Capital City Bank v. Knox

Decision Date31 January 1871
PartiesCAPITAL CITY BANK, Defendant in Error, v. SAMUEL KNOX, Plaintiff in Error.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Error to First District Court.

Ewing & Smith, for plaintiff in error.

The Circuit Court had no jurisdiction over defendant Knox. (Jacobs v. Mellen, 14 Mass. 132; 41 Mo. 493; 2 Johns. 294; 3 Abb. Pr. 474; 3 Cow. 381; 28 Mo. 75; 38 Mo. 421.)

Lay & Belch, for defendant in error.

In this case it may have been unkind in Vose to sell the dishonored note of Knox so far from his domicile. But wherein is it unlawful? No property of Knox is taken, no right divested. The court, it is presumed, would administer the rights of parties correctly. If not, the law has made ample provision by writs of error, appeal, change of venue, etc. Vose had a right to sell, the bank to buy, and the statute fixes the form.

WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff commenced its action in the Cole County Circuit Court against Samuel Knox and S. A. Vose on a negotiable promissory note executed by John F. Darby, payable to Samuel Knox, and by Knox indorsed and transferred to Vose. Vose indorsed and transferred the note to plaintiff, and at its maturity it was protested for non-payment. The plaintiff has its place of business in Jefferson City, Cole county, Missouri, and the defendant Vose also resides in Cole county. Knox lives in St. Louis county, and the writ was served upon him in that county.

At the return term Knox appeared and pleaded to the jurisdicdiction of the court; and, as reasons in denial of the jurisdiction thereof, he stated that he was a resident of the city and county of St. Louis, and that he had not been within the limits of Cole county from the date of the making of the note till after process was served upon him. And he further averred that for the purpose of compelling him to answer this suit in Cole county, and for no other purpose, Vose assigned and delivered the note to the plaintiff; that the sole purpose and object of the indorsement and transfer by Vose to plaintiff was to enable the plaintiff to institute suit against Vose, who was a resident of Cole county, and by that contrivance acquire jurisdiction over him, a resident of St. Louis county, all of which facts were well known to plaintiff when it received the note, and the plaintiff unlawfully co-operated with Vose in the unlawful transaction; that the note was indorsed and transferred for an unlawful and wrongful purpose, and was wholly ineffective to give the Circuit Court jurisdiction over him. He further alleged that Vose was made a co-defendant in the case with no purpose of holding him responsible in the suit, but for the purpose only of compelling Knox to enter his appearance and defend the suit in a county remote from his residence.

To this plea the plaintiff demurred. The court sustained the demurrer and final judgment was rendered thereon, which was affirmed in the District Court, and Knox prosecuted his writ of error.

The practice act provides that where there are several defendants, and they reside in different counties, the suit may be brought in any such county (2 Wagn. Stat. 1005, § 1), and ordinarily the plaintiff would have the right to select the county for the institution of the suit. But jurisdiction must be fairly acquired, and can not be maintained where it is sought to be obtained by fraudulent representations or for the purpose of oppression. No court should sanction any attempt to bring a party within its jurisdiction by fraud and misrepresentation. (Marsh's Adm'r v. Bast, 41 Mo. 493.)

In January v. Rice, 33 Mo. 409, it appears that suit was brought against four persons in St. Louis county, and a summons issued against three of the defendants to that county, and a separate writ was issued to St. Charles county against the defendant Rice, who resided in that county. Rice made no...

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33 cases
  • Markey v. Louisiana & M. R. R. Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 23 November 1904
    ...Scarritt, Griffith & Jones, for appellant. (1) Jurisdiction. Rev. St. 1899, §§ 562, 997; Byler v. Jones, 79 Mo. 261; Capital City Bank v. Knox, 47 Mo. 333; Vastine v. Bast, 41 Mo. 493; Graham v. Ringo, 67 Mo. Answering over and appearance at trial do not waive exception to jurisdiction. Lit......
  • Mertens v. McMahon
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 6 December 1933
    ...v. Skelton, 206 Mo. App. 471; Christian v. Williams, 111 Mo. 429; Marsh v. Bast, 41 Mo. 493; Byler v. Jones. 79 Mo. 261; Capital City Bank v. Knox, 47 Mo. 333; Wilson v. Donaldson, 117 Ind. 356, 20 N.E. 250; Andrews v. Lembeck, 46 Ohio St. 38, 18 N.E. 483; Mitchell v. Wixon, 53 Mich. 541, 1......
  • Mertens v. McMahon
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 6 December 1933
    ...Groce v. Skelton, 206 Mo.App. 471; Christian v. Williams, 111 Mo. 429; Marsh v. Bast, 41 Mo. 493; Byler v. Jones, 79 Mo. 261; Capital City Bank v. Knox, 47 Mo. 333; Wilson Donaldson, 117 Ind. 356, 20 N.E. 250; Andrews v. Lembeck, 46 Ohio St. 38, 18 N.E. 483; Mitchell v. Wixon, 53 Mich. 541,......
  • The State ex rel. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Grimm
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 27 January 1912
    ...and where parties will be denied due process of law. Mfg. Co. v. Du Bois, 165 Mass. 117; Pietraroia v. R. & F. Co., 197 N.Y. 434; Bank v. Knox, 47 Mo. 333. (3) If relators are compelled to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the circuit court they will be denied due process of law cont......
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