Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. Capstone Building Corp. (Ex parte Capstone Building Corp.)
Court | Supreme Court of Alabama |
Citation | 96 So.3d 77 |
Docket Number | 1090966. |
Parties | Ex parte CAPSTONE BUILDING CORPORATION. (In re William Walker v. Capstone Building Corporation). |
Decision Date | 16 March 2012 |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Stanley A. Cash and Joseph R. Duncan, Jr., of Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioner.
Thomas M. Powell and Derrick A. Mills of Marsh, Rickard & Bryan, P.C., Birmingham, for respondent.
Matthew C. McDonald of Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrère & Denègre, L.L.P., Mobile, for amicus curiae Business Council of Alabama, in support of the petitioner; and Patrick L.W. Sefton of Sasser, Sefton, Tipton & Davis, P.C., for amicus curiae Alabama Defense Lawyers Association, in support of the petitioner.
Leila H. Watson of Cory Watson Crowder & DeGaris, P.C., Birmingham; and David G. Wirtes, Jr., of Cunningham Bounds, L.L.C., Mobile, for amicus curiae Alabama Association for Justice, in support of the respondent.
On Application for Rehearing
This Court's opinion of June 3, 2011, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.
We granted Capstone Building Corporation's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals in Walker v. Capstone Building Corp., 96 So.3d 71 (Ala.Civ.App.2010), in which the Court of Civil Appeals, relying upon this Court's decision in McKenzie v. Killian, 887 So.2d 861 (Ala.2004), applied a six-year statute of limitations to a claim of wantonness. In McKenzie, this Court held that a tort claim based on allegations of wanton misconduct was subject to the six-year statute of limitations found in Ala.Code 1975, § 6–2–34(1), rather than the two-year statute of limitations found in Ala.Code 1975, § 6–2–38( l ). We hereby overrule McKenzie and confirm that claims of wantonness are subject to the two-year statute of limitations found in Ala.Code 1975, § 6–2–38( l ). Consistent with this holding and as further explained below, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
The pertinent facts as stated in Walker are as follows:
“....
“On August 10, 2009, the trial court granted Capstone's motion and entered a summary judgment in its favor.”
Walker appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, arguing that the six-year statute of limitations found in § 6–2–34(1) applied to his claim alleging wantonness: 1
96 So.3d at 72–73 (footnote omitted).
After discussing the decisions in McKenzie and Carr v. International Refining & Manufacturing Co., 13 So.3d 947 (Ala.2009), the Court of Civil Appeals continued:
Capstone petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, arguing that we should overrule McKenzie and reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. The question presented is a pure question of law subject to de novo review by this Court. Simcala, Inc. v. American Coal Trade, Inc., 821 So.2d 197, 200 (Ala.2001).
Specifically, the question presented is whether the six-year limitations period provided in § 6–2–34(1) is applicable to Walker's claim that he was injured as a result of wanton conduct by Capstone. Section 6–2–34(1) provides:
“The following must be commenced within six years:
“(1) Actions for any trespass to person or liberty, such as false imprisonment or assault and battery.”
If Walker's claim does not fall within the six-year limitations period provided in § 6–2–34(1), then, by default, it falls within the two-year period provided by the catchall provision of § 6–2–38( l ), which states:
“All actions for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in this section must be brought within two years.”
In applying the six-year statute of limitations of § 6–2–34(1) to Walker's claim alleging that Capstone acted wantonly, there are only two decisions of this Court upon which the Court of Civil Appeals might have, and did, rely: McKenzie v. Killian, 887 So.2d 861 (Ala.2004), and Carr v. International Refining & Manufacturing Co., 13 So.3d 947 (Ala.2009) (plurality opinion). The main opinion in only one of those decisions, McKenzie, was joined by a majority of the Court so as to constitute a precedential decision of the Court. See, e.g., State ex rel. James v. ACLU of Alabama, 711 So.2d 952, 964 (Ala.1998) (). As indicated, the main opinion in the other case, Carr, was a plurality opinion.
In McKenzie, this Court concluded that 887 So.2d at 870. Although the main opinion in Carr relied upon McKenzie, only four Justices joined the main opinion. Carr, 13 So.3d at 956. Four other Justices concurred in the result; the author of this opinion dissented. Id.
In a special writing concurring in the result in Carr, Justice See offered the view that “application [of McKenzie ] in this case is troubling.” 13 So.3d at 956 (See, J., concurring in the result). Justice See ultimately concluded, however, that he would concur in the result of the main opinion “because we have not been asked to overrule McKenzie.” 13 So.3d at 956–58. In ...
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