Capitol Leasing Co. v. F.D.I.C.

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
• Writing for the Court: Before CUMMINGS and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and WOOD, Jr.; PER CURIAM
• Citation: Capitol Leasing Co. v. F.D.I.C., 999 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1993)
• Decision Date: 30 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-3016,92-3016
• Parties: CAPITOL LEASING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Page 188

999 F.2d 188

CAPITOL LEASING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 92-3016.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 21, 1993.

Decided June 30, 1993.

Scott E. Tuckman (argued), Kwiatt & Silverman, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff-appellant.

Kenneth K. Dort, William A. Spence, David V. Goodsir, Freeborn & Peters, Chicago, IL, Joan E. Smiley (argued), F.D.I.C., Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee.

Before CUMMINGS and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and WOOD, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Capitol Leasing Company (Capitol) appeals from the district court's dismissal of its suit against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the receiver for the Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago (Cosmopolitan). The only issue on review is whether the district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Capitol's claim against the FDIC for breach of contract. We affirm.

I

Capitol leased computer equipment to Cosmopolitan under the terms of an agreement. The bank failed in 1991. When the FDIC took over as receiver, it instructed Capitol and other potential creditors to file any claims against the bank no later than August 21, 1991. Three notices appeared in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin between May and July 1991 apprising creditors of some of their rights. The notices stated that the FDIC must allow or disallow claims within 180 days of timely filing. R. 7, Exhibit A-1. Absent from the notices were any references to other crucial time limits governing such claims under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"). 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1989).

Capitol filed a proof of claim on June 17, 1991, seeking $95,087.20 for alleged breach of contract. On August 23, 1991, the FDIC notified Capitol by mail that it had been appointed receiver for the bank. Like the published notices, that letter contained no reference to the applicable statute of limitations or to the relevant sections--any sections, for that matter--of FIRREA.

The FDIC disallowed Capitol's claim. In the district court and on appeal, the FDIC asserts that it advised Capitol of that decision in a letter dated December 17, 1991--the 180th and final day it was authorized to make such a ruling. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i). Capitol denies ever having received notice of disallowance. The letter, in any event, informs Capitol that "[i]f you so choose to contest this decision, you have sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in which to take action against the FDIC as receiver. If action is not taken within sixty (60) days, this claim decision is considered final, with no further rights or remedies with respect to such claim." R. 7, Exhibit A-4. As with the publication and actual notices, the letter of disallowance also fails to cite to the statute.

Capitol did not file an action within 60 days of the adverse decision. Instead, it filed suit 86 days after the FDIC had denied its claim, and 26 days after expiration of the statute of limitations. In response, the FDIC filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The district court granted the motion, ruling that Capitol had failed to file its action in accordance with the time frame established by FIRREA. That statute, which provides for agency review or judicial determination of claims, states in relevant part:

Before the end of the 60-day period beginning on the earlier of--

(i) the end of the [180-day] period described in paragraph (5)(A)(i) [during which the FDIC must decide any claims against a depository institution for which it] is receiver; or

(ii) the date of any notice of disallowance of such claim pursuant to paragraph 5(A)(i),

the claimant may request administrative review of the claim ... or file suit on such claim ... in the district or territorial court of the United States for the district within which the depository institution's principal place of business is located or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

....

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A).

The district court held that compliance with the statutory claims process is mandatory. It rejected Capitol's argument that its claim should not be barred because it never received the disallowance notice. Also irrelevant, the court found, was any evidence tending to show insufficient compliance with the mailing requirements of § 1821(d)(5)(A)(iii). The court went on to observe that even if the FDIC had failed to notify Capitol that its claim had been disallowed, Capitol needed to bring suit within 60 days of either (1) the period beginning on the end of the 180-day determination period, or (2) the date of any notice of disallowance. Section 1821(d)(6)(A).

In this case, the two possible dates coincided. The 180th day after Capitol filed its claim fell on December 17, 1991, the same day the FDIC claims to have mailed its letter of disallowance. Accordingly, Capitol had 60 days, until February 15, 1992, to seek agency review or judicial determination of its claim. But it failed to file suit in the Northern District of Illinois until March 12, 1992, leading the district court to find the action time-barred.

On appeal, Capitol raises essentially the same arguments it advanced in the district court: (1) Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) was erroneous because there remained a question of fact as to whether (a) the FDIC properly tendered notice of disallowance, and (b) Capitol ever received the letter. (2) The FDIC is estopped from relying upon the statute of limitations provided for in § 1821(d)(6)(A) because its publication notice specifically stated that it would notify Capitol of any determination within 180 days after Capitol filed its claim. As the discussion below illustrates, neither argument is persuasive.

II

A

In ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Sladek v. Bell System Management Pension Plan, 880 F.2d 972, 975 (7th Cir.1989). This court reviews dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Joyce v. Joyce, 975 F.2d 379, 382 (7th Cir.1992) (citing Houck ex rel. United States v. Folding Carton Administration Committee, 881 F.2d 494, 503 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026, 110 S.Ct. 1471, 108 L.Ed.2d 609 (1990)).

B

Capitol argues that the trial court should have afforded it an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual issue whether it ever received proper notification that the FDIC had denied its claim. Appellant's Brief at 10. The FDIC, Capitol contends, in essence requested the district court to treat its motion as one for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56--that is, to make a determination as a matter of law. Capitol further asserts that the district court converted the motion for dismissal into one for summary judgment by considering and relying upon affidavits and documents submitted by the FDIC to show that it issued a notice of disallowance on December 17, 1991. This argument is unavailing because Capitol misconstrues the relationship between Rule 12(b)(1) and summary judgment.

Indisputably, a district court can transform a motion for dismissal under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) into one for summary judgment when "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See also R.J.R. Services, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 895 F.2d 279, 281 (7th Cir.1989). Capitol's argument notwithstanding, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain no analogous recognition that a 12(b)(1) motion can evolve into dismissal pursuant to Rule 56. Crawford v. United States, 796 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir.1986) ("The omission from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a provision for converting a Rule 12(b)(1) motion into a summary judgment motion if evidence is submitted with it was not an oversight."). Whereas a grant of summary judgment is a decision on the merits, see Winslow v. Walters, 815 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir.1987), a court must dismiss the case without ever reaching the merits if it concludes that it has no jurisdiction. Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1070 n. 1 (7th Cir.1987). In short, the question of jurisdiction is inappropriate for summary judgment, and discussing the interplay of Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 56 verges on non sequitur. Winslow, 815 F.2d at 1116. See generally Exchange National Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1130-31 (2d Cir.1976) (discussing relationship between Rules 12(b)(1) and 56). The FDIC did not request summary judgment. Nor could the district court have transformed the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.

Even if the district court did consider affidavits and other documentary evidence in granting the FDIC's motion, it did as it should have. "The district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists." Grafon Corp. v. Hausermann, 602 F.2d 781, 783 (7th Cir.1979). See also McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 785, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936); Rennie v. Garrett, 896 F.2d 1057, 1057-58 (7th Cir.1990). That aside, whether the FDIC sent proper notice of disallowance to Capitol bears little relevance to the question of jurisdiction. Capitol belabors the point that it never received the FDIC's letter of December 17, 1991. But, as the discussion below suggests, the statute of limitations in § 1821(d)(6)(A) provides that a claimant need not ever await a decision from the FDIC before it may initiate--indeed, before it must initiate--further agency review or judicial determination of a claim.

C

Capitol argues that it should not be bound by the statute of limitations provided ...