Caprood v. Atlanta Casualty Co.
Decision Date | 02 December 2003 |
Docket Number | (AC 23572) |
Citation | 80 Conn. App. 338,835 A.2d 74 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | HOPE M. CAPROOD v. ATLANTA CASUALTY COMPANY |
West, DiPentima and Peters, Js.
Thomas C. Simones, for the appellant (plaintiff). Mark J. Sheehan, with whom, on the brief, was F. Thomas Pachler, for the appellee (defendant).
This case concerns the quantum of proof that an injured insured person must present to a jury to recover damages under an automobile insurance policy covering hit and run drivers. A jury found that the injured insured had proven that her injuries resulted from the negligence of a hit-and-run driver. The trial court, however, granted the motion of the insurer to set aside the verdict in favor of the injured person and rendered judgment in favor of the insurer. The injured person has appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiff, Hope M. Caprood, filed a complaint seeking damages from the defendant, Atlanta Casualty Company, under an insurance policy that provided coverage for accidents caused by hit-and-run drivers. She alleged that she and others had been injured in such an accident that occurred on November 5, 2000, in Norwich. The defendant did not dispute that the plaintiff was an insured under the policy. Similarly, the defendant did not dispute that the plaintiff's vehicle had been struck by a hit-and-run driver. The defendant denied that the plaintiff had been injured as a result of the negligent conduct of the hit-and-run driver. The defendant also filed three special defenses.1
On October 8, 2002, a jury returned a verdict awarding the plaintiff damages of $11,239.01 with a 16 percent reduction for her comparative negligence. On the defendant's motion, the trial court set this verdict aside because, in its view, the plaintiff had presented no evidence as to what had caused the operator of the hit and run vehicle to collide with the plaintiff's vehicle. Accordingly, it rendered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict.
In the plaintiff's appeal from this adverse judgment, she argues that, for three reasons, the trial court improperly set aside the jury verdict in her favor. She claims that the court (1) undervalued the evidence of negligence that she presented at trial, (2) improperly instructed the jury and (3) deprived her of her constitutional right to trial by jury. Because we are persuaded by the plaintiff's first claim, we need not consider the other two.
We review the action of a trial court's granting of a motion to set aside a jury verdict to determine whether the court abused its discretion or reached a result that is manifestly unjust. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carusillo v. Associated Women's Health Specialists, P.C., 79 Conn. App. 649, 653, 831 A.2d 255 (2003).
It is undisputable that the verdict was proper only if the jury had sufficient evidence to find that the hit-and-run driver had been negligent. The trial court, in its memorandum of decision, outlined the facts that it found to have been established, as well as the shortcomings that it found in the plaintiff's evidentiary showing. The court's bottom line was that the plaintiff had
In this recital of the evidence, the court impliedly accepted the proposition that the jury reasonably could have credited all the evidence about the collision that the plaintiff had presented at trial. It did not express any doubt about the credibility of the plaintiff, who was the only person to testify on that subject.2 The defendant offered no contrary evidence. What the court found lacking was direct evidence of causation.
The question remains, however, whether the plaintiff presented sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that the hit-and-run driver negligently caused the collision that injured her and damaged her car. A jury often must "rely on circumstantial evidence and draw inferences from it." Blados v. Blados, 151 Conn. 391, 395, 198 A.2d 213 (1964). The drawing of inferences is "peculiarly a jury function, the raison d'etre of the jury system." Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 256, 129 A.2d 606, appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15, 78 S. Ct. 36, 2 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1957).
We must therefore examine in detail what facts the jury reasonably could have inferred on the issue of causation. The court had instructed the jury that it could find for the plaintiff if she established either that the hit-and-run driver failed to keep a proper lookout or failed to keep proper control of his vehicle.3
The jury reasonably could have inferred causation from the evidence describing the intersection at which the collision occurred. As the plaintiff testified, the intersection was well lit and unobstructed. A photograph that was an exhibit at trial depicted the intersection. The jury reasonably could have inferred that a driver keeping a proper lookout would have seen the plaintiff's vehicle, which was three-quarters of the way through the intersection. Contrary to the cases on which the defendant relies, and which the court cited, this is not a case in which "[t]here were so many possibilities as to the cause of the accident other than negligence in the operation of the car that a finding of negligence. . . could result in a verdict for the plaintiff based only on surmise, speculation and conjecture." Chasse v. Albert, 147 Conn. 680, 683, 166 A.2d 148 (1960).
The jury reasonably also could have taken note of the force of the impact, which pushed the plaintiff's vehicle a considerable distance and caused severe damage to its midsection. Another photograph at trial depicted the substantial damage that the passenger's side of the plaintiff's car had sustained as a result of the collision. The jury reasonably could have inferred that the nature of the damage caused by the hit-and-run vehicle demonstrated a failure of the hit-and-run driver to keep control of his car, perhaps because of excessive speed or inattention.
The trial court did not discuss these possible inferences. In its consideration of the evidence on causation, however, the court did refer, in some detail, not only to the testimony that the plaintiff did present, but also to the evidence that the plaintiff did not present.
The trial court, in its memorandum of decision, and the defendant in its appellate brief to this court, placed some emphasis on five witnesses whom the plaintiff did not call to testify. These were the three passengers in the plaintiff's car and the two people who were identified in the police report as having been at the scene of the collision. The defendant did not, however, present any evidence that these witnesses...
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