Capps v. Weflen

• Citation: 2013 ND 16,826 N.W.2d 605
• Decision Date: 29 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. 20120184.,20120184.
• Parties: Patricia R. CAPPS, f/k/a Patricia Anderson, Terrel A. Anderson, a/k/a Terral Anderson, Gerald C. Wools, Penny Brinks, Michael Lee, Gwen Hassan, Melissa Kellor, and the Estate of Ruth A. Nelson, Deceased, Plaintiffs. Patricia R. Capps, f/k/a Patricia Anderson, Terrel A. Anderson, a/k/a Terral Anderson, Penny Brinks, Michael Lee, Gwen Hassan, and Melissa Kellor, Appellees v. Colleen L. WEFLEN, a/k/a Colleen Weflen, a single woman, Marleen Weflen, f/k/a Marleen W. Tiedt, Sharon Kruse, a/k/a Sharon O. Kruse f/k/a Sharon Weflen, a married woman dealing in her sole and separate property, Catherine Harris f/k/a Catherine Gunderson, a single woman, Norris Weflen, a/k/a Norris L. Weflen, a single man, Windsor Bakken, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Gulfport Energy Corporation, and EOG Resources, Inc., Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota

826 N.W.2d 605

2013 ND 16

Patricia R. CAPPS, f/k/a Patricia Anderson, Terrel A. Anderson, a/k/a Terral Anderson, Gerald C. Wools, Penny Brinks, Michael Lee, Gwen Hassan, Melissa Kellor, and the Estate of Ruth A. Nelson, Deceased, Plaintiffs.

Patricia R. Capps, f/k/a Patricia Anderson, Terrel A. Anderson, a/k/a Terral Anderson, Penny Brinks, Michael Lee, Gwen Hassan, and Melissa Kellor, Appellees

v.Colleen L. WEFLEN, a/k/a Colleen Weflen, a single woman, Marleen Weflen, f/k/a Marleen W. Tiedt, Sharon Kruse, a/k/a Sharon O. Kruse f/k/a Sharon Weflen, a married woman dealing in her sole and separate property, Catherine Harris f/k/a Catherine Gunderson, a single woman, Norris Weflen, a/k/a Norris L. Weflen, a single man, Windsor Bakken, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Gulfport Energy Corporation, and EOG Resources, Inc., Defendants and Appellants.

No. 20120184.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Jan. 29, 2013.

Zachary Evan Pelham (argued) and Patrick W. Durick (on brief), Bismarck, ND, for appellees Patricia Capps and Terrel Anderson.

David Justin Smith (argued) and Sheldon A. Smith (on brief), Bismarck, ND, for appellees Penny Brink, Gwen Hassan, Melissa Kellor, Michael Lee, and the Estate of Ruth A. Nelson.

Richard P. Olson (argued), Wanda L. Fischer (on brief) and Andrew Timothy Forward (on brief), Minot, ND, for appellants Catherine Harris f/k/a Cathy Gunderson, Sharon Kruse, Colleen Weflen, Marlene Weflen, and Norris Weflen.

Monte L. Rogneby (argued), Bismarck, ND, and James Lee Mowry (on brief), Stephen Thomas Throne (on brief), and Jacob T. Haseman (on brief) (not licensed in ND), Throne Law Office, P.C., Sheridan, WY, for appellants Gulfport Energy Corporation and Windsor Bakken, LLC.

Amy Lynn De Kok (argued), Lawrence Bender (on brief), and Jillian Rene Rupnow (on brief), Bismarck, ND, for appellant EOG Resources Inc.

Matthew Arnold Sagsveen, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Attorney General, Bismarck, ND, for amicus curiae.

CROTHERS, Justice.

[¶ 1] Colleen Weflen, Marleen Weflen, Sharon Kruse, Catherine Harris, Norris Weflen, Windsor Bakken, LLC, Gulfport Energy Corp. and EOG Resources, Inc., appeal a district court judgment vacating a previous order granting Weflens' motion for summary judgment, granting Capps' motion for summary judgment and finding Weflens had no claim to a one-half mineral interest reserved by Ruth Nelson in 1975. We dismiss Weflens' appeal, concluding the district court abused its discretion in directing entry of a final judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b).

I

[¶ 2] In 1975, Ruth Nelson conveyed real property in Mountrail County, North Dakota, to Olav and Rose Weflen. Nelson reserved to herself one-half of the minerals in the property. In 1979, Nelson executed a mineral deed conveying her mineral interest to Patricia Capps and Terrel Anderson (“Capps”). Nelson's deed was not recorded until 2009. Colleen Weflen, Marleen Weflen, Sharon Kruse, Catherine Harris and Norris Weflen (“Weflens”) are the current surface owners of the real property.

