Capra v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review
| Decision Date | 30 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11-cv-4028 |
| Parties | LOUIS CAPRA, Plaintiff, v. COOK COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, LARRY ROGERS, JR., JOSEPH BERRIOS, BRENDAN F. HOULIHAN, SCOTT M. GUETZOW, JOHN P. SULLIVAN, THOMAS A. JACONETTY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Louis Capra has filed suit against the Cook Country Board of Review (the "Board"), three commissioners of the Board, ("Rodgers", "Berrios" and "Houlihan"), the Chief Deputy Commissioner of the Board ("Guetzow") and two first assistant commissioner employees of the Board ("Sullivan" and "Jaconetty"), collectively, the "Board defendants" and together with the Board, the "Defendants"). The purpose of the Board is to hear appeals of property tax valuations made by the Cook County Assessor. Plaintiff claims that the Board defendants revoked his property tax reduction without providing him due process and in violation of a number of constitutional provisions.
Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. The Court
Plaintiff is a resident and owner of real property in Cook County, IL. Compl. ¶ 6. The Board is a government office of Cook County that considers appeals of real estate valuations made by the Cook County Assessor for property tax purposes. Id. ¶ 11. In 2007, plaintiff appeared before the Board to appeal an advised assessment that had been made on his property. Id. ¶ 17. In response, the Board lowered the property's valuation such that plaintiff would save over $45,000 per year. Id.
In 2009, the news media ran reports that Representative Paul Froehlich, a member of the Illinois General Assembly, held "undue influence" at the Board. Id. ¶ 18. Specifically, the reports suggested that in exchange for campaign contributions, Representative Froehlich would promise constituents a reduction in their property taxes.
Plaintiff alleges that in response to the media reports and for "the appearance of clean hands", the Board required plaintiff to appear in June 2009 to ostensibly discuss his 2007 property assessment. Id. ¶ 20, 26. Instead of discussing the valuation assessment of plaintiff's property, the Board focused the hearing on plaintiff's relationship with Representative Froehlich. Id. ¶ 26. Following the hearing, although plaintiff testified that he did not know Representative Froehlich nor had he engaged in any illegal or improper behavior with him, the Board defendants "arbitrarily rescinded [plaintiff's] reduction in property taxes that it itself granted close to one year prior . . . . simply stating, 'we can do anything we want.'" Id. ¶ 21, 32. Plaintiff contends that his new property assessment did not accurately reflect the property's actual value, as evidenced by the fact that one year prior the Board found that the property was worth significantly less. Id. ¶ 37. Additionally, plaintiff asserts that Chief Deputy Commissioner Guetzow explained thatthe plaintiff's revocation occurred based upon a "larger issue between the relationship between the people involved." Id. ¶ 33. Plaintiff has interpreted this statement to mean that his property tax reduction was revoked based upon the Board's mistaken belief that he had a suspicious relationship with Representative Froehlich. Id. ¶ 35, 36.
In response to the revocation, plaintiff appealed the Board's decision with the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board ("PTAB"). Id. However, the PTAB has not yet rendered a decision regarding plaintiff's property valuation and plaintiff contends that the PTAB will not do so for an "unconscionably long time, if ever" because the Board has already "red-flagged plaintiff's case with the PTAB." Plaintiff further contends that the PTAB may take as long as seven or eight years to resolve this issue and it may take another two to four years for plaintiff to recoup the money he has lost as a result of the inaccurate increase of his property taxes. Id. ¶ 46. Lastly, plaintiff further alleges that the Board defendants are "powerful members of the Cook County Democratic Party and exert political influence over the State judiciary." Id. ¶ 47. Therefore, the plaintiff "cannot expect justice in this matter in Circuit Court because there are inherent conflicts of interests between many members of the State judiciary and at least two [d]efendants." Id. As a result, plaintiff contends that he has "no plain, adequate and complete state remedy in this matter." Id. ¶ 55.
Consequently, plaintiff brings forth claims in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Board and the Board defendants in their individual capacities for violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment (Counts 1 and 2) and violation of the First Amendment (Count III). Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims.
Initially, plaintiff has acknowledged that he has no viable Fifth Amendment Due Process claim and that he has not sufficiently pled a First Amendment claim. He has also clarified that he is not seeking punitive damages from the Board. Therefore, plaintiff's § 1983 claims based upon the First and Fifth Amendments are dismissed.
The defendants have moved to dismiss all the remaining claims against the individual Board defendants on the grounds that the individual board members qualify for absolute and/or qualified immunity. They also contend that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of his equal protection or due process rights. Lastly, because defendants believe that plaintiff has failed to state any claims against the individual Board defendants, defendants argue that all claims against the Board should be dismissed as well. When considering a motion to dismiss, well-pleaded facts in the complaint are accepted as true and any ambiguities are resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Court will address each of the defendants' arguments in turn.
Defendants contend that all claims against the individual Board defendants should be barred by absolute immunity. Absolute immunity is a defense that immunizes certain individuals from lawsuits "to free the judicial process from [. . .] harassment and intimidation" associated with litigation. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 479 (1991) (emphasis in the original). When determining whether an official is entitled to absolute immunity, courts apply a functional approach. Heyde v. Pittenger, 633 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2010). In other words, courts look to the nature of the function performed by anofficial and not just their title or identity to determine whether the official is entitled to absolute immunity protection. Id. Consequently, absolute immunity is not limited to judges or prosecutors, but has been granted to protect members of quasi-judicial adjudicatory bodies who function similarly to traditional judges, but fall outside of the judicial branch. Id.
For example, in Heyde, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim against members of the Tazewell County Board of Review in their individual capacities in connection with the Tazewell County Board's decision to increase the plaintiff's property tax assessment. Id., at 514. The individual Tazewell County Board defendants moved to dismiss all claims against them by arguing that they were entitled to absolute immunity. Id. The district court granted defendants' motion and the Seventh Circuit affirmed reasoning that because the plaintiff received notice and a hearing before the Tazewell Board to contest his assessment as well as opportunity to appeal the Tazewell Board's decision, the Tazewell Board functioned in a quasi-judicial manner. Therefore, the board members were entitled to absolute immunity.
Here, the Board defendants are entitled to the same immunity. As in Heyde, the plaintiff here has brought claims against certain individual members and employees of the Board for setting his property assessment at a disproportionately high level. Plaintiff received notice of his advised assessment, appeared before the Board to petition his property valuation and has appealed the Board's decision. Thus, similar to the Tazewell Board in Heyde, the Board functions as a quasi-judicial adjudicatory body which makes absolute immunity an available defense for the individual Board defendants. Accordingly, all claims against the Board defendants in their individual capacities aredismissed. Having found that the Board defendants are entitled to absolute immunity, the Court need not decide whether the defendants should also receive qualified immunity from plaintiff's § 1983 claims.
The defendants also contend that plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim for violation of his equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "[a] plaintiff must allege that a government official, acting under color of state law, deprived [him] of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. County of Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2007). Conversely, dismissal of the complaint is proper if the plaintiff fails to set forth enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "no State shall deny to any persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend XIV, § 1. Traditionally, the Equal Protection Clause is understood to protect members of vulnerable groups from unequal treatment committed by the state. Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2004). The clause also prohibits state action in a so called "class of one." To state an equal...
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