Capriglione v. Radisson Hotels Int'l, Inc., Civil No. 10-2845 (AET)
| Decision Date | 05 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 10-2845 (AET) |
| Parties | Diane M. CAPRIGLIONE, and Scott J. CAPRIGLIONE Plaintiffs, v. RADISSON HOTELS INTERATIONAL, INC. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Radisson Hotels International, Inc.'s (RHI) Motion for Summary Judgment [docket # 19]. Plaintiffs Diane Capriglione and Scott Caprilglione oppose the motion [21]. The Court has decided the motion upon the submissions of the parties and without oral argument, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is granted.
This case arises out of injuries sustained by Plaintiff Diane Capriglione, who while staying at the Radisson Hotel in Racine, Wisconsin, (Hotel) on June 3, 2007, fell and fractured her left hand allegedly as a result of the disrepair/hazardous condition of the sidewalk and roadway abutting the entrance of the hotel. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 7). [7].
On June 3, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint [1] alleging that Plaintiff Diane Capriglione's injury was caused by negligence on the part of Graves Hospitality Corporation, thecompany that owned the Radisson Hotel Racine Harbourwalk, the Hotel itself, and John Doe. Additionally, Plaintiff Scott Capriglione asserted claims for loss of consortium as a result of the injury to his wife. Graves Hospitality Corporation and the Hotel filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on September 26, 2010 [5]. Plaintiffs subsequently amended the complaint on October 18, 2010, joining RHI as a defendant. .
On January 10, 2011, this Court dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint against Graves Hospitality Corporation and Harbourwalk Hotel Limited Partnership d/b/a Radisson Hotel Racine Harbourwalk for lack of jurisdiction. [15].
Defendant RHI now moves for Summary Judgment as to the claims asserted against it. [19].
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a district court considers the facts drawn from "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials, and any affidavits" and must "view the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the Court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 251— 52 (1986). More precisely, summary judgment should be granted if the evidence available wouldnot support a jury verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 248—49. The Court must grant summary judgment against any party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Properly applied, Rule 56 will "isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses" before those issues come to trial. Id. at 323—24.
The Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1). Accordingly, while we follow federal procedural rules, we apply the substantive law of the state in which this Court sits. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The crux of the present dispute is whether Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs under multiple theories of negligence. Because negligence sounds in common law tort doctrine, we apply New Jersey substantive law. See Marino v. Industrial Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 243 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004).
To prove negligence under New Jersey common law, a plaintiff must establish: "(1) a duty of care owed to plaintiff by defendant, (2) a breach of that duty by defendant, (3) proximate cause, and (4) actual damages." Meier v. D'Ambose, 17 A.3d 271, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (citing Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Cred. Union, 972 A.2d 1112, 1123 (N.J. 2009).
The "prerequisite to recovery on a negligence theory is a duty owed by defendant to plaintiff." Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 538 A.2d 346, 349 (N.J. 1988). Whether a duty of care exists is a question of law for the court to analyze in light of "the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution." See id. at 526; Jerkins ex rel. Jerkins v. Anderson, 922 A.2d 1279, 1284 (N.J. 2007).
In New Jersey, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant breached theduty of care owed to them. See Jarrah v. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, 487 F.Supp.2d 522, 525 (D.N.J.2007).
In the instant action, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiffs by virtue of its License Agreement with Radisson Racine Hotel in which Defendant incurred certain responsibilities in regard to planning, design inspections, safety and quality standards in the operation of the hotel. (Pls. Opp. Br., at 6). In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue, Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiffs under "vicarious liability, and or agency theory, agency by estoppel, employer-employee, apparent authority theories." Id. Plaintiffs have failed to show adequate facts to prove that RHI owes a duty of care to Plaintiffs under any of these theories.
Generally, a proprietor of premises to which the public is invited for a business purpose owes a duty of reasonable care to those who enter the premises upon that invitation. Abraham v. Raso, 997 F.Supp. 611, 613 (D.N.J.1998) (internal citations omitted). However, Plaintiffs seek to establish that RHI was directly negligent in this action, despite evidence that RHI as a franchisor does not own or operate the hotel where Plaintiff Diane Capriglione's injury occurred.
According to Plaintiff, there are disputed issues of fact as to whether RHI controlled, or had the right to control, the hotel premises because (1) the License Agreement stated that the RHI had the ability to come in to the hotel and exercise its right to examine and inspect the hotel and (2) an affidavit by Raj Rana, Vice President of RHI, notes that RHI did enter the premises and conduct the inspections periodically. (Pls. Opp. Br., at 16—17). Plaintiffs contend that given these inspections "there is a triable material fact at issue as [sic] whether or not Radisson Hotels International (RHI) and or a reasonable person using ordinary care would have or did notice thedefects of lighting, the dangerous incline and or the pothole at the entrance to the hotel." (Pls. Opp. Br., at 18).
However, there is no genuine dispute that RHI lacked both ownership interest in and control over the day-to-day operations of the Hotel. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that RHI had the power to control the daily maintenance of the Hotel. Despite Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, the right to conduct periodic inspections to ensure consistency and quality of the Radisson brand does not give rise to the power to control the daily maintenance of the premises. Courts that have addressed the issue of duty require franchisors to exercise more than a right to control uniformity of appearance, products and administration in order to find a duty of care. See, e.g., Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d. 328, 338 (Wis. 2004); Hoffnagle v. McDonald's Corp., 522 N.W.2d 808, 814 (Iowa 1994); Helmchen v. White Hen Pantry, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 180, 181 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
Indeed, Plaintiffs have failed to cite a single case that supports the proposition that a franchisor has a duty to the guest of a hotel of which it does not directly own or exercise control. Nor has this Court found any such case. Instead Plaintiffs question whether RHI should properly be considered a franchisor, noting that the License Agreement does not make any mention of the word franchise, franchisor nor franchisee. (Pls. Opp. Br., at 5—6; 22—23). Under New Jersey law, however, any determination as to the existence or non-existence of a franchise relationship requires a factual evaluation of the legal rights and obligations between the parties. See N.J.S.A. 56:10-3(a) ().The terms of the License Agreement between RHI and Harbourwalk Hotel Limited Partnership clearly provide for a franchise relationship, permitting the use of the "Radisson" mark, while leaving all matters relating to the management and operation to the licensee Hotel. (Def.'s Mot. For Summ. J., Ex. F, §7). Plaintiffs were permitted ample time in discovery to explore the relationship between RHI and Harbourwalk Hotel Limited Partnership, but presented no evidence of agreements or specific terms of the relationship between the entities that would suggest an alternate definition of this relationship would be appropriate.
Nor have Plaintiffs established that Defendant...
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