Capitol Greenroofs, LLC v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 15 September 2015
• Docket Number: 2014 CA 000684 B
• Court: D.C. Superior Court
• Parties: CAPITOL GREENROOFS, LLC, Plaintiff, v. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Defendant.

CAPITOL GREENROOFS, LLC, Plaintiff, v. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Defendant.

2014 CA 000684 B

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIVIL DIVISION

September 15, 2015

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant District of Columbia's Supplemental Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (filed July 15, 2015), and Plaintiff Capitol Greenroofs, LLC ("CGR") Reply Brief (filed July 22, 2015). The District filed a second supplemental brief thereafter on August 13, 2015, and CGR followed suit by filing its second supplemental brief on September 4, 2015. Pursuant to Court Order dated July 7, 2015, the parties were ordered to brief the special duty exception to the public duty doctrine raised in CGR's motion for summary judgment.¹ The Order states: "the Court finds that CGR's argument that the District owed CGR a special duty and that the public duty doctrine applies to be unpersuasive, and notes that the District did not address the issue in its opposition. While the Court could treat the unopposed issue as conceded, the Court prefers to decide the issue on the merits and orders the parties to brief the issue." The Order concluded by setting a briefing schedule for the District's brief and CGR's reply thereto.

Upon review of the pleadings submitted, the Court finds that the special duty exception to the public duty doctrine applies as to the District's liability under section 2-201.01 (the "District's little Miller Act"), and grants in part CGR's motion for partial summary judgment to narrow litigation to the issue of damages. The Court affirms its denial of CGR's motion for summary judgment because material facts remain in dispute as to damages. The remaining issue for litigation is limited to the District's argument that CGR's invoices seek payment for work never performed, expenses never paid, or amounts that were mitigated, and that no surety would have compensated CGR.

In short, the public duty doctrine stands for the proposition that a duty to all is a duty to none in particular. The doctrine, in effect, shields the District from liability for its public official's negligence from actions performed in the course of public service. See e.g., Klahr v District of Columbia, 576 A.2d 718, 719 (D.C. 1990). The general rule is that the public duty doctrine applies unless a statute or regulation establishes a "special relationship." The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine by showing (1) a direct and continuing contact between the victim and the governmental agency or official, and (2) justifiable reliance by the victim. See Powell v. District of Columbia, 602 A.2d 1123, 1129 (D.C. 1992) (citing Platt v. District of Columbia, 467 A.2d 149, 152 (D.C. 1983)). While licensing and permit statutes do not necessarily create a special relationship, in Powell, our Court of Appeals found that it could. In Powell, the plaintiff's car was impounded for incorrect license and registration. The plaintiff sued the District for its employee's negligence in issuing the incorrect license and registration in violation of a statutory requirement that the District must issue correct license and registration to "qualified motor vehicle owners." D.C. Code § 40-102. The court enumerated factors for considering the two-pronged Platt test. Underthe first prong, the court found that Ms. Powell was a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff, and took into account Ms. Powell's application and fee as one factor in support of a direct transaction between her and the District, and the potential penalties such as vehicle impoundment. Powell, 602 A.2d at 1129-30. Under the second prong, the court found that plaintiff, and other registrants, could justifiably assume that the District, in the interest of assuring the effectiveness of their vehicle registration system, would accurately record her license and registration. Powell, 602 A.2d at 1131-32. The court found that the District's issuance of license and registrations with specific numbers to every vehicle constitutes the District's "constructive representation" that the car would be correctly registered. Id. at 1132. Thus, the court found plaintiff's subsequent reliance upon the "specific representation to her that her car would be correctly registered and her registration number correctly entered into the [] system" by affixing the tags to her car was reasonable. Id.

Here, because this issue was raised in CGR's motion for summary judgment, the Court considers the evidence in the light more favorable to the District, the non-moving party. See Biratu v. BT Vermont Avenue, LLC, 962 A.2d 261, 263 (D.C. 2008); Tucci v. District of Columbia, 956 A.2d 684, 690 (D.C. 2008). In CGR's motion, it argued that it should prevail as a...