Capper v. The Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis Railway Company
Decision Date | 17 October 1885 |
Docket Number | 11,504 |
Citation | 2 N.E. 749,103 Ind. 305 |
Parties | Capper v. The Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis Railway Company |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Floyd Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed.
C. L Jewett, for appellant.
A Dowling, for appellee.
The material allegations of the appellant's complaint are these:
The appellee contends that the trial court rightly decided that the complaint was bad, for the reason that it appears that the injury to the plaintiff was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant. The appellant, on the other hand, contends that the ruling of the trial court was wrong, because the servants of the appellee, whose negligence caused the injury, were not in the same general line of employment.
The allegations of the complaint do not bring the case within the cases holding that where a servant is transferred by command of his superior to a line of service different from that which he undertook when he entered the service of the master, he may maintain an action against the master for injuries received while engaged in the work to which he was transferred. Such decisions as those in Lalor v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 52 Ill. 401 (4 Am. Rep. 616), Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Fort, 84 U.S. 553, 17 Wall. 553, Chicago, etc., R. W. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205, Hurst v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 49 Iowa 76, and Mann v. Oriental Print Works, 11 R.I. 152, do not, in any event, rule this case, and we need not, and we do not, enter upon any examination of the doctrine which they maintain. The complaint before us does not aver that the appellant engaged in the service of the company to do a particular work, or pursue a designated line of service, from which he was wrongfully transferred. It does not appear that the command of the superintendent was not one which the duties of the appellant's employment required him to obey. For anything that appears, the command to go from one tunnel to another was one which the superintendent had a right to give, and to which the engagement of the appellant required him to yield obedience. It is true that the complaint avers that the command of the superintendent was given under a threat of discharge, but this is by no means equivalent to averring that the command took the appellant out of the general line of his employment, or that it was one to which he was not bound to submit under his engagement in the service of the company. It can not be presumed that either the master or the superior agent violated a duty, and disregarded the rights of the appellant. A plaintiff who founds a cause of action upon a breach of duty must state such facts as show the duty and its violation.
It may now be taken as settled in this State, that where a master delegates duties which the law imposes upon him to an agent, the agent, whatever his rank, in performing those duties, acts as the master. Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181, and authorities cited; Atlas Engine Works v. Randall, 100 Ind. 293 (50 Am. Rep. 798).
The case relied on by the appellant, Ohio, etc., R. W Co. v. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261 (38 Am. Rep. 134), rests on this principle. In that case the railroad company was held liable on the ground that the master mechanic, whose negligent breach of duty caused the injury, was not a fellow servant, but, in the discharge of the duties cast upon him, was acting for the master, and stood in his place. The complaint under examination does not state facts showing that the superintendent O'Hara...
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Elliot v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.
...of an engineer, (Gormley v. Railway Co., 72 Ind. 31;) and, also, where a track-man was injured by negligence of engineer, (Capper v. Railroad Co., 103 Ind. 305, 2 N. E. Rep. 749;) and in many of the other states. In all them where the subject has been considered by the courts, except Tennes......