Capitol Steel & Iron Co. v. Fuller

• Citation: 206 Okla. 638,245 P.2d 1134
• Decision Date: 20 May 1952
• Docket Number: No. 35301,35301
• Parties: CAPITOL STEEL & IRON CO. et al. v. FULLER et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Page 1134

245 P.2d 1134

206 Okla. 638

CAPITOL STEEL & IRON CO. et al. v. FULLER et al.

No. 35301.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 20, 1952.

Rehearing Denied July 8, 1952.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A constitutional amendment should be construed in the light of its purpose and given a practical interpretation so that the plainly manifest purpose of those who adopted it may be carried out.

2. A constitutional amendment is properly to be expounded in the light of conditions existing at the time of its adoption.

3. House Bill No. 312 of the 23rd Legislature, S.L.1951 pp. 267 to 270 inc., known as the Death Benefit Act, as a whole, is not vague and indefinite nor violative of Article XXIII sec. 7, Article II sec. 7, Article VII sec. 12 of the Oklahoma Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

4. The amount of compensation, provided under the Workmen's Compensation Law for the death of a workman resulting from injuries suffered in employment covered by such law, is payable, under the provisions of sec. 1 subsection (1) and sec. 4 of House Bill 312 of the 23rd Legislature (1951) and of 12 O.S.1941 sec. 1053, to his widow, to the exclusion of children having families of their own and not dependent upon him for support, and an award of the State Industrial Commission which attempts to distribute said amount in any other manner must be vacated so that a proper award may be made.

Looney, Watts, Ross, Looney & Smith, Oklahoma City, for petitioners.

Carmon C. Harris, and Frank W. Jones, Oklahoma City, for respondents.

Rowland & Rowland, Bartlesville, Paul W. Updegraff, Norman, amicus curiae.

DAVISON, Justice.

This is an original proceeding in this court to review an award of compensation for the death of Gardner O. Fuller against Capitol Steel and Iron Company, his employer, and National Surety Corporation, its insurance carrier, made by the State Industrial Commission under the provisions of House Bill No. 312 of the 23rd Legislature, S.L.1951 pp. 267 to 270 inc., 85 O.S.1951 §§ 3.1, 11, 12, 22, 24, 43, 44, 48, 84, 109, 122.

All facts, necessary for a determination of the case, are contained in the award of the State Industrial Commission, being the Order of the Trial Commissioner dated October 11, 1951, as follows, to-wit:

1.

'That on the 27th day of June 1951, Gardner O. Fuller, deceased, was in the employ of the respondent herein, engaged in a hazardous occupation, coming within the purview of the Death Benefit provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Oklahoma; that on said date, while acting in the scope of his employment, the said Gardner O. Fuller, deceased, sustained an accidental personal injury, when he was crushed between two railway cars, arising out of and in the course of his employment; resulting in his death, upon the 27th day of June 1951, as a direct result of the accident aforesaid;

2.

'That Clara R. Fuller, the widow of the deceased, Gardner O. Fuller, was entirely dependent upon the said deceased for her support, at the time of his death; that Andy W. Fuller, Christine Carter nee Fuller, and Lillie Maye Goodner, nee Fuller, were not dependent for their support upon the said deceased at the time of his death, that the said Andy W. Fuller being dependent for his support upon himself, only, the said Christine Carter nee Fuller being dependent for her support upon her husband, solely, and the said Lillie Maye Goodner nee Fuller being dependent upon her husband for her support, solely, and that the said grandchildren James Carter and Howard Lee Carter were not dependent for their support upon the deceased, but were dependent for their support upon their father, J. C. Carter;

3.

'That the dependents, within the meaning of the Death Benefit provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Oklahoma are: Clara R. Fuller, widow of the deceased, Andy W. Fuller, son, Christine Carter nee Fuller, daughter, and Lillie Maye Goodner nee Fuller, daughter, and that they are entitled to the proportionate share of the $13,500.00 award as set out by their names:

Clara R. Fuller, widow, 1/2 of the award or $4500.00

Andy W. Fuller, son 2/9ths of the award or 3000.00

Christine Carter nee Fuller, 2/9ths of award or 3000.00

Lillie Maye Goodner, nee Fuller, 2/9ths of award or 3000.00

4.

