Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence

Decision Date29 May 2012
Docket NumberNo. 38300.,38300.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
Parties CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Douglas P. LAWRENCE and Brenda J. Lawrence, husband and wife, Defendants–Appellants.

Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, Coeur d'Alene, appellants pro se.

James, Vernon & Weeks, Coeur d'Alene, for respondents. Susan P. Weeks argued.

W. JONES, Justice.

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal involves a dispute over whether Capstar Radio Operating Company, ("Capstar"), holds an easement over the property of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence. Capstar filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging in the alternative, that an easement existed based on the theory of either an easement by implication, an easement by necessity, or a prescriptive easement. The district court filed its Order granting summary judgment, finding that Capstar holds an easement implied by prior use, an easement by prescription, and an easement by necessity. The Lawrences appealed to this Court, arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist. The Lawrences also argue that the district court abused its discretion by failing to recuse itself for alleged bias, and that the lower court erred in determining that the Lawrences' defenses of latches and statute of limitations were meritless.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Appellants, Douglas and Brenda Lawrence, and the Respondent, Capstar, own parcels of property on Blossom Mountain, which is located south of Post Falls, Idaho. The Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and the Capstar parcel is located just to the east of the Lawrence parcel in the southwest quarter of Section 22. Section 21 lies directly west of Section 22. At one time, both the Lawrence parcel and the Capstar parcel were part of a larger tract of land owned in unity by Harold and Marlene Funk, referred to herein as the "Funk parcel." The Funks purchased the Funk parcel in 1969 which consisted of parts of land in Section 15, Section 21, and Section 22.

In 1966, the General Telephone Company, (the "GTC"), obtained an easement to access its acre of land in Section 22 (not the Capstar parcel) over a private road owned by Wilber Mead that crossed the southwest quarter of Section 21 (Mead's property), then moved south and entered the north half of Section 281 where it then turned northeast and entered the southeast quarter of Section 21 (over the Lawrence parcel) and into the southwest quarter of Section 22 (near the Capstar parcel). Mead included a condition that the GTC was to erect and maintain a locked gate on the property. Harold Funk testified that when he and his wife purchased the Funk parcel, the private easement road that was used by the GTC to access its parcel, was the exclusive means of accessing the Funks' property in the southeast quarter of Section 21 and in the southwest quarter of Section 22. In 1972, Mead granted the Funks an easement over the private road which crossed Mead's property in the southwest quarter of Section 21. There is a dispute about whether Funk used the access road prior to Mead granting the easement. Funk testified that, prior to Mead granting the easement, Mead allowed Funk to drive across his property, but Funk wanted to purchase the easement so that any successors in interest would have the same easement access. However, in his affidavit, Mead testified that " [f]rom the gate's construction until the time I granted Harold Funk an easement in 1972, the [GTC] had the only other key to this gate. To my knowledge, Harold Funk did not use this gate to access his property."

In 1975, the Funks broke off the Lawrence parcel and sold it to Human Synergistics, Inc., but retained their land in Section 22. The sales agreement to Human Synergistics stated that the "Section 21 parcel was being sold subject to an ingress/egress easement over the existing road on the property that was being sold to Human Synergistics." The contract was a title retaining contract in which the grant of the Lawrence parcel, and any easement over it, was contingent upon the fulfillment of the sales contract. Human Synergistics paid off the contract in 1992 and the Funks issued a warranty deed conveying title to Human Synergistics on October 29, 1992. Funk testified that after the sale, he and his wife continued to use the private easement road in Section 21 to access their property in Section 22. In 1989, the Funks broke off the Capstar parcel and sold part of their Section 22 property to Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. John Rook, the owner of Kootenai Broadcasting, testified that at the time of the purchase, the private easement road crossing over Section 21 was the only access to its property in Section 22, now the Capstar parcel.

The respective parcels passed through several other hands before either the Lawrences or Capstar purchased them. The chain of title established for the Lawrence parcel is as follows: Funks to Human Synergistics; Human Synergistics to Johnston & McHugh; Johnston & McHugh to N.A.P.; N.A.P. to Farmanian; Farmanian to the Lawrences. The Lawrences purchased their property in 1996. The chain of title established for the Capstar parcel is as follows: Funks to Kootenai Broadcasting; Kootenai Broadcasting to Rook Broadcasting; Rook Broadcasting to AGM; AGM to Capstar. Capstar purchased its parcel in 2000.

