Caprice v. Gomez

• Decision Date: 06 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. C7-96-706,C7-96-706
• Citation: 552 N.W.2d 753
• Parties: Julian A. CAPRICE, f/k/a Wilbert E. Buckhalton, Appellant, v. Maria GOMEZ, Commissioner of Human Services, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 753

552 N.W.2d 753

Julian A. CAPRICE, f/k/a Wilbert E. Buckhalton, Appellant, v. Maria GOMEZ, Commissioner of Human Services, Respondent.

No. C7-96-706.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Aug. 6, 1996.

Review Denied Oct. 29, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Requiring the committed person in a discharge proceeding under Minn.Stat.

§ 253B.19, subd. 2 (1994) to bear the initial burden of going forward with the evidence is not unconstitutional, where the state has the ultimate burden of persuasion to show commitment should be continued.

2. The phrase "burden of going forward with the evidence" is not unconstitutionally vague.

3. The discharge procedures for one committed as a psychopathic personality comport with substantive due process.

4. The discharge procedures also do not violate equal protection.

5. The psychopathic personality commitment statute is civil and does not constitute double jeopardy.

6. The 1994 session law amending Minn.Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2 (1992), did not violate the constitutional prohibition that no law shall embrace more than one subject.

Stephen D. Radtke, Bloomington, for appellant.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Paul M. Landskroener, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent Com'r of Human Services.

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Atty., Gayle C. Hendley, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent Hennepin County.

Considered and decided by HUSPENI, P.J., TOUSSAINT, C.J., and FOLEY, J.

OPINION

FOLEY, Judge. ^*

Julian A. Caprice was committed for an indeterminate period as a psychopathic personality. He petitioned for discharge, and the Commissioner of Human Services denied his petition. Caprice petitioned the judicial appeal panel for rehearing and reconsideration. The judicial appeal panel affirmed the decision of the Commissioner denying the petition. Caprice appeals, and we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Julian Caprice ¹ has a lengthy history of violent sexual misconduct. In February 1979, after helping a woman remove her automobile from a snowbank, he raped her at gunpoint. He was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. After being paroled in June 1984, he raped his former girlfriend in December 1984. Several weeks later, he assaulted, raped, and threatened to kill the mother of the December 1984 victim because he was angry that she was encouraging her daughter to press charges. He pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct.

During Caprice's terms of imprisonment, he accumulated a long record of disciplinary violations. He has eloped from community placements and failed to complete sex offender treatment programs. Caprice was initially committed as a psychopathic personality, and his commitment was then made indeterminate. Both commitments were affirmed on appeal. In re Buckhalton, 503 N.W.2d 148 (Minn.App.1993) (initial commitment), aff'd, 518 N.W.2d 531 (Minn.1994); In re Buckhalton, No. C2-93-2428, 1994 WL 43870 (Minn.App. Feb.15, 1994) (indeterminate commitment), review denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 148, 130 L.Ed.2d 88 (1994).

Caprice sought discharge through a petition to the Commissioner of Human Services. After the special review board recommended against the petition, the Commissioner issued an order denying Caprice's request. Caprice then petitioned for rehearing and reconsideration before the judicial appeal panel.

At the hearing before the appeal panel, Dr. John Austin, a licensed psychologist who was the court-appointed examiner, testified Caprice met the factors for discharge. Caprice also testified as to his belief that he should be discharged. At the conclusion of Caprice's case, the Commissioner and Hennepin County moved to dismiss the petition, arguing Caprice failed to make a prima facie case that he met the statutory discharge criteria. The appeal panel denied the motions.

Douglas Fox, a licensed psychologist and board-certified forensics examiner who conducted an independent psychological evaluation of Caprice, testified he did not meet the discharge standards. Thomas Gratzer, M.D., senior forensic psychiatrist at the Minnesota Security Hospital, concurred with the opinion.

Testimony was also received regarding Caprice's recent inappropriate sexual behavior, in which he exposed himself to female staff and masturbated in public. Caprice's former wife testified that from June to September 1995 (during the pendency of the discharge proceedings), Caprice forced her by threats to have sometimes violent sex with other men while he listened on the telephone.