'That the question of a reasonable attorney fee due attorneys for the claimants will be held in abeyance until a request for a hearing to determine a just and reasonable attorney fee has been requested by one of the parties.'

In the consideration of this case and others involving the application of the same legislative enactment, this court has had the advantage of exhaustive briefs and extended oral arguments, not only of the parties but also of amici curiae.

The sole and only authority of the legislature, to adopt said House Bill No. 312 or any legislation upon the subject of actions for death, is contained in Article XXIII sec. 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution, as follows:

'The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation'.

which was amended, by a vote of the people on July 4, 1950, in that the following proviso was added thereto, to-wit:

'* * * provided however, that the Legislature may provide an amount of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law for death resulting from injuries suffered in employment covered by such law, in which case the compensation so provided shall be exclusive.'

At the time of the adoption of the Constitution and particularly of Article XXIII sec. 7 as it was before amendment, the only right of action to recover damages for wrongful death existed by virtue of section 4313, Oklahoma Statutes of 1893, enforceable as provided therein and by section 4314 of the same laws. With only slight modification, these became sections 1053 and 1054 of Title 12 O.S.1941, as follows:

Sec. 1053,

'When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representative of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action had he lived, against the latter for an injury for the same act or omission. The action must be commenced within two years. The damages must inure to the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and children, if any, or next of kin; to be distributed in the same manner as personal property of the deceased.'

Sec. 1054,

'In all cases where the residence of the party whose death has been caused as set forth in the preceding section of this article is at the time of his death in any other State or Territory, or when, being a resident of this State, no personal representative is or has been appointed, the action provided in the said section may be brought by the widow, or where there is no widow, by the next of kin of such deceased.'

In the case of F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Todd, 204 Okl. 532, 231 P.2d 681, 684, it was said,

'The constitution, Schedule Sec. 2, proposed to extend and continue in force all of the laws in force in the Territory of Oklahoma at the time of the admission of the state into the Union which were not repugnant to the constitution and not locally inapplicable. That, of course, included Section 4313, Oklahoma Statutes 1893. That was one legislative act which the framers of the constitution desired to keep intact, and to that end they included Section 7, Article 23 in the constitution. The intent and effect of that provision is that so long as the provisions of Sec. 7, Article 23, of the constitution remain as a part of the constitution, the legislature, or the people by initiative petition, may not withdraw, take away, annul, or repeal the provisions of said Section 4313, Oklahoma statutes of 1893.'

This, then, was the situation as to actions for wrongful death when, in 1950, the above quoted constitutional amendment was adopted. The law was stabilized. Practically every part of the statutes had been legally interpreted and their every conceivable application had been before the courts. Also at that time, in cases of injuries, not resulting in death, suffered by employees engaged in hazardous occupations, the Workmen's Compensation Act, 85 O.S.1941 sec. 1 et seq., had been much more effective in granting relief than the former common law actions for damages for negligence. True, the amount of recovery was fixed and limited by the schedule of compensation, but long delays in legal procedure were eliminated and recovery was not dependent upon negligence of the employer and freedom from contributory negligence and assumption of risk on the part of the employee. It had furnished a means whereby, for the public welfare, relief could be granted as a substitute for redress. Similar to the provisions for recovery for wrongful death, the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act had been judicially interpreted and applied. The legislature had provided the method of procedure and the amount of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law for disabilities resulting from injuries suffered in employment covered by such law in which case the compensation so provided was exclusive.

Viewed in the light of this background, the meaning and intent of the amended constitutional provision, Art. XXIII sec. 7, is clear and unambiguous. As was pointed out in the case of Riley v. Carter, 165 Okl. 262, 25 P.2d 666, 678, 88 A.L.R. 1018, a constitutional provision must be so interpreted as to 'carry out the manifest intention of the framers of the same and the people who adopted it.' Consideration must be given to the 'objects contemplated by its mandates, and the evils sought to be avoided'. The people, by adopting the 1950 amendment to said Article XXIII sec. 7, meant only to authorize the legislature, in cases where death results from injuries suffered in employment covered by the Workmen's Compensation Law, to...