From a public road, known as Signal Point Road, Capstar seeks an easement to access its property over an unimproved private road known as Blossom Mountain Road. Signal Point Road lies to the west of the Lawrence parcel. Blossom Mountain Road crosses through the Lawrence parcel before passing near the Capstar parcel. In 2002, the Lawrences questioned Capstar's right to access its property over the portion of Blossom Mountain Road that traversed the Lawrences' property. On November 7, 2002, Capstar filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to have an easement declared based on the following four alternative theories: 1) express easement, 2) easement by implication, 3) easement by necessity, and 4) prescriptive easement. Capstar moved for summary judgment on the four theories and the district court found that Capstar held an express easement over the Lawrence parcel based upon an earlier contract between two other parties. The lower court did not address Capstar's other easement theories. The Lawrences appealed, and this Court vacated the district court's decision, finding that no express easement over the Lawrences' property was retained by Capstar's predecessor in interest, and remanded the case back to the district court. Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 708, 152 P.3d 575, 579 (2007).

On remand, Capstar renewed its Motion for Summary Judgment on the remaining theories of easement by implication from prior use, an easement by necessity, and a prescriptive easement. The Lawrences subsequently filed a motion to disqualify District Judge Mitchell for cause. The district judge heard evidence and issued a written decision declining to disqualify himself. On February 6, 2008, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that an easement by implication, or in the alternative, that an easement by necessity, or a prescriptive easement existed over the Lawrences' property. The district court also rejected the Lawrences' defense of laches and statute of limitations as meritless. The Lawrences again appealed, but this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because there was no separate final judgment entered. Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 149 Idaho 623, 625–26, 238 P.3d 223, 225–26 (2010). The Lawrences then moved the lower court to enter a final judgment, and the district court issued a separate Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Declaring Easement Rights. On November 10, 2010, the Lawrences properly filed their Notice of Appeal to this Court. The district court entered final judgment on September 15, 2011.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the district court erred in granting Capstar's Motion for Summary Judgment?
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to disqualify itself for cause?
3. Whether the district court erred in determining that the Lawrences' defenses of laches and statute of limitations were meritless?
4. Whether the Lawrences are entitled to attorney's fees on appeal?
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The facts must be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. Renzo v. Idaho State Dep't of Agric., 149 Idaho 777, 779, 241 P.3d 950, 952 (2010).

When an action will be tried before a court without a jury, the court may, in ruling on the motions for summary judgment, draw probable inferences arising from the undisputed evidentiary facts. Drawing probable inferences under such circumstances is permissible because the court, as the trier of fact, would be responsible for resolving conflicting inferences at trial. However, if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented, then summary judgment is improper.

Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 222, 220 P.3d 575, 578 (2009) (internal citations omitted).

V. ANALYSIS
A. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary...

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3 cases
  • MacHado v. Ryan
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 29 Junio 2012
    ...to portions of one's property that are not otherwise readily accessible. In Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, ––– Idaho ––––, 283 P.3d 728, 2012 WL 1918406 (2012)( Capstar III ), we stated: “The requirements of necessity do not require that there be access to all portions of a parcel......
  • Machado v. Quarter of the Se. Quarter of the Se. Quarter of Section 19, Twp. 45 N.
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 29 Junio 2012
    ...to gain access to portions of one's property that are not otherwise readily accessible. In Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, ––– Idaho ––––, 283 P.3d 728, 2012 WL 1918406 (2012) (Capstar III ), we stated: "The requirements of necessity do not require that there be access to all porti......
  • Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 38300.
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 8 Agosto 2012
    ...153 Idaho 411283 P.3d 728CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff–Respondent,v.Douglas P. LAWRENCE and Brenda J. Lawrence, husband and wife, Defendants–Appellants.No. 38300.Supreme Court of Idaho.Coeur d'Alene, April 2012 Term.May 29, 2012.Rehearing Denied Aug. 8, ......

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