The appeal panel rejected Caprice's constitutional challenges and affirmed the order of the Commissioner of Human Services denying Caprice's petition for discharge.

Caprice appeals.

ISSUES

1. Is it unconstitutional to require a person committed as a psychopathic personality to bear the burden of going forward with the evidence in a discharge hearing pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2 (1994), even though the state bears the ultimate burden of persuasion?

2. Is the requirement that the petitioning party bear the burden of going forward with the evidence void for vagueness?

3. Do the discharge criteria applicable to one committed as a psychopathic personality violate substantive due process?

4. Do these discharge criteria violate equal protection?

5. Is the psychopathic personality statute criminal in nature and does it violate constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy?

6. Did the session law in which the legislature amended Minn.Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2 (1992), to add the burden of proof provisions violate the single subject rule?

ANALYSIS

1. Caprice raises constitutional challenges to the discharge proceedings. The appeal panel determined that Caprice bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutes he challenged were unconstitutional.

In In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, 316-17 (Minn.App.1996), review granted (Minn. Mar. 19, 1996), this court addressed the issue:

Individuals who challenge a statute's constitutionality usually bear the heavy burden of proving their claim beyond a reasonable doubt. However, if the statute infringes on a fundamental right, the burden shifts to the state to prove the law is necessary to a compelling interest. * * *

* * * * * *

[While the trial court erroneously charged Linehan with proving the statute's unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt], [t]his error does not require us to reverse and remand for further consideration, provided a proper application of the law would have produced an identical result. Accordingly, we must independently evaluate whether the state has proven the law's constitutionality by demonstrating its narrow tailoring to a compelling interest.

(Citations omitted.)

Caprice contends that the portion of Minn.Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2 (1994), which places the initial burden of going forward with the evidence on the patient seeking discharge, is unconstitutional. ²

A person who seeks discharge from commitment as a psychopathic personality must follow the procedures applicable to one committed as mentally ill and dangerous. Minn.Stat. § 253B.185, subd. 1 (1994) (unless otherwise specified, provisions relating to commitment as mentally ill and dangerous apply to commitment as a psychopathic personality); Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn.1995) (discharge criteria in Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 15 (1994) apply to psychopathic personality commitment).

First, the committed person must petition for discharge of the commitment. Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 5 (1994). If, after a hearing and recommendation by the special review board, the Commissioner of Human Services denies the petition for discharge, the patient then may petition a judicial appeal panel for rehearing and reconsideration of the Commissioner's decision. Minn.Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2 (1994). The panel must address whether

the patient is capable of making an acceptable adjustment to open society, is no longer dangerous to the public, and is no longer in need of inpatient treatment and supervision.

Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 15 (1994); Call, 535 N.W.2d at 319.

Before the 1994 amendment, section 253B.19, subdivision 2, was silent as to the burden of proof. This court held the burden was on the petitioner seeking discharge to prove entitlement to discharge. Drewes v. Levine, 352 N.W.2d 456, 457-58 (Minn.App.1984) (construing Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 15 (1982) and holding it applicable to Minn.Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2 (1982)). Later, the supreme court, after upholding the constitutionality of the psychopathic personality law against substantive due process and equal protection challenges, addressed the issue:

Although this is not a proceeding where a committed person is seeking discharge from commitment, we believe, in such a case, that the burden of proof should be on the state to show by clear and convincing evidence that commitment should continue.

In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 146, 130 L.Ed.2d 86 (1994); see In re Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 312-13 (Minn.1986) (holding that at hearing on judicial review under Minn.Stat. § 253B.17 (1984) of indeterminate commitment as mentally retarded, burden of proof is on state to avoid serious due process concerns).

The Blodgett opinion was issued on January 14, 1994. 510 N.W.2d at 910. On May 10, 1994, the following amendment to Minn.Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2, was enacted, adding the language at issue here:

The petitioning party bears the burden of going forward with the evidence. The party opposing discharge bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is in need of commitment.

1994 Minn. Laws ch. 636, art. 8, § 2 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2 (1994)).

Caprice contends that under Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 917, the burden of proof should be on the state. He argues that requiring the committed person to bear the...