[¶ 3] In December 2005 and January 2006, the Weflens published a Notice of Lapse of Mineral Interest in the Mountrail County Promoter for three consecutive weeks. On January 13, 2006, the notice of lapse was mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, with restricted delivery to the two last known addresses of Nelson. The addresses were obtained from the 1975 warranty deed from Nelson to Olav and Rose Weflen and from an oil and gas lease dated January 12, 1973. The two notices sent by mail were returned undelivered to the Weflens. Nelson died in 1983. No Statement of Claim of Mineral Interest was filed by or on behalf of Nelson within sixty days after the first publication of the notice of lapse. Capps filed a statement of claim on October 30, 2008. Capps brought suit to quiet title in the mineral interest on December 18, 2009.

[¶ 4] The district court granted Weflens' motion for summary judgment, quieting title of the disputed minerals in the Weflens. Subsequently, Gerald Wools, Penny Brink, Michael Lee, Melissa Kellor and Gwen Hassan (“Hassans”) were joined as plaintiffs and then designated as defendants. Hassans claimed an interest to the minerals as heirs of Nelson. Weflens moved for summary judgment against Hassans. Capps requested the district court deny the motion and reconsider its prior order quieting title in Weflens. Upon reconsideration, the district court vacated its prior order granting Weflens' motion for summary judgment, granted Capps' motion for reconsideration and found as a matter of law Weflens had no claim to the one-half mineral interest. The district court entered a final judgment adjudicating fewer than all of the claims of the parties pursuant to N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b), concluding, “Because the ancillary claims in this case depend upon final resolution of the dormant minerals dispute, the Court agrees there is no just reason to delay entry of judgment on the main claim.”

[¶ 5] The following claims remain unadjudicated before the district court: (1) Capps' claim against Hassans and Hassans' counterclaim against Capps disputing ownership of the one-half mineral interest reserved by Nelson, (2) Capps' claim against Whiting Oil and Gas Corp. and Whiting's counterclaim and crossclaim against Capps, Windsor Bakken, LLC and Gulfport Energy Co. disputing ownership of a 25 percent interest in a leasehold interest in the mineral rights of the land, (3) EOG's counterclaim against Capps asserting a leasehold interest in the mineral rights of the land and (4) Windsor's counterclaim disputing a leasehold interest in the mineral rights of the land.

II

[¶ 6] Before reaching the merits of Weflens' appeal, we consider whether the district court appropriately directed entry of a final judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) without first deciding the ancillary claims. “We ‘will not consider an appeal in a multi-claim or multi-party case which disposes of fewer than all claims against all parties unless the trial court has first independently assessed the case and determined that a Rule 54(b) certification is appropriate.’ ” Pifer v. McDermott, 2012 ND 90, ¶ 9, 816 N.W.2d 88 (quotation omitted). However, “[e]ven if the trial court does make the requisite determination under Rule 54(b), we are not bound by the court's finding that ‘no just reason for delay exists.’ ” Pifer, at ¶ 9 (quotation omitted). “We will sua sponte review the court's certification to determine if the court has abused its discretion.” Id. (quotation omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion if it acts in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner, if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned decision, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Id. (quotation omitted).

[¶ 7] According to Rule 54(b),

“If an action presents more than one claim for relief, whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, or if multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.”

N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b). “Rule 54(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., preserves our long-standing policy against piecemeal appeals.” Pifer, 2012 ND 90, ¶ 8, 816 N.W.2d 88 (quotation omitted). “Upon requesting Rule 54(b) certification, the burden is upon the proponent to establish prejudice or hardship which will result if certification is denied.” Pifer, at ¶ 8 (quotation omitted). The district court must “weigh the competing equities involved and take into account judicial administrative interests in making its determination whether or not to certify under the Rule.” Id. (quotation omitted). “A N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification ‘should not be routinely granted and is reserved for cases involving unusual circumstances where failure to allow an immediate appeal would create a demonstrated prejudice or hardship.’ ” Pifer, at ¶ 8 (quotation omitted). Upon review, we determine “whether the case presents an ‘infrequent harsh case’ warranting the extraordinary remedy of an otherwise interlocutory appeal.” Id. (quotation omitted).

[¶ 8] The district court's discretion is measured against the interest of sound judicial administration. Pifer, 2012 ND 90, ¶ 10, 816 N.W.2d 88. The district court should consider the following nonexclusive list of factors articulated by this Court when assessing a request for Rule 54(b) certification:

“(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in setoff against the judgment sought to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like.”

Pifer, at ¶ 10 (quoting Union State Bank v. Woell, 357 N.W.2d 234, 238 (N.D.1984) (quoting Allis–Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir.1975))).

[¶ 9] All of the parties in this case argue the district court properly granted Rule 54(b) certification and they agree the ownership of the disputed mineral interest must be resolved before various ancillary claims can be resolved. The parties generally rely on the district court's own reasoning. However, as in Pifer, our review of the district court's decision to...