plaintiff.
David J. Adinolfi, II, N. C.Department Of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.
Plaintiff, Capital Associated Industries ("CAI"), initiated this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the enforcement of Sections 84–4and85–5 of the North Carolina General Statutes("UPL Statutes"), which govern the unauthorized practice of law, violate the United States Constitution and the North Carolina Constitution, as applied to CAI.(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 100.)Before the Court are three motions for summary judgment brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by (1)DefendantsJosh Stein,1Nancy Lorrin Freeman, and J. Douglas Henderson(collectively "State Prosecutors"), (ECF No. 100); (2) CAI, (ECF No. 103); and (3)Intervenor–Defendant, the North Carolina State Bar(the "State Bar"), (ECF No. 112).For the reasons stated below, the Court(1) denies State Prosecutors' motion, (2) denies CAI's motion, (3) and grants the State Bar's motion.
In its Complaint, CAI describes itself as a tax-exempt, "non-profit employers' association" comprised of approximately 1,080 employers throughout North Carolina that "associate[ ] ... to promote industrial development and progress."(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 6, 17.)CAI members pay annual membership dues to CAI to receive "efficient, low-cost human resources-related information, advice, data, education, legislative advocacy, and other benefits and services pertaining to each member's human resources, compliance, and day-to-day management needs."(Id.¶ 17.)In addition to its current offerings, CAI wishes to provide "employment-related legal advice and services to its members through licensed North Carolina attorneys" that it employs, as part of the dues its members currently pay.(ECF No. 105–1 ¶¶ 34, 44.)For a separate fee of $195 per hour, CAI also wishes to offer its members other legal services that would include drafting employment, separation, and non-compete agreements, reviewing employment policies and handbooks, and representation "in charges before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission."(Id.¶ 44.)The legal services that CAI wishes to offer would not include providing legal assistance with matters related to litigation or "extremely specialized areas of workplace law" including, for example, "[t]ax matters that relate to workplace and employee needs."(ECF No. 106–1at 64–67.)
In April of 2013, CAI requested from the State Bar an opinion as to whether CAI's proposed plan to provide legal advice and services to its members would constitute the unauthorized practice of law.(ECF Nos. 42 ¶¶ 7–9; 42–1.)On May 28, 2013, the State Bar issued a proposed ethics decision, which notified CAI that its plan would amount to the unauthorized practice of law because of CAI's status as a corporation not authorized to practice law.(SeeECFNo. 42–2.)
On January 23, 2015, CAI filed this lawsuit, seeking declaratory relief and requesting that State Prosecutors be enjoined from enforcing the UPL Statutes against CAI.(ECF No. 1.)CAI alleged that the enforcement of the UPL Statutes, as applied to CAI, would violate (1) its right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, (id.¶¶ 45–53);(2) its right of association under the First Amendment, (id.¶¶ 54–63);(3) its right to free speech under the First Amendment on the grounds that the UPL Statutes operate as content-based restrictions and prevent CAI from speaking because it is a corporation, (id.¶¶ 64–72); (4) its right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that the UPL Statutes are vague, (id.¶¶ 73–82); (5) its right to free speech on the ground that the UPL Statutes prohibit CAI from advertising its proposed legal services, (id.¶¶ 83–91); and (6) the Monopoly Clause of the North Carolina Constitution, (id.¶¶ 92–99).On February 16, 2015, CAI sought a preliminary injunction, requesting that the Court enjoin State Prosecutors from taking any action that would interfere with CAI offering or delivering legal advice and services to its members through CAI attorneys licensed to practice law.(ECF No. 19at 1.)State Prosecutors moved to dismiss CAI's claims.(ECF No. 10.)
The Court heard oral arguments on the motions on May 29, 2015.On September 4, 2015, this Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order ("Preliminary Injunction Order"), denying CAI's motion for a preliminary injunction, and denying State Prosecutors' motion to dismiss.Capital Associated Indus., Inc. v. Cooper , 129 F.Supp.3d 281, 308(M.D.N.C.2015).State Prosecutors later moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the Court entered an Order that denied that motion.Capital Associated Indus., Inc. v. Cooper , No. 1:15CV83, 2016 WL 6775484, at *2(M.D.N.C.June 23, 2016).Each Party has now moved for summary judgment.(ECF Nos. 100, 103, 112.)
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).A dispute is "genuine" if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party, and "[a] fact is material if it might affect the outcome" of the litigation.Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts , 780 F.3d 562, 568(4th Cir.2015)(quotations omitted).The role of the court is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter" but rather "to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986)."If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."Id. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505(citations omitted).When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must "resolve all factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable" to the nonmoving party.Rossignol v. Voorhaar , 316 F.3d 516, 523(4th Cir.2003).When, as here, a court has before it cross-motions for summary judgment, "the court must review each motion separately on its own merits" to determine whether each party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Id.
State Prosecutors have moved for summary judgment on jurisdictional grounds and on CAI's right of association claim only.(ECF No. 100.)CAI and the State Bar have each moved for summary judgment on each of the six claims brought by CAI.(ECF Nos. 103, 112.)As State Prosecutors raise the threshold issue of whether the Court can consider CAI's claims, the Court will first consider their motion.
State Prosecutors argue that CAI cannot satisfy the requirements of standing doctrine or ripeness doctrine because CAI did not face a credible threat of prosecution before it brought suit.(ECF No. 101at 6–20.)CAI contends that it does have standing to sue on the ground that such a threat exists.(ECF No. 117at 4–11.)The Court observes that "the Article III standing and ripeness issues in this case‘boil down to the same question.’ "2SeeSusan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2341 n.5, 189 L.Ed.2d 246(2014)(quotingMedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. , 549 U.S. 118, 128 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 764, 166 L.Ed.2d 604(2007) ).Accordingly, the Court will consider State Prosecutors' arguments concerning standing and ripeness simultaneously, characterizing the discussion as one involving "standing."
Article III limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases and controversies.U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.Standing doctrine is "[o]ne element of the case-or-controversy requirement," and a plaintiff that invokes federal jurisdiction must accordingly establish standing to sue.Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l , 568 U.S. 398, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1146, 185 L.Ed.2d 264(2013).A plaintiff has standing upon demonstrating an injury that is "concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling."Id. at 1147.A plaintiff has standing to bring a "pre-enforcement challenge" to a statute when the plaintiff"faces a credible threat of prosecution" under that law.N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett , 168 F.3d 705, 710(4th Cir.1999).Further, when "the State has not disclaimed any intention of enforcing" the challenged statute, a plaintiff"need not actually violate" that statute, "or be proactively threatened with prosecution prior to violation, in order to have standing to challenge its constitutionality."Does 1–5 v. Cooper , 40 F.Supp.3d 657, 671–72(M.D.N.C.2014);seeMedImmune, Inc. , 549 U.S. at 129, 127 S.Ct. 764().
The Court concludes that CAI has standing to bring its claims because it faces a credible threat of prosecution under the UPL Statutes.The Court's justification for this conclusion remains unchanged from the Court's earlier ruling on this issue:
State Prosecutors have not stated that they would refrain from prosecuting CAI for violating the UPL Statutes.Nor have State Prosecutors stated that they disagree with the State Bar's proposed ethics opinion issued to CAI.To the contrary, State Prosecutors and the State Bar vigorously contend that CAI lacks the right to...
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